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The Curious Imbroglio: Innovation, IPR, India and ‘Uncle Sam’

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Last week, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released the “2015 Special 301 Report”, which is its annual review of the global state of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection and enforcement.

While looking through the Kaleidoscope of business interests of the United States, variegated changing patterns of a wide variety of country-specific observations can be noted in this report.

It is widely believed that the report ‘pontificates’ about the adequacy and effectiveness of IPR protection and enforcement of its trading partners against USTR’s own yardstick, hinting unhesitantly at the possible consequences, if found lacking.

USTR reviewed seventy-two (72) trading partners for this year’s Special 301 Report, and placed thirty-seven (37) of them on the ‘Priority Watch List’ or ‘Watch List’. Thirteen (13) countries – Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Venezuela, are on the ‘Priority Watch List’.  These countries will be the subjects of particularly intense bilateral engagement during the coming year.

India specific significant elements of the 2015 Special 301 Report include the following:

  • Increased bilateral engagement in 2015 between the United States and India on IPR concerns, following the 2014 Out-of-Cycle Review (OCR) of India on this issue.
  • India will remain on the ‘Priority Watch List’ in 2015, but with the full expectation of US about substantive and measurable improvements in India’s IPR regime for the benefit of a broad range of innovative and creative industries.
  • The US offered to work with India to achieve these goals.
  • No OCR at this time for India, but US will monitor progress in India over the coming months, and is prepared to take further action, if necessary.

The 2015 report also highlights:

“While it is impossible to determine an exact figure, studies have suggested that up to 20% of drugs sold in the Indian market are counterfeit and could represent a serious threat to patient health and safety.”

According to media report, a senior Commerce & Industry Ministry official has commented, “India is disappointed at being featured yet again in the US ‘Priority Watch List’ of weak IPR countries. But it is not worried.”

Recent Action by India:

In October 2014, almost immediately after Prime Minister Modi’s return to India from the US, the Government formed a six-member ‘Think Tank’ to draft ‘National IPR Policy’ and suggest ways and legal means to handle undue pressure exerted by other countries in IPR related areas.

The notification mandated the ‘Think Tank’ to examine the current issues raised in such reports and give suggestions to the ministry of Commerce & Industry as appropriate.

However, the domestic pharma industry, many international and national experts together with the local stakeholders, continue to strongly argue against any fundamental changes in the prevailing robust patent regime of India.

In the same month, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) constituted a six-member ‘Think Tank’ chaired by Justice (Retd.) Prabha Sridevan to draft the ‘National IPR Policy’ of India. Taking quick strides, on December 19, 2014, the Think Tank’ released its first draft of 29 pages seeking stakeholders’ comments and suggestions on or before January 30, 2015. A meeting with the stakeholders was also scheduled on February 5, 2015 to take it forward.

Possible reasons of US concern on the draft ‘National IPR Policy’:

As I discussed in my blog post of January 19, 2015 titled, “New “National IPR Policy” of India – A Pharma Perspective”, I reckon, there are three possible key areas of concern of American pharma industry against Indian patent regime. However, in the draft National IPR Policy India seems to have stood its ground in all those areas.

The draft IPR policy responded to those concerns as follows:

Concern 1: “India’s patentability requirements are in violations of ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)’ Agreement.” (Though it has not yet been challenged at the WTO forum)

Draft IPR Policy states: “India recognizes that effective protection of IP rights is essential for making optimal use of the innovative and creative capabilities of its people. India has a long history of IP laws, which have evolved taking into consideration national needs and international commitments. The existing laws were either enacted or revised after the TRIPS Agreement and are fully compliant with it. These laws along with various judicial pronouncements provide a stable and effective legal framework for protection and promotion of IP.”

A recent vindication: On January 15, 2015, Indian Patent Office’s (IPO’s) rejection of a key patent claim on Hepatitis C drug Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) of Gilead Sciences further reinforces that India’s patent regime is robust and on course.

Gilead’s patent application was opposed by Hyderabad based Natco Pharma. According to the ruling of the IPO, a new “molecule with minor changes, in addition to the novelty, must show significantly enhanced therapeutic efficacy” when compared with a prior compound. This is essential to be in conformity with the Indian Patents Act 2005. Gilead’s patent application failed to comply with this legal requirement.

Although Sovaldi ((sofosbuvir) carries an international price tag of US$84,000 for just one treatment course, Gilead, probably evaluating the robustness of Sovaldi patent against Indian Patents Act, had already planned to sell this drug in India at a rice of US$ 900 for the same 12 weeks of therapy.

It is envisaged that this new development at the IPO would prompt entry of a good number of generic equivalents of Sovaldi. As a result, the price of sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) formulations would further come down.

However, reacting to this development Gilead has said, “The main patent applications covering sofosbuvir are still pending before the Indian Patent Office…This rejection relates to the patent application covering the metabolites of sofosbuvir. We (Gilead) are pleased that the Patent Office found in favor of the novelty and inventiveness of our claims, but believe their Section 3(d) decision to be improper. Gilead strongly defends its intellectual property. The company will be appealing the decision as well as exploring additional procedural options.”

For more on this subject, please read my blog post of September 22, 2014 titled, “Gilead: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place In India”

Concern 2: “Future negotiations in international forums and with other countries.”

Draft IPR Policy states: “In future negotiations in international forums and with other countries, India shall continue to give precedence to its national development priorities whilst adhering to its international commitments and avoiding TRIPS plus provisions.”

Concern 3: “Data Exclusivity or Regulatory Data Protection.”

Draft IPR Policy states: “Protection of undisclosed information not extending to data exclusivity.”

I discussed a similar subject in my blog post of October 20, 2014 titled, “Unilateral American Action on Agreed Bilateral Issues: Would India Remain Unfazed?”

Confusion with the Prime Minister’s recent statement:

It is worth noting that in end April 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly remarked to align India’s patent laws with “international standards”.

What the Prime Minister really meant by patent laws with “international standards” could be of anybody’s guess. This is because, even the World Trade Organization (WTO) considers Indian Patents Act compliant to TRIPS Agreement, which has been globally accepted as the ‘Gold Standard’ in the realm of IPR…unless, of course, Prime Minister Modi intends to accept ‘TRIPS Plus’ provisions for India, under US pressure and at the cost of health interest of majority of Indian patients.

It is noteworthy though, his own Ministry of Commerce & Industry has categorically emphasized and re-emphasized several times in the past that India’s patent regime is fully TRIPS compliant.

To add greater credence to this argument, the noted free market economist and Professor of Economics at Columbia University – Arvind Panagariya, who has recently been appointed to run Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s new NITI Aayog, has also endorsed it in his published articles, unambiguously.

As usual, leaving nothing to chance, immediately after the above remark of the Indian PM to align India’s patent laws with “international standards”, the USTR urged India to ‘expeditiously undertake’ initiatives stated by PM Modi, flashing across a long list of changes that the US wants to get incorporated in the Indian IP Acts and policies.

Pressure for amendment of Indian Patent Law:

From the intensity of pressure that the US Pharma industry is generating on the US Government, it is clear that American pharma industry will not be satisfied till Modi Government brings in changes in the Indian Patents Act 2005, as dictated by its constituents.

At the top of much publicized US wish list on IPR, features abolition of Section 3(d) of the Indian patent law. This provision of the Act denies patents to frivolous and incremental innovations without offering any significant value to the patients in terms of improved clinical efficacy of the drug. Many would term such innovation as attempts towards evergreening of patents through minor molecular manipulation or similar other means. This kind of innovation gives already a very high priced blockbuster drug another full term of patent monopoly, often with even higher price, at the cost of patients.

Pressure for a relook at the National IPR Policy:

In fact, the USTR 2015 report, also asks India to have yet another round of consultations with stakeholders before finalizing its IPR policy. This is widely construed as an attempt on the part of the US Government and industry to conclude their unfinished IPR agenda for India.

Whether Modi Government would be bullied by the American Pharma industry to succumb to its pressure at the cost of the Indian patients and going against the national and international experts’ opinion, only time would tell.

Benefits of Innovation and India:

India has amply demonstrated time and again that it does understand the value and benefits of innovation in different facets of life and business. The country endeavors to protect it too, according to the law of the land. However, there are still some procedural loose knots existing in the IPR environment of the country.

As stated above, for effective remedial measures in those areas, a ‘Think Tank’ has already been constituted by Modi Government to formulate a robust and comprehensive National IPR Policy.

In this context, a media report quoted a senior official from the Union Ministry of Commerce & Industry saying, “We hope this year we can convince the US that our laws are drafted in a way so as to protect both our consumer and industry’s interest. The new IPR policy that we are coming out with will take care of any anomalies or vagueness in our existing regime and make it tight and also fast-track clearances of patent applications.”

Would there be a ‘Ghost Writer’ for Indian IPR Policy?

The first draft of the policy has already been circulated in January 2015 and discussed in the following month with the stakeholders. However, American Pharma industry does not seem to be satisfied with its overall content, leave aside the nitty-gritty.

Going by this development some apprehends that a powerful lobby group probably wants to be the ‘Ghost Writer’ for the IPR Policy of India. Coincidentally enough, we also see the USTR blowing hot and cold on this critical issue…blowing hot through its ‘Special 301 Report’ and cold by praising Prime Minister Modi’s remark to align India’s patent laws with “international standards”.

India should play a catalytic role in changing the drug innovation model:

A paradigm shift in the drug innovation model can materialize only when there will be a desire to step into the uncharted frontier…coming out of the comfort zone of much familiar independent money spinning silos of all kinds of drug innovations…from break-through drugs to me-too varieties. Dove tailing scientific and business excellence with patients’ health interest, dispassionately, would then be the name of the game.

Though arduous, playing a catalytic role to bring out this transformation sooner, is extremely important for India. This is because, drug innovation with significant value addition would continue to remain as critical as access to important medicines for all, in perpetuity. India understands that just as clearly as USTR …for its ‘make in India’ campaign or otherwise. No well-orchestrated and spoon-fed pontification required in this area…uncalled for.

Conclusion:  

The bottom line is, the US Pharma industry continues to flex its muscle relentlessly under the very often used, misused and even abused façade that India does not understand the value of innovation.

On the other hand, the general sentiment in this area, both national and international, favors India.

As the new Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog of India, Dr. Arvind Panagariya wrote, “India must call the US’ bluff on patents,” it’s indeed time to demonstrate the same, once and for all.

However, in the context of upholding patients’ health interest in India, a lurking fear does creep in, after PM Modi’s well publicized recent remark to align India’s patent laws with “international standards”, especially when Indian Patents Act 2005 is already TRIPS compliant, according to WTO requirements.

That said, in the midst of a raging debate involving innovation, IPR, India and ‘Uncle Sam’, the moot question that floats at the top of mind is:

Has seemingly tough-minded Prime Minister Modi already yielded to ‘Uncle Sam’s’ bullying tactics to effect changes in an otherwise robust Indian patent regime, and that too at the cost of health interest of needy patients of the country?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

‘Data Protection’: Needs A Clear Direction…But Is It An IPR Issue?

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The terminologies ‘Data Exclusivity’ and ‘Data Protection’ are quite often used interchangeably by many, creating a great deal of confusion on the subject. However, in a true sense these are quite different issues having critical impact on public health interest of a nation.

In several media reports as well, one can notice the interchangeable use of these two terms. It is especially happening when the reports are speculating whether or not the Government of India is considering putting in place ‘Data Exclusivity’/ ‘Data Protection’ along with ‘Patent Linkage’ through administrative measures, without making any amendments in the Patents Act 2005 of the country.

Tracking this development, the last week, I wrote about ‘Patent Linkage’. In this article, I shall dwell on the same area, but from ‘Data Exclusivity’/ ‘Data Protection’ perspective.

A brief overview:

Close to a decade ago, Government of India constituted ‘Satwant Reddy Committee’ to recommend a direction that India should follow on ‘Data Protection’ in the country involving pharmaceutical and agricultural products.

In 2007 the Committee submitted its report recommending ‘Data Protection’ in the country to be introduced for pharma products in a calibrated manner. However, the report did not specify a timeline for its implementation.

Interestingly, even this committee did not differentiate between the terminologies ‘Data Protection’ and ‘Data Exclusivity, as we now see in the first draft of the ‘National IPR Policy.’

According to available reports, after due deliberation, the erstwhile Government decided not to take any action on the committee’s recommendations for ‘Data Protection’ in India.

Difference between ‘Data Protection’ and ‘Data Exclusivity’:

In an article published in ipHandbook, titled “Data Protection and Data Exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals”, the author Charles Clift with a great deal of experience in the U.K. Department of International Development (DFID) and a former Secretary, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World Health Organization; differentiated these two terminologies as follows:

Data Protection (DP): Protection of commercially valuable data held by the drug regulator against disclosure and unfair commercial use.

Data Exclusivity (DE): A time bound form of Intellectual Property (IP) protection that seeks to allow companies recouping the cost of investment in producing data required by the regulatory authority.

Arguments in favor of ‘Data Exclusivity’:

International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA), Geneva, in its website argues in favor of ‘Data Exclusivity’ as follows:

- Health authorities require, as part of a submission for a marketing authorization, that proprietary information be disclosed in order to ensure public health and patient safety.

- The innovator assumes the entire risk for the generation of the data, what requires expensive and lengthy clinical trials.

- ‘Data Exclusivity’ is necessary to provide a measure of certainty to the innovator that they will be provided with a period of protection for their efforts of testing a drug.

- Patents and ‘Data Exclusivity’ are different concepts, protect different subject matter, arise from different efforts, and have different legal effects over different time periods

Arguments suspecting the intent of ‘Data Exclusivity’:

The above paper of Charles Clift highlights the following on DE:

- The effect of DE is to prevent entry of generic competitors, independent of the patent status of the product in question.

- DE law, wherever applicable, prevents generic manufacturers from using innovators’ test data, though it would allow the drug regulator to analyze this data prior to market approval.

- Even if the patent period has expired or there is no patent on a product, DE will act independently to delay the generic entry until the period of DE is over.

- In that way DE compensates innovators for delayed market entry and concomitant loss of potential profits.

- DE is a much stronger right than a patent, mainly because, unlike patent law, there is no exceptions or flexibilities that allow the governments to provide the equivalent of Compulsory License (CL).

- DE acts as a barrier to CL of a patent on the same product by preventing marketing approval for a CL.

TRIPS Agreement talks about DP, but not DE:

Article 39 of TRIPS Agreement on “Protection of Undisclosed Information” contains a general clause on the obligations of the members of the WTO, where Article 39.3 specifies three obligations for its member countries as follows:

- To protect data on New Chemical Entities (NCE), the collection of which involves considerable effort, against unfair commercial use.

- To protect these data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public

- To protect such data against disclosure, unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use

According to Charles Clift, Article 39.3 only articulates widely accepted trade secret and unfair competition law, and is not an invitation to create new IP rights per se for test data. Nor does it prevent outside parties from relying on the test data submitted by an originator, except in case of unfair commercial practices.

Some developed countries, such as the United States and the European Union have argued that Article 39.3 of TRIPS requires countries to create a regime of DE, which is a new form of time-limited IP protection. However, it is worth noting that in both these countries DE regime was adopted prior to TRIPS Agreement. Hence, many experts construe such approaches and pressure, thus created for DE, as ‘TRIPS Plus’.

What is ‘TRIPS Plus’?

The ‘TRIPS-Plus’ concept would usually encompass all those activities, which are aimed at increasing the level of IP protection for the right holders, much beyond what is required for conformance of TRIPS Agreement by the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Some section of the civil society nurtures a view that ‘TRIPS Plus’ provisions could significantly jeopardize the ability, especially, of developing countries to protect the public health interest adequately.

Some common examples of ‘TRIPS Plus’ provisions:

Common examples of ‘TRIPS Plus’ provisions could include:

- Extension of the patent term beyond usual twenty-year period

- Introduction of provisions, which could restrict the use of CL

- Delaying the entry of generics

Is ‘Data Protection’ an IPR issue?

In my view, the issue of ‘Data Protection’ is more a drug regulatory than an IPR related subject and should be treated as such. This is because ‘Data Protection’ is more related to the ‘Drugs and Cosmetics Act’ of India rather than the ‘Patents Act 2005′.

Thus, it is quite intriguing to make out why ‘Data Protection’, which will be governed by ‘Drugs and Cosmetics Act’, is featuring in the IPR Policy of the country.

I wrote on the draft National IPR Policy in my blog post of January 19, 2015, titled “New “National IPR Policy” of India – A Pharma Perspective”.

Conclusion:

After jettisoning the ‘Satwant Committee Report’ on ‘Data Protection’, the Government was in no mood, until recently, to discuss anything about DP and DE, despite intense pressure from the pharma MNC lobby in India. However, the issue first resurfaced during EU-FTA negotiation, when India rejected these provisions outright and unambiguously.

However, the ghost started haunting India, yet again, when the US Government started flexing its muscle on this issue, at the behest of the American pharma companies.

Although DP is a drug regulatory issue, curiously, it features in the draft National IPR Policy. Even there, the subject has taken an interesting turn, when in the first draft of ‘National IPR Policy’ of India, the six-member ‘Think Tank’ chaired by Justice (Retd.) Prabha Sridevan clearly recommended “Protection of undisclosed information not extending to data exclusivity.”

In my opinion this is indeed a very pragmatic recommendation. It deserves support from all concerned so that the profound intent continues to feature in the final IPR Policy of India, to protect public health interest of the nation.

Just like ‘Patent Linkage’, as I discussed in my last week’s article, finding a middle ground to put ‘Data Protection’ in place through administrative measures, without making any amendments either in the Drugs & Cosmetics Act or in the Patents Act of the country, seems to be desirable and very much possible, as well.

However, the very thought of considering ‘Data Exclusivity’ in India, in my view, should prompt a clear ‘No…No’ response from the present Government of India.

This is mainly because, besides all other reasons as mentioned above, even if the patent period for a molecule has expired or there is no patent on a product, DE will act independently to delay the generic entry until the period of ‘Data Exclusivity’ gets over.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

‘Patent Linkage’: Can The Core Issue Be Resolved?

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On February 10, 2015, a leading business daily of India, quoted the Commerce Secretary of India – Rajeev Kher, saying, “India needs to relook at its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy with a view to bring in a differentiated regime for sectors that have a greater manufacturing potential.”

In the present Government regime, it appears virtually impossible to make such important comments out of turn by a senior bureaucrat without the blessings of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). I hold this view, despite the fact that the Commerce Secretary reportedly added that his suggestion is “a highly controversial subject and if I discussed this in the government, I think I will be shot down in the very first instance”.

Be that as it may, as I indicated in my just previous article, several recent media reports also speculated, around the same time, that the Government of India is probably considering putting in place ‘Patent Linkages’ and ‘Data Exclusivity’ through administrative measures, without making any amendments in the Patents Act 2005 of the country.

As I had indicated in my blog post of January 19, 2015 titled, “New ”National IPR Policy” of India – A Pharma Perspective”, these speculations originated mainly from the following events:

  • During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States in September 2014, a high-level Indo-US working group on IP was constituted as a part of the Trade Policy Forum (TPF), which is the principal trade dialogue body between the two countries.
  • Almost immediately after the Prime Minister’s return to India, in October 2014, the Government formed a six-member ‘Think Tank’ to draft the ‘National IPR Policy’ and suggest ways and legal means to handle undue pressure exerted by other countries in IPR related areas. The notification mandated the ‘Think Tank’ to examine the current issues raised by the industry associations, including those that have appeared in the media and give suggestions to the ministry of Commerce and Industry as appropriate.

Speculations arising out of these two events were almost simultaneously fuelled by the following developments:

A. US Trade Representative Mike Froman’s reported affirmation of the following to the US lawmakers during a Congressional hearing held on January 27, 2015:

- “We have been concerned about the deterioration of the innovation environment in India, and we have engaged with the new government since they came into office in May of last year about our concerns.”

- “We held the first Trade Policy Forum in four years in November. I just returned from India yesterday as a matter of fact … and in all of these areas, we have laid out a work program with the government of India to address these and other outstanding issues.”

- “We are in the process of providing comments on that draft policy proposal on IPR, and we are committed to continuing to engage with them to underscore areas of work that needs to be done in copyright, in trade secrets as well as in the area of patents.”

- “We’ve got a good dialogue going now with the new government on this issue, and we’re committed to working to achieve concrete progress in this area.”

B. Union Minister of Commerce and Industry of India specifically seeking American Government’s inputs in the finalization process of the new National IPR policy of the country.

Keeping these in perspective, let me try to explore whether or not it would be fair for India deciding to put in place ‘Patent Linkages’ and ‘Data Exclusivity’ through administrative measures, without making any amendments in the Patents Act of the country.

In this article, I shall deliberate on my personal take on ‘Patent Linkage’ and in the next week’s article on ‘Data Exclusivity’.

Definition:

Patent linkage is broadly defined as the practice of linking market approval for generic medicines to the patent status of the originator reference product.

A brief background in India:

The ‘Patent Linkage’ saga has an interesting background in India. I would now try to capture the essence of it, as stated below.

About 7 years ago, probably prompted by intense lobbying by the Pharma MNCs, the then Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) reportedly informed the media, on April 28, 2008, the following:

“We (DCGI) are going to seek the list of the drugs from innovator companies that have received patent in India. Once we have the database of the drugs which have been granted patent, we will not give any marketing approval to their generic versions…The DCGI has issued internal guidelines to this effect and it will also co-ordinate with the health ministry to give a formal shape to the initiative. The government expects to finalize a proper system within the next 2-3 months.”

It was also reported in the same article that Patent attorney Pratibha Singh, who along with Arun Jaitley was representing Cipla in the Tarceva case against Roche said:

“The DCGI does not have the authority to reject marketing application of a generic drug on the grounds that an innovator company has received the patent for the same drug in the country.”

Immediately following the above reported announcement of the DCGI on ‘Patent Linkage’, another media report flashed that the domestic drug companies are strongly objecting to the DCGI’s plans to link marketing approval for a drug with its patent status in the country, citing requirement of additional resources for the same and concern that it could block access to affordable medicines by suppressing competitive forces.

Despite this objection of the domestic Indian pharma companies, a senior official in DCGI office reportedly reaffirmed the DCGI’s intent of establishing the linkage so that no slips happen in the future. The same media report quoted that Government official as saying:

“We will have to amend the rules in the Act. We have to put it before the Drugs Consultative Committee first and this could be around the end of this year.”

Current ‘administrative’ status in India:

Currently in India, there is no provision for ‘Patent Linkage’, either in the Statute or through any administrative measure.

After those potboiler reports, it is quite challenging to fathom, what exactly had happened for the reverse swing thereafter at the DCGI’s office. The bottom line is, the above initiative of the then DCGI for ‘Patent Linkage’ in India ultimately got killed in the corridors of power. Hence, there does not exist any direct or indirect measure for ‘Patent Linkage’ in India, as I write this article.

Current legal status:

In 2008 Bayer Corporation had filed a Writ Petition before the Delhi High Court against Union of India, the DCGI and Cipla seeking an order that the DCGI should consider the patent status of its drug, Sorefenib tosylate, and refuse marketing approval to any generic versions of this drug.

It is worth mentioning, Sorefenib tosylate is used to treat renal cancer and was being reportedly sold in India by Bayer at Rs. 2,85,000 for 120 tablets for a monthly course of treatment.

The appeal in the Delhi High Court was filed against a judgment delivered by Justice Ravindra Bhat on 18 August 2009, rejecting Bayer’s attempt to introduce the patent linkage system in India through a court direction. But, in a landmark judgment on February 9 2010, a division bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal of Bayer Corporation in this regard. Thereafter, Bayer Corporation moved Supreme Court against this Delhi High Court order.

However, in December 01, 2010, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the appeal filed by Bayer Corporation against the February 2010 decision of the Delhi High Court. The Apex Court of India ordered, since the Drugs Act does not confer power upon the DCGI to make rules regarding the ‘Patent Linkage’, any such attempt would constitute substantive ultra vires of the delegated power.

RTI helps to get the marketing approval status of drugs:

Currently relevant information on marketing approval application status of generic drugs are not available at the CDSCO website. Hence, some innovator companies have resorted to using Right To Information (RTI) Act to ferret out such details from the DCGI office and initiate appropriate legal measures for patent infringement, well before the generic version of the original drug comes to the market.

A middle ground:

In view of the above order of the Supreme Court, the government of India may try to seek a middle ground without amending any provision of the Patents Act, in any way.

Even avoiding the word ‘Patent Linkage’, the Ministry of Health can possibly help the pharma MNCs achieving similar goal, through administrative measures. It can instruct the DCGI to upload the ‘Marketing Approval’ applications status for various generic products in the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) website. If for any patented drugs, applications for marketing approval of generic equivalents are made, the available information would enable the patent holder taking appropriate legal recourse for patent infringement, much before the drug is marketed at a heavily discounted price.

It is quite possible that the interested constituents had put requests for such administrative measures even before the earlier Government. As no tangible action has been taken even thereafter, the erstwhile Government probably felt, if introduced, such a system would adversely impact quick and early availability of the generic drugs in the market place.

Conclusion: 

I wrote an article on similar issue in my blog post of August 24, 2009 titled, “Recent Bayer Case Judgment: Patent Linkage: Encouraging Innovation in India.”

Taking all these into consideration, in my view, it is quite possible for the present Indian Government to resolve the core issue related to ‘Patent Linkage’ through administrative measure, without amending any Acts or breaching any case laws of the land.

In the present IPR imbroglio, the above administrative measure could well be a win-win solution for all.

It would help facilitating early judicial intervention by the patent holder in case of prima facie patent infringements, enabling the Government to send a clear reiteration that the patents granted to pharmaceutical products will be appropriately enforced and protected in the country.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

India’s Pharma Marketing Code (UCPMP): Is It Crafted Well Enough To Deliver The Deliverables?

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On December 12, 2014, the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) of the Government of India announced details of the ‘Uniform Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP)’, which would be effective across the country from January 1, 2015.

Just to recapitulate, the DoP came out with a draft UCPMP on March 19, 2012, inviting stakeholders’ comments. Immediately thereafter, the officials at the highest level of the department held several discussions on that draft with the constituents of the pharmaceutical industry, Ministry of Health, Medical Council of India (MCI), besides other stakeholders. Unfortunately, no decision on the subject was taken for nearly three years since then, probably due to intense lobbying by interested constituents.

It is heartening to witness now that the new government, within six months of coming into the office, has ensured that the long awaited UCPMP sees the light of the day. The Dos and Don’ts of the Code for the pharma industry appear to be a replica of the same that the Medical Council of India (MCI) had announced for the doctors, several years ago.

Though UCPMP is not a panacea for all malpractices in the pharma industry, with this announcement, the government at least has sent a clear signal to errant pharma players to shape up, soon. The Government’s action on the subject is also laudable from the good governance perspective, as the codes are quite appropriate to uphold public health interest.

Having acknowledged that unambiguously, I would deliberate in this article why, in my opinion, not much thought has gone to ensure effective implementation of the UCPMP, where subjectivity and vagueness prevail. Moreover, the absence of strong deterrent measures in the document may seriously impede its impact. I shall also briefly touch upon whether self-regulation in pharma marketing practices has worked or not on the ground, globally.

Before I do that, a quick recapitulation of the relevant background, I reckon, would be meaningful.

What necessitated regulation in pharma marketing?

Pro-active role of the pharmaceutical industry in the fight against diseases of all kinds and severity is absolutely critical for any nation.

As happens in most other industries, the ultimate economic performance of a pharma player too predominantly depends on how productive are its sales and marketing activities. In a situation like this, the current ‘free for all model’ of pharma sales and marketing, where end results dominate the means adopted, usually places the profit earning objectives much ahead of public health interest. As result, higher priced medicines are prescribed more, even where their lower price equivalents of similar quality standards are available, besides over or unnecessary prescribing of drugs.

Dubious models are springing up at regular intervals, aiming at achieving all-important objective of generation of more and more prescriptions, which differentiate men from the boys in the pharma marketing warfare.

It is widely alleged that public perceptions are also craftily created on the quality of medicines. All branded generic drugs, including those manufactured by little known companies, are made to perceive better than their cheaper non-branded equivalents, even if coming from better-known and reputed manufacturers. Such industry created perceptions, cleverly channelized through some doctors with vested interests, enhance the drug treatment costs for the patients, significantly.

Other modes of gratifications under different guises also put significant number of doctors in a dilemma between cost effective prescription requirements of the patients and commercial expectations of the pharma players.

To meet with this challenge, the World Health Organization (WHO) in its publication, ‘Pharmaceutical Legislation and Regulation’, clearly articulated that realistic and effective laws and regulations are needed for the pharmaceutical sector, where informal controls are insufficient. This is mainly because of the following two factors:

  • Medicines concern the whole population
  • The consumer has no way to choose the drug and its price

The new government acts:

Irrespective of whatever had happened in the past, no government with a reasonable agenda of ‘Good Governance’ can afford to ignore the conflict of interests of such kind and magnitude between the doctors and patients.

Hence, comes the importance of uniform codes of pharma marketing practices that can be carefully monitored, thoroughly implementable and measured with transparent yardsticks.

As the World Medical Association states, the key ethical basis for any such code is the understanding that the values of clinical care, of the welfare of society and of science should prevail over commercial imperatives and monetary concerns.

In one of my earlier blog posts of July 07, 2014 titled,“Kickbacks And Bribes Oil Every Part of India’s healthcare Machinery” – A National Shame, I deliberated on similar issues.

Vagueness in measuring delivery of the deliverables:

Let me now get back to the UCPMP. As mentioned in the draft proposal of 2012, after six months from the date of its coming into effect, the government would review the quality of implementation of the UCPMP by the pharma players and their trade associations. If the same is found unsatisfactory, the DoP may consider a statutory code, thereafter.

Interestingly, nothing has been mentioned in the UCPMP document about the process that would be followed by the government to assess the quality of implementation of the Code after six months prompting the DoP to take a very crucial decision, either way.

Vagueness in monitoring UCPMP:

The UCPMP of the DoP states, the Managing Director/CEO of the company is ultimately responsible for ensuring the adherence to the code and the executive head of the company should submit a self-declaration within two months from the date of issue of UCPMP. Thereafter, within two months of the end of every financial year, the declaration needs to be submitted to the respective industry associations for uploading those on the Associations’ websites. These declarations must also be uploaded on the website of the respective companies.

As we know, there are several thousands of pharma marketing players in India. Many of these players, especially those in the micro and small-scale sectors, including their trade associations, do not maintain websites either. Thus, it would be interesting to know how does the DoP monitor such declarations bi-monthly in the six months’ time, to start with.

Lack of strong deterrents and cumbersome process:

There are no strong deterrent measures in the UCPMP to minimize flouting of the code, nor would the complaint filing process encourage any victim with relevant details, such as patients, to lodge a complaint after paying non-refundable Rs.1, 000. It is beyond an iota of doubt that patients are the ultimate victims of most of sales and marketing malpractices by the pharma players.

Moreover, this non-refundable money would ultimately go to whom and how would it be used are still unclear.

Self-regulation in pharma marketing has hardly worked anywhere:

Many international pharmaceutical trade associations, which are primarily the lobbying bodies, are the strong votaries of self-regulations by the industry. They have also created many documents in this regard, which are also displayed in their respective websites.

However, despite all these show pieces, the ground reality is that, the well-hyped self-regulation by the industry to stop the menace of pharma marketing malpractices is not working, anywhere.

As I indicated earlier, the following are a few recent examples of just the last two years to help fathom the enormity of the problem and also to vindicate the point made above:

  • In March 2014, the antitrust regulator of Italy reportedly fined two Swiss drug majors, Novartis and Roche 182.5 million euros (U$ 251 million) for allegedly blocking distribution of Roche’s Avastin cancer drug in favor of a more expensive drug Lucentis that the two companies market jointly for an eye disorder.
  • Just before this, in the same month of March 2014, it was reported that a German court had fined 28 million euro (US$ 39 million) to the French pharma major Sanofi and convicted two of its former employees on bribery charges.
  • In November 2013, Teva Pharmaceutical reportedly said that an internal investigation turned up suspect practices in countries ranging from Latin America to Russia.
  • In May 2013, Sanofi was reportedly fined US$ 52.8 Million by the French competition regulator for trying to limit sales of generic versions of the company’s Plavix.
  • In August 2012, Pfizer Inc. was reportedly fined US$ 60.2 million by the US Securities and Exchange Commission to settle a federal investigation on alleged bribing of overseas doctors and other health officials to prescribe medicines.
  • In April 2012, a judge in Arkansas, US, reportedly fined Johnson & Johnson and a subsidiary more than US$1.2 billion after a jury found that the companies had minimized or concealed the dangers associated with an antipsychotic drug.

A survey on UCPMP:

A survey report of Ernst and Young titled, “Pharmaceutical marketing: ethical and responsible conduct”, carried out in September 2011 on the UCMP and MCI guidelines, highlighted some of the following points:

  • More than 50 percent of the respondents are of the opinion that the UCPMP may lead to manipulation in recording of actual sampling activity.
  • Over 50 percent of the respondents indicated that the effectiveness of the code would be very low in the absence of legislative support provided to the UCPMP committee.
  • 90 percent of the respondents felt that pharma companies in India should focus on building a robust internal controls system to ensure compliance with the UCPMP.
  • 72 percent of the respondents felt that the MCI was not stringently enforcing its medical ethics guidelines.
  • Just 36 percent of the respondents felt that the MCI’s guidelines would have an impact on the overall sales of pharma companies.

Disclosure norms necessary:

It is interesting to note that many countries have started acting in this area enforcing various regulatory disclosure norms. Some examples are as follows:

USA:

The justice department of the U.S has reportedly wrung huge settlements from many large companies over allegedly unholy nexus between the doctors and the pharmaceutical players.

To address this issue, on February 1, 2013 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) of the United States released the final rules of implementation of the ‘Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)’, which is commonly known as the “Physician Payment Sunshine Act” or just the “Sunshine Act”.

This Act has been a part of President Obama’s healthcare reform requiring transparency in direct or indirect financial transactions between the American pharmaceutical industry and the doctors and was passed in 2010 by the US Congress as part of the PPACA.

The Sunshine Act requires public disclosure of all financial transactions and transfers of value between manufacturers of pharmaceutical / biologic products or medical devices and physicians, hospitals and covered recipients. The Act also requires disclosure on research fees and doctors’ investment interests.

These disclosure reports are available on a public database effective September 30th, 2014.

France:

In December 2011, France adopted legislation, which is quite similar to the ‘Sunshine Act’. This Act requires the health product companies like, pharmaceutical, medical device and medical supply manufacturers, among others to mandatorily disclose any contract entered with entities like, health care professionals, hospitals, patient associations, medical students, nonprofit associations, companies with media services or companies providing advice regarding health products.

Netherlands:

On January 1, 2012, Netherlands enforced the ‘Code of Conduct on Transparency of Financial Relations’. This requires the pharmaceutical companies to disclose specified payments made to health care professionals or institutions in excess of € 500 in total through a centralized “transparency register” within three months after the end of every calendar year.

UK:

Pharmaceutical companies in the UK are planning voluntary disclosures of such payments. One can expect enforcement of such laws in the entire European Union, soon.

Australia and Slovakia:

Similar requirements also exist in Australia and Slovakia.

Japan:

In Japan, the Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA) reportedly requires their member companies to disclose certain payments to health care professionals and medical institutions on their websites, starting from 2013.

So, why not enforce such disclosure norms in India too?

Conclusion:

December 12, 2014 announcement of the UCPMP in its self-regulatory mode sends a message of good intent of the government to curb pharma marketing malpractices in India, which are threats to the society.

However, I reckon, the document is rather weak in its effective implementation potential. Meaningful and transparent deterrent measures to uphold public health interest are also lacking. The entire process also deserves a well-structured monitoring mechanism and digital implementation tools that can be operated with military precision.

It also raises a key question – Is this UCPMP good enough, especially after witnessing that self-regulation in pharma marketing practices is not working in most countries of the world?

In that sense, would the UCPMP, in its current avatar, with weak enforcement potential, shorn of enough deterrent against violations and commensurate sanctions, be able to deliver the requisite deliverables?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Awaiting ‘The Moment of Truth’ on ‘Working of Patents’ in India

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By a letter dated October 21, 2014 addressed to the Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) of India, the domestic pharma major Cipla has sought for the revocation of five patents of Novartis AG’s respiratory drug Indacaterol (Onbrez) in India, under Sections 66 and 92 of the Indian Patents Act.

Launch of a generic equivalent:

Cipla also announced its decision to launch shortly a generic equivalent of Indacaterol with the brand name Unibrez Rotacaps to satisfy the unfulfilled requirement of the new drug in India.

The Maximum Retail Price for a strip of 10 capsules of Unibrez Rotacaps 150 mcg would cost Rs.130.00 to patients against the equivalent strength of Onbrez of Novartis costing Rs.677.00, which is 420 percent more expensive than the price at which Cipla would sell this drug.

What do the Sections 66 and 92 of the Indian Patents Act say?

- Section 66 of the Indian Patents Act:

“66. Revocation of patent in public interest: Where the Central Government is of the opinion that a patent or the mode in which it is exercised is mischievous to the State of generally prejudicial to the public, if any, after giving the patentee an opportunity to be heard, make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette and thereupon the patent shall be deemed to be revoked.”

- Section 92 of the Indian Patents Act:

“92. Special provision for compulsory licenses: (1) If the Central Government is satisfied, in respect of any patent in force in circumstances of national emergency or in circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public non- commercial use, that it is necessary that compulsory licenses should be granted at any time after the sealing thereof to work the invention, it may make a declaration to that effect, by notification in the Official Gazette, and thereupon the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say –

(i) The Controller shall on application made at any time after the notification by any person interested, grant to the applicant a license under the patent on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit;

(ii) In settling the terms and conditions of a license granted under this section, the Controller shall endeavor to secure that the articles manufactured under the patent shall be available to the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advantage from their patent rights.

(2) The provisions of sections 83, 87, 88, 89 and 90 shall apply in relation to the grant of licenses under this section as they apply in relation to the grant of licenses under section 84.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (2), where the Controller is satisfied on consideration of the application referred to in clause (i) of sub- section (1) that it is necessary in –

(i) A circumstance of national emergency; or

(ii) A circumstance of extreme urgency; or

(iii) A case of public non- commercial use, which may arise or is required, as the case may be, including public health crises, relating to Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome, Human Immuno Deficiency Virus, tuberculosis, malaria or other epidemics, he shall not apply any procedure specified in section 87 in relation to that application for grant of license under this section:

Provided that the Controller shall, as soon as may be practicable, inform the patentee of the patent relating to the application for such non-application of section 87.”

Two key reasons:

Anchored on the above two sections of the Indian Patents Act, the two key reasons cited by Cipla for revocation of five patents granted to Indacaterol of Novartis AG are, very briefly, as follows:

Lack of inventive steps and ‘evergreening’ of patents:

The exclusivity given to five patents of Indacaterol is contrary to law due to lack of inventive step, being obvious inventions. Novartis allegedly has indulged in ‘evergreening’ with a number of patents to extend monopoly of the drug much beyond the term of the first patent. Indian law expressly bars ‘evergreening’ as it impedes drug access to a large majority of the patients.

Lack of working of the patents:

Cipla also claimed lack of “working” of those patents in the country, as a mere 0.03 percent of the drug requirement is currently being fulfilled in India. This leaves the percentage of inadequacy in the requirement of the drug per year at a staggering number of around 99.97 percent.

With supporting details, Cipla has stated in its letter that Indacaterol under the brand name Onbrez is imported by Novartis through its licensee Lupin Pharma only. It further pointed out that the Indian law requires all patents to be “worked” within the territory of India.

While adequate quantity of imports may qualify as working, the present case is one in which the patents in question have not been worked through imports of adequate quantity of the drug. Thus reasonable requirements of the public have not been fulfilled, at all.

Abysmally low drug access to Indian patients:

According to Cipla, when there has been a necessity for the availability of Indacaterol to a much larger number of patients afflicted by COPD, that has assumed magnitude of an epidemic, just a miniscule of 0.03 percent of the total drug requirement is currently being met in the country. In 2013, the import of Indacaterol, as reportedly declared in Form 27 by Novartis to the Patent office, was just 53,844 units, which could meet this drug requirement at best of only 4,500 out of 15 million patients, annually.

Despite accepted drug benefits, the doctors are unable to adequately prescribe Indacaterol in India, due to low quantity of the drug import for the public.

Thus, while announcing the launch of cheaper generic equivalents of the drug, Cipla emphasized that its Unibrez Rotacaps would fulfill the requirements of the public, meet public health interest and at the same time increase access to this medicine, with an affordable alternative, for a large number of patients.

Increasing incidence of COPD in India:

In its application to the DIPP, Cipla underscored that Indacaterol is one of the preferred medications to treat widely prevalent Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) that has reached the magnitude of an epidemic in India with about 15 million Indians afflicted with the ailment.

COPD is now among the top ten causes of disease burden in India. According to Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), the overall prevalence rates of COPD in India are 5.0 and 3.2 percent respectively in men and women of and over 35 years of age. The World Health Organization (WHO) also reported that COPD is the cause of death of more people than HIV-AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis all put together in the South East Asian Region.

Cipla quoted an Indian Study on “Epidemiology of Asthma, Respiratory Symptoms and Chronic Bronchitis in Adults (INSEARCH)”, which estimated that about 7 percent of deaths annually are a result of Chronic Respiratory Diseases in India.

Importance of Indacaterol in COPD treatment:

Cipla reiterated that Indacaterol is the preferred drug over other beta adrenoceptor agonists, as it has to be consumed only once a day. Moreover, it has a higher potency and prolonged effect as compared to other beta adrenoceptor agonists.

Strong arguments make the case interesting:

Though appropriate legal authorities would take a final call on the subject, prima facie, Cipla seems to have a strong case resting on the pillars of Sections 66 and 92 of the Indian Patents Act.

Since, Cipla has already gone ahead and announced the launch of cheaper generic equivalent of Indacaterol in India, it gives a sense about the company’s confidence in its argument against five valid patents of Novartis on this drug.

On the other hand, one may also justifiably say that Cipla should have waited for the final verdict of the court of law on the validity of five Indacaterol patents in India, before deciding to actually launch a generic version of the patented drug.

It is worth noting that in 2013, Novartis lost a legal battle related to patent grant for its anti-leukemia drug Glivec in the Supreme Court of India. The case lasted over seven years in various courts of law. Interestingly, Cipla had followed similar course of action in the Glivec case too, and had won the case decisively.

‘Form 27’ and the Indian Patent office (IPO):

At this stage it is worth noting, a ‘Public Notice’ dated December 24, 2009 was issued by the Controller General of Patents, Design & Trade Marks, directing all ‘Patentees and Licensees’ to furnish information in ‘Form No.27’ on ‘Working of Patents’ as prescribed under Section 146 of the Patents Act read with Rule 131 of the Patents Rule 2003.

The notice also drew attention to penalty provisions in the Patents Act, in case of non-submission of the aforesaid information.

The information sought by the IPO in ‘Form 27’ can be summarized as follows:

A. The reasons for not working and steps being taken for ‘working of the invention’ to be provided by the patentee.

B. In case of establishing ‘working of a patent’, the following yearly information needs to be provided:

  • The quantity and value of the invention worked; which includes both local manufacturing and importation.
  • The details to be provided, if any licenses and/or sub-licenses have been granted for the products during the year.
  • A statement as to whether the public requirements have been met partly/adequately to the fullest extent at a reasonable price.

The ‘Public Notice’ also indicated that:

• A fine of up to (US$ 25,000 may be levied for not submitting or refusing to submit the required information by the IPO.

• And providing false information is a punishable offence attracting imprisonment of up to 6 months and/or a fine.

The important point to ponder now is, if Cipla’s allegation is correct, what has been the IPO doing with the ‘Form 27’ information to uphold the spirit of Indian Patents Act 2005, thus far?

Conclusion:

For various reasons, it would now be interesting to follow, how does the IPO deal with this case right from here. In any case, information provided through ‘Form 27’ cannot remain a secret. ‘The Right to Information Act (RTI)’ will help ferret more such details out in the open.

As the ‘Moment of Truth’ unfolds in this case, one would be quite curious to fathom how the strong voices against ‘non-working of patents’ and ‘evergreening’ drive home their arguments before the court of justice.

On the other hand, the global innovator companies, their highly paid lobby groups and the USTR are expected to exert tremendous pressure on the Indian Government to protect the global pharma business interests in India, come what may. All these would indeed create a potboiler, as expected by many.

In this complex scenario, striking a right balance between rewarding genuine innovation, on the one hand, and help improving access to affordable modern medicines to a vast majority of the population in the country, on the other, would not be an enviable task for the Indian Government.

As the juggernaut of conflicting interest moves on, many would keenly await for a glimpse of ‘the moment of truth’ based on the judicial interpretation of ‘evergreening’ and ‘working of patents’, for this case in particular.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Gilead: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place In India

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I had mentioned in my blog post of August 4, 2014, titled “Hepatitis C: A Silent, Deadly Disease: Treatment beyond reach of Most Indians” that in line with Gilead’s past approach to its HIV medicines, the company would offer to license production of sofosbuvir (brand name Sovaldi) to a number of rival low-cost Indian generic drug companies. They will be offered manufacturing knowhow, allowed to source and competitively price the product at whatever level they choose.

Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) is a once-a-day patented drug of Gilead for cure of chronic hepatitis C infection in most patients. Sovaldi has been priced at Rs 60,000 (US$ 1,000) per tablet in the developed markets with a three-month course costing Rs1.8 Crore (US$ 84,000), when it reportedly costs around U$130 to manufacture a tablet. This treatment cost is being considered very high even for many Americans and Europeans.

Gilead has also announced that it has set a minimum threshold price for Sovaldi of US$ 300 (Rs.18,000) a bottle, enough for a month. With three months typically required for a full course and taking into account the currently approved combination with interferon, the total cost of Sovaldi per patient would be about US$ 900 (Rs.54,000) for a complete treatment against its usual price of US$ 84,000 (Rs1.8 Crore). The company would offer this price to at least 80 countries.

Breaking-news in India:

On September 15, 2014, International media reported that Cipla, Ranbaxy, Strides Arcolab, Mylan, Cadila Healthcare, Hetero labs and Sequent Scientific are likely to sign in-licensing agreements with Gilead to sell low cost versions of Sovaldi in India.

It was also reported that these Indian generic manufacturers would be free to decide their own prices for sofosbuvir, ‘without any mandated floor price’.

Indian companies would require paying 7 per cent of their revenues as royalty to Gilead, which, in turn would ensure full technology transfer to them to produce both the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) and finished formulations. The generic version of Sovaldi is likely to be available in India in the second or third quarter of 2015, at the earliest.

Another reason of Gilead’s selecting the Indian generic manufacturers could possibly be, that of much of the global supply of generic finished formulations is manufactured in India, especially for the developing countries of the world.

Patent status, broad strategy and the possibility:

It is worth noting here that the Indian Patent Office (IPO) has not recognized Sovaldi’s (sofosbuvir) patent for the domestic market, just yet. This patent application has been opposed on the ground that it is an “old science, known compound.”

It is interesting that the Indian Pharmaceutical Association (IPA) and others, such as, Delhi Network of Positive People and Natco have reportedly opposed Sovaldi’s (sofosbuvir) patent application. If the patent for this drug does not come through, low priced generic versions of Sovaldi, without any licensing agreement with Gilead, would possibly capture the Indian market.

Conversely, due to unaffordable price of Sovaldi for most of the Hepatitis C patients, even if a patent is granted for this drug in India, the sword of Compulsory License (CL) on the ground of ‘reasonably affordable price’ looms large on this product.

To negate the possibility of any CL, in the best-case scenario of a patent grant, Gilead seems to have decided to enter into licensing agreement with seven other Indian generic manufacturers to create a sense of adequate competition in the market, as many believe.

However, if the IPO considers sofosbuvir not patentable in India, it would indeed be a double whammy for Gilead. Without any patent protection, all these in licensing agreements may also fall flat on the face, paving the way of greater access of much lesser priced generic sofosbuvir to patients, as indicated above.

The action replay:

If we flash back to the year 2006, we shall see that Gilead had followed exactly the same strategy for another of its patented product tenofovir, used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS.

1. Voluntary license:

At that time also Gilead announced that it is offering non-exclusive, voluntary licenses to generic manufacturers in India for the local Indian market, along with provision for those manufacturers to export tenofovir formulations to 97 other developing countries, as identified by Gilead.

Gilead did sign a voluntary licensing agreement with Ranbaxy for tenofovir in 2006.

The arrangement was somewhat like this. Gilead would charge a royalty of 5 percent on the access price of US$ 200 a year for the drug. Any company that signs a manufacturing agreement with Gilead to manufacture API of tenofovir would be able to sell them only to those generic manufacturers that have voluntary license agreements with Gilead.

Interestingly, by that time Cipla had started selling one of the two versions of tenofovir, not licensed by Gilead. Cipla’s generic version was named Tenvir, available at a price of US$ 700 per person per year in India, against Gilead’s tenofovir (Viread) price of US$ 5,718 per patient per year in the developed Markets. Gilead’s target price for tenofovir in India was US$ 200 per month, as stated above.

2. Patent challenge:

Like sofosbuvir (Sovaldi), Gilead had filed a patent application for tenofovir (Viread) in India at that time. However, the ‘Indian Network for People Living with HIV/AIDs’ challenged this patent application on similar grounds.

3. Patent grant refused:

In September 2009, IPO refused the grant of patent for tenofovir to Gilead, citing specific reasons  for its non-conformance to the Indian Patents Act 2005. As a result, the voluntary license agreements that Gilead had already signed with the Indian generic manufacturers were in jeopardy.

Current status:

In 2014, while planning the launch strategy of sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) for India, Gilead seems to have mimicked the ‘Action Replay’ of 2006 involving tenofovir, at least, in the first two stages, as detailed above. Only the patent status of sofosbuvir from the IPO is now awaited. If IPO refuses patent grant for sofosbuvir, Gilead’s fate in India with sofosbuvir could exactly be the same as tenofovir, almost frame by frame.

Gilead and the two top players in India:

Very briefly, I would deliberate below the strategic stance taken by two top generic players in india, from 2006 to 2014, in entering into voluntary licensing agreements with Gilead  for two of its big products, as I understand.

Ranbaxy:

In my view, the stand of Ranbaxy in Gilead’s India strategy of voluntary licensing in the last eight years has remained unchanged. It involves both sofosbuvir and tenofovir.Thus, there has been a clear consistency in approach on the part of Ranbaxy on this issue.

Cipla:

Conversely, an apparent shift in Cipla’s strategic position during this period has become a bone of contention to many. For tenofovir, Cipla did not sign any voluntary license agreement with Gilead. On the contrary, it came out with its own version of this product, that too much before IPO refused to grant patent for this drug.

However, unlike 2006, Cipla decided to sign a voluntary license agreement with Gilead for sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) in 2014, though no patent has yet been granted for this product in India.

Has Cipla changed its position on drug patent?

I find in various reports that this contentious issue keeps coming up every now and then today. Some die-hards have expressed disappointments. Others articulated that the new dispensation in Cipla management, has decided to take a different stance in such matter altogether.

In my view, no tectonic shift has taken place in Cipla’s position on the drug patent issue, just yet.

The owner of Cipla, the legendary Dr.Yusuf Hamied has always been saying: ‘I Am Not Against Patents … I Am Against Monopolies’

He has also reportedly been quoted saying: “About 70 per cent of the patented drugs sold worldwide are not invented by the owning companies”.

He had urged the government, instead of having to fight for CL for expensive lifesaving medicines by the generic drug makers, where voluntary licenses are not forthcoming, the government needs to pass a law giving the generic players “automatic license of rights” for such drugs, making these medicines affordable and thereby improving access to patients. In return, the local generic manufacturers would pay 4 percent royalty on net sales to patent holders. He was also very candid in articulating, if Big Pharma would come into the developing markets, like India, with reasonable prices, Cipla would not come out against it.

According to Dr. Hamied, “When you are in healthcare, you are saving lives. You have to have a humanitarian approach. You have to take into account what it costs to make and what people can pay.”

Considering all these, I reckon, the core value of Cipla and its stand on patents have not changed much, if at all, for the following reasons:

  • The voluntary license agreement of Cipla with Gilead for sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) along with six other generic manufacturers of India, unlike tenofovir, still vindicates its strong opposition to drug monopoly, respecting product patents.
  • Cipla along with manufacturing of sofosbuvir, maintains its right to market the product at a price that it considers affordable for the patients in India.

Conclusion:

Indian Patents Act 2005 has the requisite teeth to tame the most aggressive and ruthless players in drug pricing even for the most feared diseases of the world, such as, HIV/AIDS, cancer, Hepatitis C and others.

Many global drug companies, resourceful international pharma lobby groups and governments in the developed world are opposing this commendable Act, tooth and nail, generating enormous international political pressure and even chasing it in the highest court of law in India, but in vain. Glivec case is just one example.

Some pharma majors of the world seem to be attempting to overcome this Act, which serves as the legal gatekeeper for the patients’ interest in India. Their strategy includes not just voluntary licenses, but also not so transparent, though well hyped, ‘Patient Access Programs’ and the so called ‘flexible pricing’, mostly when the concerned companies are able to sense that the product patents could fail to pass the scrutiny of the Indian Patents Act 2005.

It has happened once with even Gilead in 2006. The drug was tenofovir. Following the same old strategy of voluntary licenses and relatively lower pricing, especially when its drug patent is pending with IPO post patent challenges, Gilead intends to launch Sovaldi in India now.

Carrying the baggage of its past in India, Gilead seems to have been caught between a rock and the hard place with sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) launch in the country. On the one hand, the risk of uncertain outcome of its patent application and on the other, the risk of CL for exorbitant high price of the drug, if the patent is granted by the IPO. Probably considering all these, the company decided to repeat its 2006 tenofovir strategy of voluntary licenses, yet again in 2014, for Sovaldi in India.

As of today, Sovaldi strategy of Gilead in India appears to be progressing in the same direction as tenofovir, the way I see it. However, the final decision of IPO on the grant of its patent holds the key to future success of similar high-voltage, seemingly benign, marketing warfare of pharma majors of the world.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Playing Hardball, Riding the Horse of ‘Innovation’

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Media reports are now abuzz with various stories related to intense pressure being created by Big Pharma on the United States Government to declare India as a ‘Priority Foreign Country’ for initiating ‘Trade Sanctions’.

As we know, ‘Priority Foreign Country’ is the worst classification given by the United States to “foreign countries” that deny “adequate and effective” protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) or “fair and equitable market access” to the US.

One of the key factors that infuriated Big Pharma is the ‘patentability’ criterion of the Indian Patents Act 2005 captured in its section 3(d).  This denies grant of patent to those inventions, which are mere “discovery” of a “new form” of a “known substance” and do not result in increased efficacy, offering no significant treatment advantages over already existing drugs.

A brief perspective:

The sole requirement for any company to enjoy market monopoly with a medicine, for a specific period, with its associated commercial advantages, is obtaining a valid patent for that new drug substance from a competent authority of the concerned country. Marketing approval process and other requirements for the same of the drug regulators do not come in the way of the market monopoly status granted to patented products.

This is mainly because the drug regulators do not require to be convinced that a new drug is an improvement or more effective than the existing ones. As a consequence of which, there has been no compulsion for the Big Pharma to bring to the market only those New Molecular Entities (NMEs) that would significantly improve efficacy of a disease treatment benefitting the patients.

Choosing the easier path:

Developing any NME that is a breakthrough in the treatment of a disease is not just difficult and time consuming, it is very risky too. For this reason, once a new innovative drug gets well established in the market, many companies decide to produce their own versions of the same and obtain patent rights for the new ‘tweaked’ molecules, as is generally believed by many.

This approach of bringing ‘me-too’ types of so called ‘innovative’ drugs into the market is considered much less risky, takes lot lesser time in the R&D process, not as expensive and most importantly, enjoys all the commercial benefits that a break through NME would otherwise derive out of its invention, especially the market monopoly with free pricing.

In his well-known book titled ‘Bad Pharma’, Ben Goldacre stated that, as very often these ‘me-too’ drugs do not offer any significant therapeutic benefits, many people regard them as wasteful, an unnecessary use of product development money, potentially exposing trial participants to unnecessary harm for individual companies commercial gain, rather than any medical advancement.

‘Innovation’ of ‘me-too’ molecules:

Examples of some of the ‘me-too’ molecules are as follows:

  • Cemetidine – Ranitidine – Famotidine – Nizatidine – Roxatidine (to treat Acid-peptic disease)
  • Simvastatin – Pravastatin – Lovastatin – Pitavastatin – Atorvastatin – Fluvastatin – Rosuvastatin (to treat blood lipid disorder)
  • Captopril – Enalepril – Lisinopril – Fosinopril – Benzapril – Perindopril – Ramipiril – Quinalapril – Zofenopril (Anti-hypertensives)

Goldacre further highlighted in his book that despite this fact, pharma market does not behave accordingly. Unlike usual expectations that multiple competing drugs in the same disease area would bring the prices down, a Swedish data showed that the drugs considered by the US-FDA as showing no advantages over the existing ones, enter the market at the same or even at higher prices than the original ones. Consequently, the outcome of such innovations adversely impacts the patients and the payor including the government, as Big Pharma takes full advantage of market monopoly and free pricing for such drugs in the garb of innovation.

‘Innovation’ of ‘me-gain’ molecules:

Unlike the above ‘me-too’ drugs, which are new molecules, though work in a similar way to the original ones, another kind of patented drugs have now come-up in a dime a dozen.

Goldacre defined those drugs as ‘me-again’ drugs. These are the same molecule re-launched in the same market at the same price with a different patented ‘enantiomer’. Each of a pair of such molecules is a mirror image of each other e.g. esomeprazole (Nexium) is the left-handed version of the omeprazole molecule (Prilosec), which is a mixture of both left and right handed forms.

There is no dramatic difference between omeprazole and esomeprazole in any respect. Moreover, it is worth noting that concerned constituents of Big Pharma come out with ‘me-again’ drugs only at the end of the patent lives of the original ones. What then could be the reason?

Some examples of ‘me-again’ drugs are as follows:

Enantiomer/Brand Medical Condition Original Drug/Brand
Levocetirizine (Vozet) Allergies Cetirizine (Zyrtec)
Escitalopram (Lexapro) Depression Citalopram (Celexa)
Esomeprazole (Nexium) Acid reflux Omeprazole (Prilosec)
Desloratadine (Clarinex) Allergies Loratadine (Claritan)
Pregabalin (Lyrica) Seizures Gabapentin (Neurotonin)

Why do the doctors prescribe such drugs?

That is indeed a good question, why do the doctors prescribe such costly, avoidable and so called ‘innovative’ drugs? Well, don’t we know that already?

Section (3d) plugs the loophole:

To discourage market entry of high priced and avoidable ‘me-too’ and ‘me-again’ types of drugs that are also an outcome of so called pharma ‘innovations’, the Indian law makers very wisely introduced the section (3d), while amending the Indian Patents Act in 2005. This section, as indicated above, categorically states that inventions that are mere “discovery” of a “new form” of a “known substance” and do not result in increased efficacy of that substance are not patentable. This law has also passed the scrutiny of the Supreme Court of India in the Glivec case of Novartis.

With this Act, India has unambiguously reiterated that it does not support the grant of patents for inventions that are minor modifications of the original ones, effectively blocking the usual path of patents grant as followed by Big Pharma across the world to enjoy monopolistic commercial advantages of ‘frivolous’ innovations, as called by many experts in this area.

Consequent ire of Big Pharma:

This above action of Indian law makers has raised the ire of Big Pharma, as it has a huge commercial interest to protect ‘me-too’ and ‘me-again’ types of innovations in India, even if that comes at the cost of patients’ health interest.

Section (3d) of the Indian Patents Act, therefore, became a major hindrance in meeting the commercial goals of its constituents in India, as such molecules constitute a large majority of the total number of NMEs innovated globally.

As intense power-packed advocacy campaigns of the global pharma companies with the Government of India did not yield any meaningful result to get the section 3(d) amended, it unleashed the might of its well funded lobby groups having free access to the corridors of political power to play hardball with India, riding the horse of innovation and pooh-poohing patients’ interests.

Playing hardball:

The question therefore arises, would India tactfully reciprocate playing hardball or give in to the pressure of trade sanctions under ‘Priority Foreign Country’ categorization of the United States?

I reckon India would not give in. To state more emphatically, India just cannot give in now, under any circumstances.

Come May 16, 2014, the new Union Government of India would almost be ready take its position on the saddle. Thereafter, even if it prefers to give in to intense US political pressure just to avoid trade sanctions, in all practicality that would virtually be a non-starter. This is because, the new Government would unlikely to be in a position to garner enough votes in the Parliament to amend the section (3d), ignoring the general sentiment on this important public health related issue and political compulsions of many of its constituents on the subject.

Would America go to WTO?

Would the United States of America ultimately complain against India in the multilateral forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for alleged violation of the TRIPS Agreement? That is exactly the question that many people are asking today.

In this context it is worth noting, India has reiterated time and again that Indian Patents Act 2005 is in full compliance of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration of 2001.

Since, no country has complained to WTO against India on this issue, as yet, despite so much of posturing and the noise generated the world over, it appears improbable that the US would now do so, though Big Pharma would continue playing hardball raising the same old bogey of protection of ‘innovation’ in a much higher pitch, cleverly camouflaging its hardcore vested commercial interests.

What happens, if WTO decides in favor of India?

In the multilateral forum, if the WTO decides in favor of India, there is much to loose for Big Pharma.

In that scenario, the Indian example would encourage a large number of countries to enact similar model of Patents Act fully complying with the TRIPS agreement, as vetted by the WTO.

Some has termed it as a refreshingly fresh “Alternative Model of Patent Law’, going away from the dominant IP model as is being propagated by the US.

As I had indicated in the past, countries like the Philippines, Brazil and South Africa have either emulated or strongly favoring this alternative model that favors protection of Intellectual Property (IP) and at the same time promotes access to new inventions to a large majority of the global population.

Conclusion:

I reckon, Big Pharma’s playing hardball with India, riding the horse of ‘innovation’, could ultimately boomerang.

The Government of India, irrespective of any political color, lineage or creed, is unlikely to be bullied by Big Pharma constituents any time soon.

More importantly, even in a worse case scenario, the Government would be incapable of getting the section (3d) amended by the Indian Parliament garnering majority of the lawmakers’ support and going against strong political and public voices on this issue.

Nevertheless, Big pharma would continue to wish it to happen… and that drags me to the good old saying:

“If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.”

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Is The Indian Patent Regime Weak?

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“India misuses its own IP system to boost its domestic industries,” US Senator Orrin Hatch commented while introducing the 2014 report of the Global Intellectual Property Centre (GIPC) on ‘International Intellectual Property (IP) Index’. In this report, India featured at the bottom of a list of 25 countries, scoring only 6.95 out of 30.

The reasons for this low score, especially true in the case of the pharma sector, are the US view that India’s patentability requirements are in violations of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, the non-availability of regulatory data protection, non-availability of patent term restoration and the use of compulsory licensing (CL) for commercial, non-emergency situations.

Given this, one could, erroneously though, assume that the Indian Patent Act is weak and not TRIPS-compliant….

To read more of this article, along with another interesting expert view, please click on The Financial Express March 4, 2014.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.