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Drug Price Control in India: A Fresh Advocacy With Blunt Edges

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It is no-brainer that the advocacy initiatives to influence the new Government doing away with the ‘Drug Price Control’ in India has re-started by flooring the gas pedal. A fresh invigorating effort, apparently a pretty expensive one, has been initiated in July 2015 with an interesting study conducted on the subject by an international market research organization, sponsored by a multi-national pharma trade association in India.

Having gone through the report, it appears to me, as if the whole purpose of the study was to rationalize an ‘advance’ conclusion in mind, weaving plethora of data around it for justification.

The report presents an abundance of selective data, apparently to rubbish the very concept of ‘Drug Price Control’ in India. In that process, it reinforced the existence of a deep seated malady in the overall sales and marketing strategic framework of most of the pharma players, rather than failure of ‘Drug Price Control’ in India, meant for the essential drugs.

In this article, I shall dwell on this issue adding my own perspective. Although my views are different, I totally respect the findings and suggestions made in this report.

Drug price control in India:

From 1970, Drug Price Control Orders (DPCO) are being issued in India under the Essential Commodities Act, without any break, so far. The key intent of the DPCO is to provide quality essential medicines at a reasonably affordable price to the consumer. The DPCO has been amended four times since then, the latest one being DPCO 2013.

Unlike the previous ones, the span of price control of DPCO 2013 is restricted to essential medicines, as featured in the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011). The methodology of price control has also now changed to ‘marked-based’ pricing from earlier ‘cost-based’ pricing.

However, for the first time in July 2013, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) extended ‘Drug Price Control’ beyond the Schedule Drugs, when by a notification it announced price fixation of ‘anti-diabetic and cardiovascular drugs in respect of 108 non-scheduled formulation packs under Paragraph 19 of DPCO, 2013’,

Paragraph 19 of DPCO, 2013, authorizes the NPPA in extraordinary circumstances, if it considers it necessary to do so in public interest, to fix the ceiling price or retail price of any drug for such period as it deems fit.

Although the pharma industry initially had supported the switch from ‘cost based’ price control to ‘market based’ price control and only for NLEM 2011 drugs, it took a tougher stand after the above notification. Some trade association reverted to the same good old genre, yet again, trying to establish that ‘Drug Price Control’ does not help at all. The brand new market research report under discussion in this article, appears to be a step in that direction.

‘Market failure in pharma’ where competition does not work:

In its price notification dated July 10, 2014, as mentioned above, the NPPA justified its action by underscoring ‘market failure’ for those anti-diabetic and cardiovascular drugs, where competition does not work. NPPA considered ‘market failure’ as one of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and explained the situation as follows:

  • There exist huge inter-brand price differences in branded-generics, which is indicative of a severe market failure, as different brands of the same drug formulation, which are identical to each other in terms of active ingredient(s), strength, dosage, route of administration, quality, product characteristics, and intended use, vary disproportionately in terms of price
  • It is observed that, the different brands of the drug formulation may sometimes differ in terms of binders, fillers, dyes, preservatives, coating agents, and dissolution agents, but these differences are not significant in terms of therapeutic value.
  • In India the market failure for pharmaceuticals can be attributed to several factors, but the main reason is that the demand for medicines is largely prescription driven and the patient has very little choice in this regard.
  • Market failure alone may not constitute sufficient grounds for government intervention, but when such failure is considered in the context of the essential role of pharmaceuticals play in the area of public health, which is a social right, such intervention becomes necessary, especially when exploitative pricing makes medicines unaffordable and beyond the reach of most and also puts huge financial burden in terms of out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare.

I discussed this subject in my bog post of April 27, 2015 titled, “Does ‘Free-Market Economy’ Work For Branded Generic Drugs In India?”

Are medicines cheapest in India, really?

It is quite often quoted that medicines are cheapest in India. In my view, it would be too simplistic, if we compare the prevailing Indian drug prices in Rupee, against prices of similar drugs in other countries, just by simple conversion of the foreign currencies, such as, US$ and Euro converted into Rupee. To make the comparison realistic and credible, Indian drug prices should be compared against the same in other countries only after applying the following two critical parameters:

  • Purchasing Power Parity and Per Capita Income
  • Quantum of per capita ‘Out of Pocket Expenditure’ on drugs

The Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) with the help of academia and other experts had earlier deliberated on this issue in one of its reports on patented drugs pricing. The report established that post application of the above two parameters, medicines in India are virtually as expensive as in the developed world, causing great inconvenience to majority of patients in the country.

Hence, common patients expectedly look for some kind of critical intervention by the Government, at least, on the prices of essential drugs in India.

A new study on drug price control:

Recently, I came across a ‘brand new’ research report that tries to justify the fresh stance allegedly taken by the pharma industry on the abolition of ‘Drug Price Control’ in India.

This new study of IMS Health released on July 2015, sponsored by a pharma MNC trade association in India, titled “Assessing the Impact of Price Control Measures on Access to Medicines in India”, categorically highlights ‘price control is neither an effective nor sustainable strategy for improving access to medicines for Indian patients’.

The key findings:

The following are the key findings of the report:

  • High income patient populations, rather than the low-income targets are the primary beneficiaries of the DPCO 2013.
  • The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.
  • The DPCO 2013 has resulted in an increase in market concentration and a decrease in competitive intensity.
  • Price control has increased margin pressures for small and mid-sized companies, limiting both employment and investment opportunities in the sector.
  • Price controls negatively impact internal capability-building and expertise-building initiatives, discourage local talent and undermine the government’s ’Make in India’ initiative.

The suggestions made:

In my view, the report almost repeats the same old suggestions being made by the pharma industry over decades. However, while making recommendations, this new report selectively quotes, without clearly naming them, from the draft National Health Policy 2015 and ‘Jan Aushadhi’ initiative of the DoP. It also attempts to ride on the shoulder of Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Make in India’ campaign. The key recommendations of the study are, as follows:

  • Strengthen healthcare financing and extend universal health coverage across population segments with focus on providing cover for medicines
  • Invest in healthcare infrastructure and capability building
  • Promote joint and bulk procurement mechanisms, e.g. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation
  • Levy a cess on the tobacco and liquor industries to fund the healthcare sector and subsidize essential medicines from taxes
  • Introduce mechanisms to ensure availability of generics at lower prices, to improve affordability for patients i.e. set up dedicated generic medicine stores.

An official of IMS Health was also quoted by the media that sounds to me almost like pontification:

“Price control has limited impact on improving patient access and, furthermore is not aligned with the requirements of a vibrant economy like India” and the “Government’s priority should be on strengthening India’s healthcare infrastructure and extending universal insurance coverage.”

The blunt edges in the report raise more questions than answers:

I wonder, whether another apparently expensive research, such as this, was at all necessary to reinvent the same old advocacy narratives on ‘Drug Price Control’ in India.

As I note, the report highlights, “The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.” If this is true, one should try to fathom:

  • What does it really mean and what are its implications?
  • Can it happen, if it has happened, just because of ‘Drug Price Control’?

I am raising these two questions mainly because, price controlled drugs are prescription medicines. Thus, post DPCO 2013, when it happens to ‘prescription only medicines’, other critical questions that come at the top of mind are as follows:

  • Are the doctors now prescribing less of price controlled drugs? If so, why?
  • Price controlled drugs being essential drugs, are the doctors prescribing less of essential drugs? If so, why?
  • Do the doctors prefer prescribing expensive ‘non-schedule’ drugs to patients against their interest? if so, why?

Further, deliberately causing decline in consumption of these drugs, for margin or whatever may be the reasons, without intimating the NPPA as stipulated in the DPCO 2013, is a serious offense, attracting stringent penal action under the Essential Commodities Act.

Therefore, if the above finding of this study is correct and assuming that NPPA is not aware of such shortages or declining consumption of essential drugs in India, yet another critical question that needs to be answered:

  • By deliberately bringing down the consumption of essential medicines, are the concerned pharma players not taking the law in their own hands?

If yes, the Government would need to act forthwith. If not, the above finding of the report is just not correct.

The DoP, NPPA and other stakeholders would, therefore, need to ferret out, which one of the above two is correct.

Thus, I reckon, to wish away ‘Drug Price Control’ in India, the fresh advocacy initiative of the pharma trade association, keeping in the forefront a new study with blunt edges, raises more questions than answers. I have given just an example here, as above.

More marketing push on ‘free-pricing’ drugs is common:

It is not uncommon that the sales of ‘free-pricing’ drugs are usually more, as their margin is unlimited. Pharma players take increasing interest in those drugs and push them harder, almost totally controlling the ‘push-pull’ effect of drug marketing.

Globally, drug companies take increasing interest in such medicines. India is no exception. Here too ‘out of price control’ non-schedule drugs usually show higher growth, as the doctors are influenced to prescribe more of such drugs, though at the cost of consumer.

This practice may not be acceptable to many, but is a stark reality. This process is expected to continue, at least, till Uniform Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP) is made mandatory with strict enforcement and strong punitive provisions for any violations.

Is the growth of price controlled drugs declining?

If the growth of price controlled medicines drastically comes down post DPCO 2013, that should get reflected on the declining overall sales and growth of those drugs. Similar pattern should also be visible in the growth of those types products marketed by most of the major pharma companies in India.

Let me now present the scenario of that space. The following analysis is based on the monthly retail audit data of AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS.

When I look at the growth of DPCO 2013 products based on NLEM 2011 and other price controlled drugs under ‘Para 19’ from January to July 2015 period in the following table, the scenario does not look as worrying just yet, as the above report has made it out to be.  

Product group-wise market growth (in Value):

Month (2015) DPCO products (%) DPCO  Para 19 Products (%) Non-DPCO Products (%) Total Market Growth (%)
July 5.1 11.8 14.2 12.9
June 5.6 14.6 16.2 14.8
May 5.3 7.2 12.1 11.0
April 11.1 11.9 18.4 17.2
March 1.6 15.6 21.7 20.9
February 13.9 14.4 20.0 18.9
January 6.9 NA 14.0 12.7

(Source: AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS )

Again, in the following table, when I look at the growth of DPCO 2013 products of some the very major pharma players in India, the conclusion still remains the same as above:

DPCO Products Growth (%) by major companies (Jan-July 2015):

Company July June May April March Feb Jan
Ranbaxy 20.5 31.9 29.5 17.3 27.6 20.7 53.7
Pfizer 13.0 17.4 5.7 16.7 25.6 21.1 18.6
Abbott 7.2 11.7 18.5 13.5 15.5 18.3 21.2
GSK -2.1 - 1.8 -1.2 12.2 12.2 NA NA

(Source: AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS )

The blunt edges fail to cut ice:

Quite expectedly, even a month after its release in July 2015, the blunt edges in the report seem to have cut no ice, especially at a very important place that matters most to the industry in this area. This observation gets vindicated by a credible media report.

On August 24, 2015 in an interview to a national business daily, V K Subburaj, the Secretary of the Department of Pharmaceuticals commented, “Price control on drugs a shot in the arm for health care” and “the Government cannot do away with it.”

He argued, “A large section of the population is poor. Suddenly, your system is disturbed if you have to spend more on drugs. Drugs are an important component of health care expenditure.”

Accepting the fact that in India, big and small companies investing in research would need more money, Mr. Subburaj said, “In India, we can’t afford to remove controls as the burden of disease is high.”

Conclusion:

With all due respect to all concerned, the above report appears to me palpably commercial, sans any worthy academic value or intellectual input that could trigger thinking for a change in the Government policy. The report apparently lacks in the required cutting edge to achieve the intended goal. The blunt edges are glaring, suggesting on the contrary, that the real action actually lies with the industry. Let me hasten to add, if any one has a different view on the subject, I would respect that with all humility.

The drug price control in India has been continuing since 1970, without any gap. The retail audit data clearly indicates that the growth of the Indian pharma industry did not get stunted or stifled during the period for this particular reason, as postulated in the above report of IMS Health. On the contrary, despite price control of drugs with all its ‘ill-effects’, as highlighted in the study, the growth of the Indian pharma industry in the last 4 decades has been nothing less than spectacular. This would consequently mean, increasing consumption of drugs, leading to improving access to medicines in India, including its hinterland, though may still not be good enough. I discussed this subject in my blog post of December 13, 2013, titled “Access to Medicine: Losing Track in Cacophony”.

Coincidentally, at the commencement of drug price control regime in India, almost all, if not all, the players in the ‘Top 10’ pharma league table of the country, were multi-national drug companies. Today the situation has just reversed. Out of ‘Top 10’, about 7 are home grown drug companies. Many of these companies were born post 1970. Without M&As by the pharma MNCs, this number could have been even higher today.

When it comes to profitability, it is worth mentioning, the soft-spoken and well-respected owner of the so called ‘low margin’ generic pharma company – Sun Pharma, is the second-richest person of the country. He created his initial wealth from India, despite ostensible ‘growth stunting’ price control – as elaborated in the above report.

By the way, what is the span of drug price control in India really – just around 18 percent of the total domestic pharma market now? More than 80 percent of the local drug market continue to remain in the ‘free-pricing’ and ‘high-profit’ zone. In that case, is the essence of the report not chanting… ‘yeh dil maange more’?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

An Aggressive New Drug Pricing Trend: What It Means To India?

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A new class and an aggressive drug-pricing trend is now evolving in the global pharmaceutical industry, exerting huge financial pressure on the patients and payers, including governments, especially, in the developed nations of the world.

Another aspect of this issue I deliberated in one of my earlier blog posts of August 18, 2014 titled, “Patented Drug Pricing: Relevance To R&D Investments.”

Let me start my deliberation today by citing an example. According to 2013 Drug Trend Report of the pharmacy benefits manager Express Scripts, the United States will spend 1,800 percent more on Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) medications by 2016 than it did last year. This is largely attributed to new Hepatitis C cure with Sovaldi of Gilead, priced at Rs 61,000 (US$ 1,000) per tablet with a three-month course costing around Rs. Million 5.10 (US$ 84,000), when it reportedly costs around U$130 to manufacture a pill.

In a Press Release, Express Scripts stated, “Never before has a drug been priced this high to treat a patient population this large, and the resulting costs will be unsustainable for our country…The burden will fall upon individual patients, state and federal governments, and payers who will have to balance access and affordability in a way they never have had to before.”

The magnitude of impact – an example:

According to another report from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid of the US, the cost to treat all Americans, who have hepatitis C, with Sovaldi would cost US$227 billion, whereas it currently costs America US$260 billion a year for all drugs bought in the country. According to Express Scripts, no major therapy class has experienced such a hefty increase in spending over the last 21 years.

This gives us a feel of the net impact of the evolving new aggressive drug pricing strategy on the lives of the patients and payers of one of the richest nations of the world.

Three critical parts of the evolving pricing strategy:

In an era, when new drug pricing has come under great scrutiny of the stakeholders globally, this strategy seems to have three critical components as follows:

1. Strategy for the developed countries: Set the launch price as high as possible and generate maximum profit faster from wealthy minority who can afford to pay for the drug.

It helps establishing the base price of the product globally, despite all hue and cries, maintaining a very healthy top and bottom line business performance, amidst ‘Wall Street cheering’.

Implementing this strategy meticulously and with precision, Gilead has reportedly registered US$ 5.8 billion in sales for Sovaldi in the first half of 2014. That too, in the midst of huge global concerns on alleged ‘profiteering’ with an exorbitantly priced HCV drug.

At that time, the company noted on its earnings call that it believes 9,000 people have been cured of HCV so far with Sovaldi, which means that the 6-month turnover of Sovaldi of US$ 5.8 billion was generated just from the treatment of 9000 patients. If we take the total number of HCV infected patients at 150 million globally, this new drug benefited less than one percent of the total number of HCV patients, despite clocking a mind-boggling turnover and profit.

2. Strategy for the developing countries: Create a favorable optic for the stakeholders by lowering the drug price significantly, in percentage term from its base price, earning still a decent profit. However, in reality the discounted price would continue to remain high for a very large number of patients.

Gilead is now in the process of implementing this strategy for 80 developing countries. For these markets, it has already announced a minimum threshold price of US$ 300 a bottle, enough for a month. With three months typically required for a full course and taking into account the currently approved combination with interferon, the total cost per patient would be about US$ 900 for a complete treatment against its usual price of US$ 84,000.

If we convert the discounted treatment cost, it comes down to around Rs. 55,000 from the base price of around Rs. Million 5.10. This discounted price, which is significantly less than the base price of the drug, creates an extremely favorable optic. No one discusses how many Hepatitis C patients would be able to afford even Rs. 55,000, say for example in a country like India? Thus, setting a high base price in the developed market for a new drug could make many in the developing world perceive that the treatment cost of Rs. 55,000 is very reasonable for majority of not so privileged patients.

Under the second strategy, Gilead has targeted mostly the world’s poorest nations, but also included some middle income ones such as Egypt, which has by far the highest prevalence of HCV in the world.

A ‘Financial Times’ report, also states, “At the US price, Gilead will recoup its Sovaldi development investment  . . . in a single year and then stand to make extraordinary profits off the backs of US consumers, who will subsidize the drug for other patients around the globe.”

If other global pharma companies also follow this differential strategy, one for the developed markets and the other for the developing markets, it could be a masterstroke for the Big Pharma. This would help address the criticism that its constituents are facing today for ‘obscene’ pricing of important new life saving drugs, as they target mostly the creamy layer of the society for business performance.

However, many in the United States are also articulating that they understand, the countries getting steep discounts from Gilead have high levels of poverty, but clearly points out that the disease affects lower-income patients in America, as well. To substantiate the point, they reiterate, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) about 150 million people worldwide have HCV, out of which around 2.7 million HCV diagnosed people live in the US. They highlight that currently even less than 25 percent of Americans with chronic HCV have had or are receiving treatment. In Europe, just 3.5 percent of patients of are being treated.

Thus, keeping in view of the increasing number of voices in the developed countries against abnormally high prices of the new drugs, the moot questions that come up are as follows:

  • Is Strategy 1 sustainable for the developed markets?
  • If not, would Strategy 2 for the developing market could ever be broader based?

3. Strategy for Voluntary License (VL) in those countries, where grant of product patent is   doubtful.

Thanks to the Indian patent regime, global companies would possibly consider following this route for all those products that may not be able to pass the ‘Acid Test’ of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act 2005. Gilead has followed this route for Sovaldi and before that for tenofovir (Viread).

In this context, it is worth noting that the Indian patent office has not recognized Sovaldi’s patent for the domestic market, just yet. Thus, following this strategy Gilead announced, “In line with the company’s past approach to its HIV medicines, the company will also offer to license production of this new drug to a number of rival low-cost Indian generic drug companies. They will be offered manufacturing knowhow and allowed to source and competitively price the product at whatever level they choose.”

Accordingly, on September 15, 2014, international media reported that Cipla, Ranbaxy, Strides Arcolab, Mylan, Cadila Healthcare, Hetero labs and Sequent Scientific are likely to sign in-licensing agreements with Gilead to sell low cost versions of Sovaldi in India.

It was also reported that these Indian generic manufacturers would be free to decide their own prices for sofosbuvir, ‘without any mandated floor price’.

Indian companies would require paying 7 per cent of their revenues as royalty to Gilead, which, in turn would ensure full technology transfer to them to produce both the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) and finished formulations. The generic version of Sovaldi is likely to be available in India in the second or third quarter of 2015, at the earliest.

However, the final decision of the Indian Patent Office on the patent grant for Sovaldi holds the key to future success of similar high-voltage, seemingly benign, VL based game plan of the global pharma majors.

The new trend:

In April 2014, Merck and Co. announced that its two HCV drug candidates had a 98 percent cure rate in a mid-stage trial. In addition, AbbVie is also expected to launch a high-end hepatitis C drug within the next year. The prices for these drugs are yet to be announced.

However, a new report of October 2014 states that USFDA has approved this month a new drug named Harmony, a ledipasvir/sofosbuvir combo formulation, again from Gilead for curative treatment of chronic HCV genotype 1 infection in adults. Harmony, which is called the son of Sovaldi, would cost a hopping US$ 94,500 for a 12-week regimen, as against US$ 84,000 for Sovaldi.

Hence, I reckon, similar aggressive pricing strategy for new drugs would gain momentum in the coming years and at the same time.

Is this pricing model sustainable?

Though Gilead pricing model for patented drugs works out better than what is prevailing today in India, the question that comes up yet again, whether the new model is sustainable for various reasons as mentioned above or would it be followed by majority of the global drug innovators?

In a situation like this, what then could be a sustainable solution in India?

The desirable pathway:

A transparent government mechanism for patented drugs pricing, as followed by many countries in the world, would be quite meaningful in India. The Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) of the Government of India could play a constructive role in this area, as already provided in the Drug Policy 2012 of the country.

This measure assumes greater urgency, as the astronomical prices of patented drugs, especially for life-threatening illnesses, such as cancer, have become a subject of great concern in India too, just as it has become a critical issue across the world.

DoP is in inactive mode:

It is not difficult to fathom that CL for all patented life-saving drugs would not be a sustainable measure for all time to come. Thus, the need for a robust mechanism of price negotiation for patented drugs was highlighted in the Drug Policy 2012.

The DoP first took up the issue for consideration in 2007 by forming a committee. After about six years from that date, the committee produced a contentious report, which had hardly any takers.

Today, despite the new government’s initiative to inject requisite energy within the bureaucracy, administrative lethargy and lack of sense of urgency still lingers with the DoP, impeding progress in this important subject any further.

Intense lobbying on this issue by vested interests from across the world has further pushed the envelope in the back burner. Recent report indicates, the envelope has since been retrieved for a fresh look with fresh eyes, as a new minister is now on the saddle of the department.

According to reports, a new inter-ministerial committee was also formed by the DoP under the chairmanship of one of its Joint Secretaries, to suggest a mechanism to fix prices of patented drugs in the country.
The other members of the committee are Joint Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP); Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; and Member Secretary, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA).

Unfortunately, nothing tangible has been made known to the stakeholders on this matter, just yet. I sincerely hope that the new government expedites the process now.

Three critical factors to consider:

While arriving at the patented products price in India, three critical factors should be made note of, as follows:

  • The discussion should start with the prices adjusted on the Purchasing Power Parity factor for India.
  • Any price must have a direct relationship with the per capita income of the population of the country.
  • Details of other public healthcare measures that the government would undertake, by increasing its healthcare spends as a percentage of GDP, should also be clearly articulated.

Conclusion:

The evolving and aggressive new product-pricing trend has three following clearly identifiable facets:

One, the base price of the drugs would be established at a very high level to help increase both the turnover and profit of the companies significantly and quickly. This measure would consequently make the drug bills of the developed world even more expensive, which could limit healthcare access wherever co-payment exists or the expenditures are Out of Pocket (OoP) in nature.

Two, against intense global criticism for aggressive drug pricing strategy, to create a favorable optic, the concerned companies would launch these products at a deep discount on the base price in the developing world. However, the net price would still remain high in absolute terms, considering per capita income in those countries.

Three, for many of these new products, Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents 2005 would place India at an advantage. Thus, in absence of evergreening type of product patents, to salvage the situation, many of these companies would prefer to offer Voluntary License (VL) to Indian generic manufacturers under specific terms and conditions. However, such VL may not have any potential value, if IPO refuses to grant patents to those products, which would fall under the above section. In that case, generic competition would further bring down the prices.

No doubt, the above pricing model for patented drugs works out better than what is prevailing today in India. However, the question that comes up, whether the new model is sustainable or would be followed by majority of the global drug innovators in the same way? Considering all these, it does not seem to be the most desirable situation. Moreover, the current patent regime is a deterrent mostly to evergreening of patents.

Thus, the Indian government should play a more specific and proactive role in this game by first putting in place and then effectively implementing a country specific mechanism to tame the spiraling patented drug prices in India, for the interest of patients.

The world has taken serious note of this fast evolving aggressive new drug-pricing trend, as different countries are in the process of addressing the issue in various country-specific ways. Unfortunately, the DoP still remains in a deep slumber, having failed once to half-heartedly put a clumsy mechanism in place to address the issue.

As India is now under a new political regime, let us sincerely hope, the new minister in charge succeeds to make it happen, sooner, reducing vulnerability of a vast majority of patients during many life threatening ailments and…of course, in tandem, ensuring justifiable profit margin for the innovator drug companies…the evolving aggressive new drug pricing trend notwithstanding.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Patented Drugs’ Pricing: Apprehensive Voices Could Turn into a Self-Defeating Prophecy

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On February 21, 2013, the Department of Pharmaceuticals in a communication to the stakeholders announced that the committee to examine the issues of ‘Price Negotiations for Patented Drugs’ has since submitted its report to the Department. Simultaneously the stakeholders were requested to provide comments on the same urgently, latest by March 31, 2013.

This committee was constituted way back in 2007 to suggest a system that could be used for price negotiation of patented medicines and medical devices ‘before their marketing approval in India’.

In that process, the Committee reportedly had 20 meetings in two rounds, where the viewpoints of the Pharmaceutical Industry including FICCI, NGOs and other stakeholders were taken into consideration.

Simultaneously, the Committee had commissioned a study at the Rajiv Gandhi School of Intellectual Property Law and Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Kharagpur to ascertain various mechanisms of price control of Patented Drugs in many countries, across the world. The Committee reportedly has considered this ‘Expert Report’ while finalizing its final submission to the Government.

Scope of recommendations:

The Committee in its final report recommends price negotiations for Patented Drugs only for:

  • The Government procurement/reimbursement
  • Health Insurance Coverage by Insurance Companies

Issues to remain unresolved despite price negotiation:

In the report, the Committee expressed the following view:

  • Even after calibrating the prices based on Gross National Income with Purchasing Power Parity of the countries where there are robust public health policies, with the governments having strong bargaining power in price negotiation, the prices of patented medicines will still remain unaffordable to a very large section of the population of India. Such countries were identified in the report as UK, Canada, France, Australia and New Zealand
  • The government should, therefore, extend Health Insurance Scheme covering all prescription medicines to all citizens of the country, who are not covered under any other insurance /reimbursement scheme.

Three categories of Patented Drugs identified:

The committee has identified three categories of patented drugs, as follows:

1. A totally new class of drug with no therapeutic equivalence

2. A drug that has therapeutic equivalence but also has a therapeutic edge over the  existing ones

3. A drug that has similar therapeutic effectiveness compared to the existing one

The Committee recommended that these three categories of Patented Drugs would require to be treated differently while fixing the price.

A bullish expectation of the Government on Patented Drugs market:

The report highlights that the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry has currently registered a turnover exceeding US$ 21 billion with the domestic turnover of over US$ 12 billion.

The report also estimates that the total value turnover of patented medicines in India, which is currently at around US$ 5 million, is expected to grow at a brisk pace due to the following reasons:

  • Rapid up-gradation of patent infrastructure over the past few years to support new patent laws with the addition of patent examiners.
  • Decentralization of patent-filing process and digitization of records.
  • Increase of population in the highest income group from present 10 million to 25 million in next 5 years.

All these, presumably have prompted the Government to come out with a ‘Patented Drugs Pricing’ mechanism in India.

Pricing Mechanism in China: 

Just to get a flavor of what is happening in the fast growing neighboring market in this regard, let us have a quick look at China.

In 2007, China introduced, the ‘New Medical Insurance Policy’ covering 86 percent of the total rural population. However, the benefits have so far been assessed as modest. This is mainly because the patients continue to incur a large amount out of pocket expenditure towards healthcare.

There does exist a reimbursement mechanism for listed medicines in China and drug prices are regulated there with the ‘Cost Plus Formula’.

China has the following systems for drug price control:

  • Direct price control and competitive tendering

In this process the Government directly sets the price of every drug included in the formulary. Pharmaceutical companies will require making a price application to the government for individual drug price approval.The retail prices of the drugs are made based on the wholesale price plus a constant rate.

Interestingly, unlike Europe, the markup between the retail and wholesale price is much higher in China.

Apex body for ‘Patented Drugs Price Negotiation’: 

The Report recommends a committee named as ‘Pricing Committee for Patented Drugs (PCPD)’ headed by the Chairman of National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) to negotiate all prices of patented medicines.

As CGHS, Railways, Defense Services and other Public/Private institutions cover around 23 percent of total healthcare expenditure, the members of the committee could be invited from the Railways, DGHS, DCGI, Ministry of Finance and Representatives of top 5 health insurance companies in terms of number of beneficiaries.

Recommended pricing methodology:

For ‘Price Negotiation of Patented Drugs’, the report recommends following methodologies for each of the three categories, as mentioned earlier:

  1. For Medicines having no therapeutic equivalence in India:
  • The innovator company will submit to the PCPD the details of Government procurement prices in the UK, Canada, France, Australia and New Zealand for the respective Patented Drugs.
  • In the event of the concerned company not launching the said Patented Drug in any of those reference countries, the company will require to furnish the same details only for those countries where the product has been launched.
  • The PCPD will then take into consideration the ratio of the per capita income of a particular country to the per capita income of India.
  • The prices of the Patented Drug would be worked out for India by dividing the price of the medicine in a particular country by this ratio and the lowest of these prices would be taken for negotiation for further price reduction.
  • The same methodology would be applicable for medical devices also and all the patented medicines introduced in India after 2005.

2. For medicines having a therapeutic equivalent in India:

  • If a therapeutically equivalent medicine exists for the Patented Drug, with better or similar efficacy, PCPD may consider the treatment cost for the disease using the new drug and fix the Patented Drug price accordingly
  • PCPD may adopt the methodology of reference pricing as stated above to ensure that the cost of treatment of the Patented Drug does not increase as compared to the cost of treatment with existing equivalent medicine

3. For medicines introduced first time in India itself:

  • PCPD will fix the price of such drugs, which are new in the class and no therapeutic equivalence is available, by taking various factors into consideration like cost involved, risk factors and any other factors of relevance.
  • PCPD may discuss various input costs with the manufacturer asking for documented evidence.
  • This process may be complex. However, the report indicates, since the number of medicines discovered and developed in India will not be many, the number of such cases would also be limited.

Negotiated prices will be subjected to revision:

The report clearly indicates that ‘the prices of Patented drugs so fixed will be subjected to revision either periodically or if felt necessary by the manufacturer or the regulator as the case may be.’

Strong voices of support and apprehension:

A.  Support from the domestic Indian Pharmaceutical Industry

Interestingly there have emerged strong voices of support on this Government initiative from the domestic Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, as follows:

  • Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA) has commented, “This policy is in the right direction as we know that Compulsory License (CL) cannot address the need of price control for all patented drugs, so this policy takes care of that issue of a uniform regulation of price control for all patented drugs”. IPA had also suggested that the reference pricing should be from the developed countries like UK, Australia and New Zealand where the 80 percent of the expenditure being incurred on public health is borne and negotiated by the government.
  • Pharmexcil - another pharma association has commented, “This report is balanced and keeps India’s position in the global market in mind while recommending a pricing formula.”
  • Federation of Pharma Entrepreneurs (FOPE) & Confederation of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry (CIPI) had submitted their written views to the Committee stating that FOPE supports price negotiation mechanism for Patented Drugs and strongly recommends that Compulsory License (CL) provisions should not get diluted while going for price negotiation.
  • Indian Drug Manufacturer Association (IDMA) supported price negotiation for all Patented Drugs and recommended that the issue of CL and price negotiation should be dealt separately.

However, the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) feels, as the report indicates, ‘Price Negotiations for Patented Products’ should be made only for Government purchases and not be linked with ‘Regulatory Approval’. They have already expressed their serious concern on the methodology of ‘Patented Products Pricing’, as detailed in the above report.

B. Apprehension within the Government

Even more interestingly, such apprehensive voices also pan around the Government Ministries.

Though the DoP has proposed in the report that once the Patented Drug Policy is implemented the issuance of CL may be done away with, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has reportedly commented with grave caution, as under:

“If it is decided that Price Negotiations on Patented Drugs should be carried out then, the following issues must be ensured:

(i) Negotiations should be carried out with caution, as the case for Compulsory License on the ground of unaffordable pricing of drugs [Section 84(b) of the Patent Act] will get diluted.

(ii) Re-Negotiations of the prices at periodic intervals should be an integral part of the negotiation process.”

C. Apprehension of other stakeholders 

The NGOs like, “Lawyer’s Collective HIV/Aids Unit” and “Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF)” reportedly have urged that the price negotiation should not be allowed to weaken the position of CL for the Patented Drugs.

They had mentioned to the Committee as follows:

“As regards the plea of the patent holder that they had spent a large sum on R&D, one should note that most of the funds for R&D come from the Governments of their respective countries”. They further stated, “when the cost of production of the patented drugs is not known, it would be impossible to negotiate the price in a proper manner.”

The DoP report states that the other members of the NGOs also seconded these views.

Conclusion:

Not so long ago, on January 12, 2013, one of the leading dailies of India first reported that in a move that is intended to benefit thousands of cancer patients, Indian Government has started the process of issuing Compulsory Licenses (CL) for three commonly used anti-cancer drugs:

-       Trastuzumab (or Herceptin, used for breast cancer),

-       Ixabepilone (used for chemotherapy)

-       Dasatinib (used to treat leukemia)

For a month’s treatment drugs like, Trastuzumab, Ixabepilone and Dasatinib reportedly cost on an average of US$ 3,000 – 4,500 or Rs 1.64 – 2.45 lakh for each patient in India.

I reckon, a robust mechanism of ‘Price Negotiation for Patented Drugs’ could well benefit the global pharmaceutical companies to put forth even a stronger argument against any Government initiative to grant CL on the pricing ground for expensive innovative drugs in India. At the same time, the patients will have much greater access to patented drugs than what it is today, due to Government procurement of these drugs at a negotiated price.

On the other hand, apprehensive voices as are now being expressed on this issue, just hoping for drastic measures of grant of frequent CL by the Government for improved patients’ access to innovative drugs, could well turn into a self-defeating prophecy – making patients the ultimate sufferers, yet again, as happens most of the time.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.