Tag Archives: Compulsory

Why MNC Pharma Still Moans Over Indian IP Ecosystem?

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Improving patient access to expensive drugs, paving the way for entry of their cheaper generic equivalents, post patent expiry, and avoiding evergreening, is assuming priority a priority focus area in many countries. The United States is no exception, in this area. The Keynote Address of Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drug at the 2018 Food and Drug Law Institute Annual Conference inWashington, DC by, on May 3, 2018, confirms this. Where, in sharp contrast with what the MNC Pharma players and their trade associations propagated, the US-FDA commissioner himself admitted by saying, “Let’s face it. Right now, we don’t have a truly free market when it comes to drug pricing, and in too many cases, that’s driving prices to unaffordable levels for some patients.”

Does US talk differently outside the country?

At least, it appears so to many. For example, in April 2018, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released its 2018 Special 301 Report. In this exercise, the USPTO names the country’s trading partners for not adequately protecting and enforcing Intellectual Property (IP) rights or otherwise deny market access to U.S. innovators that rely on the protection of their IP rights.’ Accordingly, U.S. trading partners are asked to address IP-related challenges, with a special focus on the countries identified on the Watch List (WL) and Priority Watch List (PWL).

In 2018, just as the past years, India continues to feature, along with 11 other countries, on the PWL, for the so called longstanding challenges in its IP framework and lack of sufficient measurable improvements that have negatively affected U.S. right holders over the past year.

From Patient access to affordable drugs to Market access for Expensive Drugs: 

Curiously, the USTR Report highlights its concerns not just related to IP, but also on market access barriers for patented drugs and medical devices, irrespective of a country’s socioeconomic compulsion. Nevertheless, comparing it to what the US-FDA Commissioner articulated above, one gets an impression, while the US priority is improving patient access to affordable drugs for Americans, it changes to supporting MNC pharma to improve market access for expensive patented drugs, outside its shores.

Insisting others to improve global IP Index while the same for the US slides:

In the context of the 2018 report, the U.S. Trade Representative, reportedly said, “the ideas and creativity of American entrepreneurs’ fuel economic growth and employ millions of hardworking Americans.” However, on a closer look at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s annual Global IP Index for 2018, a contrasting fact surfaces, quite clearly. It shows, America, which once was at the very top of the overall IP Index score, is no longer so – in 2018, the world rank of the US in offering patent protection to innovators, dropped to 12thposition from its 10thglobal ranking in 2017. Does it mean, what the US is asking its trading partners to follow, it is unable to hold its own ground against similar parameters, any longer.

Should IP laws ignore country’s socioeconomic reality? 

MNC Pharma often articulated, it doesn’t generally fall within its areas of concern, and is the Government responsibility. However, an affirmative answer, echoes from many independent sources on this issue. No wonder, some astute and credible voices, such as an article titled “U.S. IP Policy Spins Out of Control in the 2018 Special 301 Report”, published by the Electronic Frontier Foundation on May 01, 2018, termed 2018 Special 301 Report – ‘A Tired, Repetitive Report.’ It reiterates in no ambiguous term: ‘The report maintains the line that there is only one adequate and effective level of IP protection and enforcement that every country should adhere to, regardless of its social and economic circumstances or its international legal obligations.

The ever-expanding MNC Pharma list of concerns on Indian IP laws:

The areas of MNC Pharma concern, related to Indian IP laws, continues to grow even in 2018. The letter dated February 8, 2018 of the Intellectual Property Owners Association, Washington, DC to the USTR, makes these areas rather clear. I shall quote below some major pharma related ones, from this ever-expanding list:

  • Additional Patentability Criteria – section 3 (d): The law makes it difficult for them to secure patent protection for certain types of pharma inventions.
  • TADF (Technology Acquisition and Development Fund)is empowered to request Compulsory Licensing (CL) from the Government:Section 4.4 of India’s National Manufacturing Policy discusses the use of CL to help domestic companies access the latest patented green technology.This helps in situations when a patent holder is unwilling to license, either at all or “at reasonable rates,” or when an invention is not being “worked” within India.
  • India’s National Competition Policyrequires IP owners to grant access to “essential facilities” on “agreed and nondiscriminatory terms” without reservation. They are not comfortable with it.
  • Regulatory Data Protection: The Indian Regulatory Authority relies on test data submitted by originators to another country when granting marketing approval to follow-on pharma products. It discourages them to develop new medicines that could meet unmet medical needs.
  • Requirement of local working of patents: The Controller of Patents is empowered to require patent holders and any licensees to provide details on how the invention is being worked in India. Statements of the Working, (Form 27),must be provided annually.Failure to provide the requested information is punishable by fine or imprisonment. It makes pharma patent holders facing the risk of CL, if they fail to “work” their inventions in India within three years of the respective patent grant.
  • Disclosure of Foreign Filings: Section 8 of India’s Patent Act requires disclosure and regular updates on foreign applications that are substantially “the same or substantially the same invention.” They feel it is irrelevant today.

Pharma MNCs’ self-serving tirade is insensitive to Indian patient interest:

Continuing its tirade against some developed and developing countries, such as India, the US drug manufacturers lobby group – Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) has urged the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) to take immediate action to address serious market access and intellectual property (IP) barriers in 19 overseas markets, including India, reports reported The Pharma Letter on February 28, 2018. It will be interesting to watch and note the level active and passive participation of India based stakeholders of this powerful US lobby group, as well.

Government of India holds its ground… but the saga continues:

India Government’s stand in this regard, including 2018 Special 301 Report, has been well articulated in its report released on January 24, 2018, titled “Intellectual Property Rights Regime in India – An Overview”, released by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Ministry of Commerce and Industry (DIPP). The paper also includes asummary of some of the main recommendations, as captured in the September 2016 Report of the High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, constituted by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon of the United Nations in November 2015.  Some of these observations are as follows:

  • WTO members must make full use of the TRIPS flexibilities as confirmed by the Doha Declaration to promote access to health technologies when necessary.
  • WTO members should make full use of the policy space available in Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement by adopting and applying rigorous definitions of invention and patentability that are in the interests of public health of the country and its inhabitants. This includes amending laws to curtail the evergreening of patents and awarding patents only when genuine innovation has occurred.
  • Governments should adopt and implement legislation that facilitates the issuance of Compulsory Licenses (CL). The use of CL should be based on the provisions found in the Doha Declaration and the grounds for the issuance left to the discretion of the governments.
  • WTO members should revise the paragraph 6 decision in order to find a solution that enables a swift and expedient export of pharmaceutical products produced under compulsory license.
  • Governments and the private sector must refrain from explicit or implicit threats, tactics or strategies that undermine the right of WTO Members to use TRIPS flexibilities.
  • Governments engaged in bilateral and regional trade and investment treaties should ensure that these agreements do not include provisions that interfere with their obligations to fulfill the rights to health.

The DIPP report includes two important quotes, among several others, as follows:

Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize for Economics (2001) – an American Citizen:

-       “If patent rights are too strong and maintained for too long, they prevent access to knowledge, the most important input in the innovation process. In the US, there is growing recognition that the balance has been too far tilted towards patent protection in general (not just in medicine).”

-       “Greater IP protection for medicines would, we fear, limit access to life-saving drugs and seriously undermine the very capable indigenous generics industry that has been critical for people’s well-being in not only India but other developing countries as well”.

Bernie Sanders, an American Citizen and Senior U.S. Senator:

-      “Access to health care is a human right, and that includes access to safe and affordable prescription drugs. It is time to enact prescription drug policies that work for everyone, not just the CEOs of the pharmaceutical industry.”

-      “Healthcare must be recognized as a right, not a privilege. Every man, woman and child in our country should be able to access the health care they need regardless of their income.”

Conclusion:

Why is then this orchestrated moaning and accompanying pressure for making Indian IP laws more stringent, which apparently continues under the façade of ‘innovation at risk’, which isn’t so – in any case. But, cleverly marketed high priced ‘me too’ drugs with molecular tweaking do impact patient access. So is the practice of delaying off-patent generic drugs entry, surreptitiously. Instead, why not encourage Voluntary Licensing (VL) of patented drugs against a mutually agreed fee, for achieving greater market access to the developing countries, like India?

Whatever intense advocacy is done by the vested interests to change Indian patent laws in favor of MNC pharma, the intense efforts so far, I reckon, have been akin to running on a treadmill – without moving an inch from where they were, since and even prior to 2005. The moaning of MNC Pharma on the Indian IP ecosystem, as I see it, will continue, as no Indian Government will wish to take any risk in this area. It appears irreversible and is likely to remain so, for a long time to come. The time demands from all concerned to be part of the solution, and not continue to be a part of the problem, especially by trying to tamper with the IP ecosystem of the country.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

How Cost-Effective Are New Cancer Drugs?

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The main reason why cancer is so serious a disease, is the ability of the malignant cells to spread in the body, both locally by moving into nearby normal tissue, and regionally to nearby lymph nodes, tissues, or organs, affecting even the distant parts of the body. When this happens, doctors term it as metastatic or stage IV (four) cancer.

Although most patients with metastatic tumors would eventually die of cancer, the treatment with various types of anticancer drugs, could help prolong life, in varying degree. No wonder, many new anticancer drugs now obtain regulatory approval based on their effectiveness on metastatic cancer patients. Consequently, it has now become almost a routine to administer newer anticancer drugs to patients with early stage of disease, after they have undergone surgery or radiotherapy.

But, these lifesaving drugs are expensive – very expensive! For example, a newer anticancer treatment is often priced at US$ 100,000 or more per patient, which, obviously, a large majority of the population can’t just afford.

Are these new drugs cost-effective?

To put in simple words, cost effectiveness of a drug is generally ‘expressed in terms of a ratio where the denominator is a gain in health from a measure (years of life, premature births averted, sight-years gained) and the numerator is the cost associated with the health gain.’

From this perspective, a January 2015 research study titled, “Pricing In The Market For Anticancer Drugs”, published by the National Bureau Of Economic Research of the United States observed that anticancer drugs like bevacizumab (US$ 50,000 per treatment episode) and ipilimumab (US$120,000 per episode) have fueled the perception that the launch prices of anticancer drugs are fast increasing over time.

To evaluate the pricing trend of these drugs, the researchers used an original dataset of 58 anticancer drugs, approved between 1995 and 2013, and found that launch-prices, adjusted for inflation and drugs’ survival benefits, increased by 10 percent, or about US$ 8,500, per year. This study was restricted to drugs administered with the primary intent of extending survival time for cancer patients and drugs for which survival benefits have been estimated in trials or modeling studies. The researchers did not consider drugs administered to treat pain or drugs that are administered to alleviate the side effects of cancer treatments.

The paper concluded, as compared to the older ones, newer anticancer treatments, generally, are less cost-effective. Despite this fact, the prices of these drugs are rising faster than their overall effectiveness.

How much do these drugs cost to prolong a year of life for cancer patients?

Another paper, titled “Cancer Drugs Aren’t As Cost-Effective As They Used To Be”, published in the Forbes magazine on September 30, 2015, expressed serious concern on the declining cost-effectiveness of new anticancer drugs. The author termed this trend as unacceptable, and more disturbing when providing just a year of life to cancer patients costs around US$ 350,000 to even US$ 800,000. High prices should reflect large benefits, and we need to demand value out of medical interventions – he recommended.

Do the claims of efficacy also reflect the real-world effectiveness?

Providing an answer to this question, a very recent article titled, “Assessment of Overall Survival, Quality of Life, and Safety Benefits Associated With New Cancer Medicines”, published in the well reputed medical journal ‘JAMA Oncology’ on December 29, 2016, concluded as follows:

“Although innovation in the oncology drug market has contributed to improvements in therapy, the magnitude and dimension of clinical benefits vary widely, and there may be reasons to doubt that claims of efficacy reflect real-world effectiveness exactly.”

As stated above, this conclusion was drawn by the researchers after a detail study on the overall survival, quality of life, and safety benefits of recently licensed cancer medicines, as there was a dearth of evidence on the impact of newly licensed cancer medicines.

The authors analyzed in detail health technology assessment reports of 62 cancer drugs approved in the United States and Europe between 2003 and 2013, and found that these were associated with increased overall survival by an average of 3.43 months between 2003 and 2013. Following is a summary of the detail findings:

  • 43 percent increased overall survival by 3 months or longer
  • 11 percent by less than 3 months
  • 30 percent was not associated with any increase in overall survival, which means almost one third of these drugs lacked evidence to suggest their increased survival rate when compared to alternative treatments
  • Most new cancer drugs, though improved quality of life, were associated with reduced patient safety

The researchers expect this study to support clinical practice, and promote value-based decision-making in the cancer drug treatment, besides assessing their cost-effectiveness.

Some overseas Cancer Institutes protested:

In 2012, doctors at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center reportedly announced through ‘The New York Times’ that their hospital would not be using Zaltrap, a newly patented colorectal cancer drug at that time, from Sanofi. This action of the Sloan-Kettering doctors compelled Sanofi to cut the price of Zaltrap by half.

Unlike India, where prices of even cancer drugs do not seem to be a great issue with the medical profession, just yet, the top cancer specialists of the American Society of Clinical Oncology are reportedly working out a framework for rating and selecting cancer drugs not only for their benefits and side effects, but prices as well.

In a 2015 paper, a group of cancer specialists from Mayo Clinic also articulated, that the oft-repeated arguments of price controls stifle innovation are not good enough to justify unusually high prices of these drugs. Their solution for this problem includes value-based pricing and NICE like body of the United Kingdom.

This Interesting Video from Mayo Clinic justifies the argument.

Was it a tongue-in-cheek action from India?

On March 9, 2012, India did send a signal to global pharma players on its apparent unhappiness of astronomical pricing of patented new cancer drugs in the country. The then Indian Patent Controller General, on that day, issued the first ever Compulsory License (CL) to a domestic drug manufacturer Natco, allowing it to sell a generic equivalent of a kidney cancer treatment drug from Bayer – Nexavar, at a small fraction of the originator’s price.

However, nothing has changed significantly since then on the ground for cancer drugs in the country. Hence, many construe the above action of the Government no more than mere tokenism.

In this context, it won’t be out of place recapitulating an article, published in a global business magazine on December 5, 2013 that quoted Marijn Dekkers, the then CEO of Bayer AG as follows:

“Bayer didn’t develop its cancer drug, Nexavar (sorafenib) for India, but for Western Patients that can afford it.”

Whether, CL is the right approach to resolve allegedly ‘profiteering mindset’ at the cost of human lives, is a different subject of discussion.

VBP concept is gaining ground: 

The concept of ‘Value-Based Pricing (VBP)’, has started gaining ground in the developed markets of the world, prompting the pharmaceutical companies generate requisite ‘health outcome’ data using similar or equivalent products.

Cost of incremental value that a product delivers over the existing ones, is of key significance, and should always be the order of the day. Some independent organizations such as, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK have taken a leading role in this area.

Intriguingly, in India, public health related issues, however pressing these are, still do not seem to arrest much attention of the government to provide significant relief to a large majority of population in the country.

Conclusion:

Warren Buffet – the financial investor of global repute once said, “Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.” Unfortunately, this dictum is not applicable to the consumers of high priced life-saving drugs, such as, for cancer.

Prices of new drugs for the treatment of life-threatening ailments, such as cancer, are increasingly becoming unsustainable, across the world, and more in India. As articulated by the American Society of Clinical Oncology in 2014, this is mainly because their prices are disconnected from the actual therapeutic value of products.

Currently, a sizable number of poor and even middle-income patients, who spend their entire life’s saving for treatment of a disease like cancer, have been virtually priced out of the patented new cancer drugs market.

The plight of such patients is worse in India, and would continue to be so, especially when no trace of Universal Health Care/Coverage (UHC) is currently visible anywhere near the healthcare horizon of the country.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

At The Indian IPR Front: ‘Ground Control, There’s No Major Storm’

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The incessant pressure of the developing countries on India, from 2005 to date, to include various restrictive conditions in the Indian Patents Act 2005, still continue. This demand spans across the inclusion of even those provisions, which many experts term as TRIPS-Plus, as these are not required by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. More interestingly, the pressure group also insists on the simultaneous deletion or dilution of some existing important provisions in the statute that guarantee public health interest of the nation.

This pressure is expected to mount in the G20 summit of September 4-5, which is now being held in China.

Refreshingly, on 30 August 2016, just ahead of this summit, the eminent economist Dr. Arvind Panagariya, who is also the incumbent Vice Chairman of Niti Aayog of India, and India’s Sherpa at the G20 summit reiterated, as follows, in an interview to a leading National English Business Daily:

“India has strongly opposed the language of the draft on Intellectual Property Protection (IPR) to be taken up at the upcoming G20 meeting in Beijing.”

In the interview, having re-emphasized the critical point that “there is a certain flexibility that we have under the TRIPS agreement and anything that dilutes that flexibility is not acceptable to India,” Dr. Panagariya clearly reaffirmed, yet again that ‘Indian IPR laws and policies are absolutely TRIPS compliant’.

This statement indeed sends a very positive signal to all on the ground, regarding the robust position maintained by the Government, to ward off any move by the overseas vested business interest to derail the flexibility that Indian well-balanced patent regime offers today, not just for public health, but also to foster innovation ecosystem in the country.

At the same time, India’s Sherpa at G20 summit also reportedly clarified that the IPR framework being proposed at the G20, in its strictest sense, cannot be construed as TRIPS-Plus. Nevertheless, some language used in the proposed G20 draft could be subject to interpretation, and India feels that it should not leave any room for ambiguity that has the potential to stretch this demand further, as we move on.

According to Dr. Panagariya: “Right now, these documents have some language where people in the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) feel that it impinges a bit. We have to fight it out at the summit.”

The basis of apprehension:

There are many reasons for the recent apprehension that India may buckle under the US pressure to dilute its IP laws and policies. One of the reasons could well be a possibility that India has come to an understanding with USTR in this area.

An interesting article published in the ‘spicyip’ on March 14, 2016 also captured this scenario pretty well. I am reproducing below in verbatim a paragraph of this paper, just as an example:

“Last month, the Indian government privately assured the US-India Business Council (“USIBC’’) that it would not invoke compulsory licensing for commercial purposes, as reported in their submissions (available here) to the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) for the 2016 Special 301 Review. The USIBIC stated that it would be “further encouraged” if the government of India were to make a public commitment, or a written declaration to only issue compulsory licenses in the event of public health emergencies, and not for commercial purposes. This, in their eyes, would “greatly enhance legal certainty for innovative industries”. While such a private assurance doesn’t give rise to any legal commitments, it may well be indicative of a policy shift.”

Prior to this, among many others, a March 3, 2016 ‘The Wire’ report captioned “India Assures the US it Will Not Issue Compulsory Licenses on Medicines”, also raised the same red flag.

The pressure continues even post engagement:

Be that as it may, America has been, repeatedly, raising its concerns over India’s patent regime, driven by its powerful pharma lobby groups.

To keep the kettle boiling, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in its 2016 Special 301 Report released this year on April 12, continued to keep India, along with 11 countries, on the Priority Watch List (PWL) for the current year.

USTR reportedly expressed serious concern about Indian IP policies stating that the regime apparently ‘favor’ indigenous manufacturing or Indian innovators. It also alleged that such direction ‘damages’ the patent infrastructure not just in India, but across the world.

It is believed by many that the Special 301 Report is, in fact, a formal posturing of the country on their unilateral IP related business hurdles for the year, exhibiting the power to implement unilateral trade sanctions when the US demands are not met.

In that context, the 2016 Special 301 Report caught many by surprise, as the Indian ‘IPR Think Tank’ (a body of the Union Government-selected experts) was also working closely with the United States to identify and address their issues of concern, such as, patent system, copyright infringement, trademark and counterfeiting, among others.

At that time, this discussion was possibly in its final stage as, just a month after, on May 12, 2016, the Union Cabinet approved the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy (IPR) of India, as proposed by the ‘Think Tank’, in consultation with, among others, especially the United States, which reportedly expressed its overall satisfaction with the final IPR policy.

Key concerns:

From the pharma industry perspective, the key IP concerns are centered, primarily, in the following three areas, besides a few others:

  • Patentability
  • Compulsory Licensing (CL)
  • Data Exclusivity

I would, therefore, concentrate briefly on these three areas to argue how reasonable is the Indian Patents Act 2005 to create a win-win situation both for the patients and the industry while fostering pharma innovation in the country.

Patentability:

One of their key concerns on patentability, revolves round an important provision in the statute – Section 3 (d).

Pharma Multinational Corporations (MNCs), and their trade associations have been going overboard, since long, to lobby hard to make all concerned believe that section 3 (d) is a stumbling block for pharma innovation, as it does not allow patent protection on known chemical substances lacking any significant improvement in clinical efficacy.

This provision of the statute prevents ever-greening of patents with frivolous incremental innovation. Consequently, it blocks the possibility of pricing such ‘me too’ new molecules, exorbitantly, and persuading the prescribers of the existing molecule switching over to the new brand, backed by contentious marketing campaigns, adversely impacting affordability and access to the majority of the patients in India.

Notwithstanding the shrill voices of vested interests, Section 3 (d) has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India in the famous Glivec case of Novartis against Cipla.

The Submission of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) to USTR for the Review of ‘2016 Special 301 Report’, categorically also states that the Indian Patent Act prescribes a higher threshold on inventive step for medicines, which is in keeping with the TRIPS Agreement, Paris Convention and the Doha Declaration. Hence, Section 3 (d) is sound in terms of the TRIPS, Public policy and Health policy.

Compulsory License (CL):

Besides the hard fact that India has, so far, granted just one CL in a span of more than the last ten years, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement related public health clearly provides the flexibility to all its member states to decide on the necessary grounds for granting CL. It is noteworthy that for public health interest, TRIPS flexibilities for CL has been used even by the developed countries, such as, Canada, United States and Germany, in the not too distant past.

Data exclusivity:

The terminologies ‘Data Exclusivity’ and ‘Data Protection’ are quite often used interchangeably by many, creating a great deal of confusion on the subject. However, in a true sense these are quite different issues having a critical impact on the public health interest of a nation.

In an article published in ‘ipHandbook’, titled “Data Protection and Data Exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals”, the author Charles Clift, a former Secretary, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World Health Organization; differentiated these two terminologies as follows:

Data Protection (DP): Protection of commercially valuable data held by the drug regulator against disclosure and unfair commercial use.

Data Exclusivity (DE): A time bound form of Intellectual Property (IP) protection that seeks to allow companies recouping the cost of investment in producing data required by the regulatory authority.

According to Charles Clift, Article 39.3 only articulates widely accepted trade secret and unfair competition law, and is not an invitation to create new IP rights, per se, for test data. Nor does it prevent outside parties from relying on the test data submitted by an originator, except in case of unfair commercial practices.

Some developed countries, such as the United States and the European Union have argued that Article 39.3 of TRIPS requires countries to create a regime of DE, which is a new form of time-limited IP protection. However, it is worth noting that in both these countries DE regime was adopted prior to the TRIPS Agreement. Hence, many experts construe such approaches and pressure, thus created for DE, as ‘TRIPS-Plus’.

In its new IPR Policy, India has successfully resisted the demands of TRIPs-Plus provisions, such as, data exclusivity, patent linkage and patent-term extension.

Even the draft IPR policy had reiterated that India accepts: “Protection of undisclosed information not extending to data exclusivity.”

Any near-term possibility of a change in the statute?

While the new IPR Policy of India focuses on consolidating institutional mechanisms to create a robust IPR ecosystem in the country, besides resolving some pressing issues, such as, expediting approval processes involving patents or trademarks, it does not indicate any possible change in the important provisions in the Patents Act 2005, including the much talked about Section 3 (d) and compulsory licensing, despite concerns expressed by the US and pharma companies.

Moreover, a May 13, 2016 Press Trust of India (PTI) report on the Union Cabinet approval of Indian IPR Policy quoted a Government official, as follows, negating the apprehensions that the government may yield to the pressure of developed countries with regard to its IR regime:

“India will never go beyond its current commitments in the TRIPS. Section 3 (d), patent linkage, data exclusivity and compulsory licensing are red lines.”

On the same day and in the same context, Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley also reportedly stressed that India’s IPR policies are TRIPS-compliant and encourage invention of life-saving drugs, while at the same time, “we must also be conscious of the need to make it available at a reasonable cost so that drug cost does not become prohibitive as has become in some parts of the world”, he articulated, unambiguously.

Conclusion:

Despite all these developments, reiterations and interpretations, a lurking fear on India’s diluting the current patent regime of the nation was refusing to die down in the country.

Many experts were also quite apprehensive about what would be India’s stand on IP in the G 20 summit on September 4-5, currently being held in China.

Is it, then, just a storm in a tea cup on the ground?

This is not a very easy question to answer, though, as many industry watchers sense. Nonetheless, yet another emphatic statement on the subject coming from a top Government echelon and none other than Dr. Arvind Panagariya, the Vice Chairman of Niti Aayog and India’s Sherpa at G20 summit, possibly sends a clear message, at least for now, to all those holding ground in the Indian IPR front:

‘Ground Control, There’s No Major Storm’.

By: Tapan J. Ray 

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion. 

For Drug Safety Concern: “Whistleblower’s Intention Should Be Nationalistic”

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In the recent weeks, three significant developments related to the Pharmaceutical Industry in India, have triggered rejuvenated concerns in the following critical areas: 

A. Overall drug safety standards in the country

B.  Self serving interest, rather than patients’ interest, dominate the prescribing decisions

C. Government assurance to American Trade Organization on ‘Compulsory License (CL)’ in India. 

These important issues fall under three key regulatory areas of India, as follows:

  • The Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO)
  • The Medical Council of India (MCI)
  • The Indian Patent Office

It is worth mentioning here that the Department Related Parliamentary Committee on Health and Family Welfare in its 59th Report, placed before both the houses of the Parliament on May 08, 2012, on the functioning of the Central Drug Standards Control Organization (CDSCO), begins with the following observations:

Medicines apart from their critical role in alleviating human suffering and saving lives have very sensitive and typical dimensions for a variety of reasons. They are the only commodity for which the consumers have neither a role to play nor are they able to make any informed choices except to buy and consume whatever is prescribed or dispensed to them, for the following reasons:

  • Drug regulators decide which medicines can be marketed
  • Pharmaceutical companies either produce or import drugs that they can profitably sell
  • Doctors decide which drugs and brands to prescribe
  • Consumers are totally dependent on and at the mercy of external entities to protect their interests.

Most importantly, all these concerns, if not properly clarified and appropriately addressed by the Government, soon enough, have the potential to create an adverse snowballing impact on the uniform access to affordable quality medicines, for all sections of the society in India.

Under this backdrop, I shall discuss in this article briefly, my perspective on each of these critical areas, as they are today, and not just the drug safety concerns.

The headline of this article is expected capture not only the prevailing mood of some key regulators, but also their inertia to address critical healthcare concerns and above all how the core public health related issues are getting lost, and the trivial ones are gradually occupying the center stage.

A. Overall drug quality and safety  standards in India:

A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) suit, filed against the Drugs Consultative Committee and the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), was listed on the Supreme Court website for hearing on March 11, 2016.

The PIL has been filed by one Dinesh Thakur, requesting the Supreme Court to lay down guidelines by which manufacturers could be made liable for violating drug standards and also give a direction to the government to set up a ‘Drug Approvals Review Committee’ for examining criminality in the manner in which faulty drug approvals were granted. 

Many may recall that the same Dinesh Thakur worked for Ranbaxy from 2003 for two years, and is now the Chief Executive of MedAssure Global Compliance based in Florida, US. Thakur’s Company now advises pharma manufacturers on drug safety and quality standards.

As reported by Reuters, Thakur had earlier exposed how the erstwhile largest drug maker of India, Ranbaxy Laboratories, failed to conduct proper safety and quality tests on drugs and lied to regulators about its procedures. Consequently, USFDA fined Ranbaxy US$500 million for violating federal drug safety laws, and making false statements to the US regulator.

This news report further states: “Indian Parliamentary Committee, thereafter, reportedly demanded an investigation and the drugs regulator committed to one in 2013. Thakur received a statement from the health ministry last year, seen by Reuters, showing no inquiry had begun.”

On the last Friday, however, the Supreme Court of India refused to entertain this PIL of Dinesh Thakur, saying it does not have time to adjudicate academic issues, such as, need for guidelines to regulate quality of medicines.                                                  

The core issue:

The core issue here is not at all the above PIL, not at the very least. The issue is the much reported concern being expressed, over a period of time, regarding the drug safety standards in India. The reasons include breach of of data integrity, and gross violation of the ‘Good Manufacturing Practices’ standards. Such instances are being detected, almost regularly, by the foreign drug regulators, in several manufacturing facilities run by many large and small Indian drug producers.

It is well vindicated by the fact that around 45 Indian drug manufacturing plants have been banned by the USFDA alone, from shipping generic drugs to the United States, as these were considered unsafe for consumption of patients in the US. Some other foreign regulators too had taken similar action, citing similar reasons. The USFDA website specifies the details of gross violations made in each of these cases.

Ironically, all such facilities can manufacture and sell their drugs in India, as they conform to the quality requirements of the Indian drug regulator. Consequently, the Indian patients consume even those medicines, which are considered unsafe by the USFDA for American patients, innocently, as and when prescribed by the doctors.

Arising out of these incidents, when asked about the drug safety standards in India, and the public health-safety, instead of giving credible and action oriented answers for public reassurance, some of the apparently brazen replies of the DCGI are quite stunning for many stakeholders, both within and outside the shores of India.

I would now quote below just a few of those replies, just as examples. 

“…Whistleblower’s Intentions Should Be Nationalistic” -  DCGI:

According to Reuters, it has received the following response from the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI), on the above PIL related to the drug safety standards in India:

“We welcome whistleblowers, we have got great respect, but their intentions should be genuine, should be nationalistic… I don’t have any comment on this guy.”

Thus, many industry watchers feel that in a situation like this, the honorable Supreme Court of India would possibly require to intervene, just as what it did on alleged ‘Clinical Trial’ malpractices in the country or for drug price control, solely for public health interest.

The same attitude continues:

Such brazen response of the Central Drug Regulator, and that too on a serious subject, is indeed bizarre. It becomes increasingly intriguing, as the same attitude continues without any perceptible meaningful intervention from the Ministry of Health.

For example, on February 22, 2014, in the midst of a more intense scenario on a similar issue, instead of taking transparent and stringent measures, the DCGI was quoted by the media commenting:

“We don’t recognize and are not bound by what the US is doing and is inspecting. The FDA may regulate its country, but it can’t regulate India on how India has to behave or how to deliver.”

On February 26, 2014, presumably reacting to the above remarks of the DCGI, the American Enterprise Institute reportedly commented, “Indian drug regulator is seen as corrupt and colliding with pharma companies…”

Such apparently irresponsible and loose comments keep continuing, despite the 2012 report of the Parliamentary Committee of India alleging collusion between some pharmaceutical companies and officials of the CDSCO, which oversees the licensing, marketing and trials of new drugs. The report also commented that the agency is both chronically under-staffed and under-qualified.

Some possible remedial measures:

As the saying goes, “better late than never”, considering all these continuing developments, it is about time to reconsider some of the key recommendations of Dr. R. A. Mashelkar Committee on a similar subject and make amendments in the relevant Act accordingly, soon, to facilitate creation of a robust with high accountability ‘Central Drugs Authority (CDA)’. It would introduce a centralized licensing system for drug manufacturing, along with stringent drug safety standards; besides, sale, export and distribution of drugs. Perhaps, the draft bill on CDA is now lying in the heap of archival documents with the change in Government.

Why does India need CDA?

I believe, the formation of a robust CDA with high accountability, besides meeting with drug safety concerns, would provide the following significant benefits, both to the Industry and also to the Government:

  • Achieving uniform interpretation of the provisions of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act & Rules
  • Standardizing procedures and systems for drug control across the country
  • Enabling coordinated nationwide action against spurious and substandard drugs
  • Upholding uniform quality standards with respect to exports to foreign countries from anywhere in India
  • Implementing uniform enforcement action in case of banned and irrational drugs
  • Creating a Pan-Indian approach to drug control and administration
  • Evolving a single-window system for pharmaceutical manufacturing and research undertaken anywhere in the country.

B.  Self serving interest dominates the prescribing decision: 

That the self serving interest, rather than patient interest, dominate the prescribing decision, was vindicated by a key announcement of the Medical Council of India (MCI) last month.

In February 2016, apparently succumbing to continuous and powerful external pressure, the MCI announced an amendment in a clause of its Code of Ethics Regulations 2002, exempting doctors’ associations from the ambit of its ethics code, as applicable to doctors now across the country. Prior to the amendment, this section used to read as: “code of conduct for doctors and professional association of doctors in their relationship with pharmaceutical and allied health sector industry”.                      

In other words, it means that the professional associations of doctors will no longer come under the ambit of ethics regulations, legitimizing their indulgence in the identified unethical and corrupt practices, by receiving gifts in cash or kind from the pharma or healthcare industry.

A large section of the key stakeholders believes that this amendment would help creating an additional large space for the pharmaceutical marketing malpractices to thrive, unabated, at the cost of patients.

The latest report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on MCI:

In its 92nd Report, the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare titled, “The Functioning of Medical Council of India”, presented to the Rajya Sabha and laid on the Table of Lok Sabha on 8th March, 2016, the Committee observed on this amendment as “an action that is ethically impermissible for an individual doctor cannot become permissible, if a group of doctors carry out the same action in the name of an association.”

The report also noted the failure of MCI to instill respect for a professional code of ethics in the medical professionals and take disciplinary action against doctors found violating the code of Ethics, etc.

The Committee called for a complete restructuring of the MCI, since it believes that the Council has failed as a regulator of medical education and the profession. Casting serious aspersions on the functioning of the MCI, the house panel of the Parliament recommended that the Act under which the MCI was set up be scrapped and a new legislation be drafted “at the earliest”. 

The report castigated the health ministry:

The lawmakers castigated the Health Ministry in this report saying, “The committee also finds it intriguing that instead of intervening to thwart attempts of MCI at subverting the system, the ministry meekly surrendered to MCI.”

While summing up, the report states, “the Committee exhorts the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to implement the recommendations made by it in this report immediately and bring a new Comprehensive Bill in Parliament for this purpose at the earliest.”

How will it pan out now?

I reckon, it will now be immensely interesting now for all concerned to follow, how does the Government deal with this report to curb, among others, the strong interference of mighty and powerful vested interests to continue with the rampant pharma marketing malpractices, at the cost of patients in India.

C. Reported Government assurance on ‘Compulsory License’: 

On March 3, 2016, a media report quoted a submission by the US Chamber of Commerce to the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) as follows:

“While the Government of India has privately reassured (American) industry that it would not use compulsory licenses for commercial purposes, a public commitment to forgo using (this) would enhance legal certainty for innovative industries.”

This is an interesting development, primarily because there are a number of legal provisions for granting Compulsory Licenses (CL) in the Indian Patents Act 2005, including, when a drug is not widely available, extremely expensive and some other situation. In some these provisions, law should follow its own course and there is no legally permissible scope for Government’s administrative interference. Grant of CL for Nexavar of Bayar is one such example, and incidentally, that’s the sole CL that India has granted, so far, from the date of amendment of the country’s Patents Act in 2005. 

Thus, a blanket assurance of not invoking any of the provisions of the CL, as provided in the Indian Patents Act 2005, if true, would possibly require to pass through intense legal scrutiny, as that would adversely impact the access to key medicines in a necessary situation, for the public health interest.

So far, India has amply demonstrated to all, time and again, that the country does not grant a CL at the drop of a hat. That situation should continue to encourage and protect innovation. 

Nevertheless, “a written public commitment to forgo using the CL provisions for enhancing legal certainty for innovative industries,” as demanded by the US Chamber of Commerce, appears to be unreasonable, goes against the spirit of India’s Patents Act, and perhaps is not legally tenable either, unless the IP Act is amended accordingly in the Parliament.

Conclusion:

All these three areas, as discussed above, are critical from the healthcare perspective of the country.

Ironically, while deliberating on the subject, the capability, credibility and competence of some of the key regulators of the country, are being repeatedly questioned. These doubts emanate not just from Tom, Dick and Harry, but from an illustrious spectrum of constitutional institutions of India, spanning across the lawmaking Parliament, through its various committee reports, to the ultimate legal justice provider – the Supreme Court of India, through is various orders and key observations.

Regrettably, in this specific space, which is primarily related to healthcare, nothing seems to be changing on the ground, since long. The same tradition continues, without any visible sense of urgency, even from the Government.

On the contrary, we now read a new genre of comments, even from a key regulator, on the stakeholder concerns. For example, reacting to concern on drug safety standards, instead of articulating tangible actions to usher in a perceptible change, the chief action taker reportedly specified a totally judgmental and an outlandish requirement: “…Whistleblower’s intentions should be Nationalistic.”

Together with these incidents, the key public healthcare concerns of India too, are now apparently getting drowned in the high decibel ‘Nationalistic’ versus ‘Anti-nationalistic’ cacophony. But, the hope still lingers… for a change…for our nation’s sound health!

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Unsustainable New Cancer Drug Prices: Resolution Remains A Far Cry

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Prices of new drugs for the treatment of life-threatening ailments, such as cancer, are increasingly becoming unsustainable, across the world, and more in India. As articulated by the American Society of Clinical Oncology in 2014, this is primarily due to the fact that their prices are disconnected from the actual therapeutic value of products.

Today, a very large number of poor and even the middle-income patients, who spend their entire life-savings for treatment of a disease like cancer, have been virtually priced out of the patented new drugs market.

The plights of such patients are worse in India and would continue to be so, especially when no trace of Universal Health Care/Coverage (UHC) is currently visible anywhere near the healthcare horizon of the country.

I discussed about the recent decision of the Government for shelving UHC in my recent Blog Post titled, “Would Affordable ‘Modicare’ Remain Just A Pipe Dream In India?”

Irresponsible pricing?

To highlight this point, I shall quote from the research paper titled, “Five Years of Cancer Drug Approvals, Innovation, Efficacy and Costs” published in JAMA Oncology dated April 02, 2015. This report states that just one year’s cost of treatment with a patented new cancer drug now routinely exceeds US$ 100,000. It is much known today that the medical bills for cancer treatment have become the single largest cause of personal bankruptcy, in many countries of the world.

The issue is even more impactful and heart wrenching in India, as with much lower per capita income, compared to the global median, a cancer patient pays around the same price for the same patented drugs in the country. Much talked about Nexavar of Bayer, has been a good example.

The above report underscores, the big global pharma players still vigorously contend to establish that the high cost of drugs is required to support their research and development efforts. However, none would possibly deny the hard data that, when costs and revenues are balanced, the pharmaceutical industry generates high profit margins.

On a lighter vain – the fact that the richest person in India is a pharma player of ‘low price generic medicines’ vindicates this point.

The latest report on pharma R&D costs:

In a ‘Press Release’ of November 18, 2014, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development announced, “Cost to develop and win marketing approval for a New Drug is US$2.6 Billion”.

This is around 2.5 times more than its previous estimate published in 2003, which reads as US$802 million.

Although the study is not publicly available, neither has it been peer reviewed, it does reflect that above overall inflation rate, pharma R&D costs are reportedly going up at an annual rate of around 8 percent!

Even if the R&D cost of US$2.6 Billion is accepted as correct to justify high prices of patented drugs, one should note that this figure is applicable only to those types of New Chemical Entities (NCE) that did not receive any outside funding in their developmental process, such as, from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

It is worth noting, such types of NCEs account for less than one-sixth of the annual new drugs approval in the United States.

Interestingly, Tufts Center receives its funding from the pharmaceutical industry, according to reports.

When is a high cost of medicine defendable?

According to some, high price may be justified, if novel products offer significant benefits to patients giving rise to indirect quantifiable economic value through restoration of health of patients.

This is understandable, as those patented drugs represent significant and well-accepted pharmacological advances over the existing ones, offering novel mechanisms of actions for better treatment value through ‘high-risk-high-cost’ research.

Price is a function of the value that a drug offers:

The price of any drug must be a function of the value that it offers to the patients. Not just the cost of its innovation, irrespective of the fact, whether it is a ‘New-Class (Novel)’ or ‘Next-in Class’ or even a ‘Me-too’ NCE.

The above April 2015 research report published in JAMA Oncology, investigated at length, whether novelty of medications or their relative benefits dictated drug pricing.

In that endeavor, the authors found out that from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2013, the USFDA approved 51 drugs in oncology for 63 indications. During this period, 9 drugs received more than 1 approved indication.

The study observed:

Of these 51 drugs:

- 21 (41 percent) exert their effect via a novel mechanism of action

- While 30 (59 percent) are next-in-class drugs

Despite this fact, there was no difference in the median price per year of treatment between the 30 next-in-class drugs (US$119, 765) and the 21 novel drugs (US$116, 100).

Global cancer market is soaring high fuelled by astronomical prices:

According to a report that quotes an official of IMS Health, the overall cost for cancer treatments per month in the United States is now US$10,000, up from $5,000 just a year ago. At the same time, according to a 2014 study by the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, global oncology spending has hit US$91 billion in 2013, and despite patent cliff is growing at 5 percent annually.

None likes nightmarish cancer drug-pricing trend:

None likes this worrisome drug-pricing trend, not even in the developed world. God forbid, just one cancer patient in the family can drag even a middle class household to the poverty level, especially in a country like India, where Out of Pocket (OoP) expenses for health hovers around 70 percent and Universal Health Coverage still remains a pipe dream.

Payers, including governments and private insurers, in the top cancer markets such as the United States and Europe, are trying hard to bring the cancer drug prices to a reasonable level through regulatory pressure of various kinds and forms. For example, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom and the regulators for drug cost-effectiveness in other large European countries, are coming hard on patented new cancer drugs with small improvements in survival time but priced much higher than the existing ones.

Even many private insurers in those countries are now raising questions about the additional value offerings in quantifiable terms, especially for the new cancer drugs and other treatments for life-threatening ailments, such as hepatitis C. To give an example, in late 2014, Express Scripts in America negotiated hard for an exclusive deal with AbbVie to provide its hepatitis C treatment Viekira Pak over Gilead’s exorbitantly priced Sovaldi.

Action by the doctors outside India:

In 2012, doctors at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center reportedly announced in ‘The New York Times’ that their hospital would not be using Zaltrap, a newly patented colorectal cancer drug from Sanofi. This action of the Sloan-Kettering doctors compelled Sanofi to cut Zaltrap price by half.

Unlike in India, where prices of even cancer drugs do not seem to be a great issue with the medical profession, just yet, the top cancer specialists of the American Society of Clinical Oncology are reportedly working out a framework for rating and selecting cancer drugs not only on their benefits and side effects, but prices as well.

In a recent 2015 paper, a group of cancer specialists from Mayo Clinic also articulated, that the oft-repeated arguments of price controls stifle innovation are not good enough to justify unusually high prices of such drugs. Their solution for this problem includes value-based pricing and NICE like body of the U.K.

This Interesting Video from Mayo Clinic justifies the argument.

Tokenism by the Indian Government:

India sent a signal to global pharma players about its unhappiness of astronomical pricing of patented new cancer drugs in the country on March 9, 2012. On that day, the then Indian Patent Controller General issued the first ever Compulsory License (CL) to a domestic drug manufacturer Natco, allowing it to sell a generic equivalent of a kidney cancer treatment drug from Bayer – Nexavar, at a small fraction of the originator’s price.

In this context, it won’t be out of place recapitulating that an article published in a global business magazine on December 5, 2013 quoted Marijn Dekkers, the CEO of Bayer AG saying: “Bayer didn’t develop its cancer drug, Nexavar (sorafenib) for India but for Western Patients that can afford it.”

Whether, CL is the right approach to resolve allegedly ‘profiteering mindset’ at the cost of human lives, is a different subject of discussion.

Be that as it may, India did send a very strong signal in this regard, which some construe as mere tokenism. Nonetheless, this action of the Indian Government shook the global pharma world very hard, that it would find difficult to forget in a foreseeable future.

Government’s determination to make it happen is still eluding:

The headline of this article would probably invoke an instant negative response from my friends in the industry, an understandably so, expressing… ‘Hey, are you talking against innovation and suggesting one more regulator for the heavily regulated pharma industry?’ 

I would very humbly say, no…I am suggesting neither of those two, but requesting to give shape to a very important decision already taken by the Government on this issue, in a meaningful way. That decision has been scripted in Para 4.XV of the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012) and was notified on December 07, 2012.

On ‘Patented Drugs Pricing’, it categorically states as follows:

“There is a separate committee constituted by the Government Order dated February 01, 2007 for finalizing the pricing of Patented Drugs, and decisions on pricing of patented Drugs would be based on the recommendation of this committee.”

The following long drawn unproductive events would vindicate, beyond even an iota of doubt, that a strong determination to make it happen, by even by the new Government, is still eluding by far.

Is this committee ‘Jinxed’?

To utter dismay of the patients and their well-wishers, the above committee took over six years after it was formed to submit its report.

It recommended ‘Reference Pricing’ for the Patented Drugs in India, after adjusting against India’s Gross National Income and Purchasing Power Parity. The suggested ‘Reference Countries’ were UK, Canada, France, Australia and New Zealand, where there exist a strong public health policy, together with tough bargaining power of the governments for drug price negotiations.

However, our Government found this report useless for various reasons and dissolved the panel. The grapevine in the corridors of power whispers, it could possibly be due to intense pressure from the global pharma players and their powerful lobby groups.

Interestingly, again by the end of 2013, the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) set up a brand new inter-ministerial committee with four representatives each from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) and one from the DoP to resolve the same issue of ‘Patented Drugs Pricing’ in India.

Unfortunately, a serious issue of this magnitude has still remained unresolved, even under the new seemingly dynamic Government, till date. There were media reports though, just prior to the Union Budget in January 2015, that ‘the Government may negotiate prices of patented medicines with their manufacturers before allowing pharmaceutical companies to launch them in India.’

The scenario is still far from even sketchy. A lurking fear, therefore, creeps into the minds of many: Is this committee on ‘Patented Drugs Pricing’ jinxed or incompetent or has deliberately been kept non-functional under tremendous external pressure on pricing of patented drugs?

The way forward:

To find an implementable ‘Patented Drug Pricing Model’ soon, the new committee of the Government should consider Pharmacoeconomics Based or Value-Based Pricing (PBP/VBP) Model for the country.

Pharmacoeconomics, as we know, is a scientific model of setting price of a medicine commensurate to the economic value of the drug therapy.  Pharmacoeconomics principles, therefore, intend to maximize the value obtained from expenditures towards medicines through a structured evaluation of products costs and disease outcomes.

Thus, PBP/VBP basically offers the best value for money spent. It ‘is the costs and consequences of one treatment compared with the costs and consequences of alternative treatments’.

To the best of my knowledge, the Public Health Foundation of India, spearheaded by well-reputed internationally acclaimed physician – Dr. Srinath Reddy, has requisite expertise in this area and to build on it further, as required by the committee.

This new model would help establishing in India that the price of any drug is always a key function of the value that it offers and not of the so called ‘high cost of innovation’, irrespective of whether it is a ‘New-Class (Novel)’ or ‘Next-in Class’ or even ‘Me-Too’ NCE.

The concept is gaining ground: 

The concept of ‘Value-Based Pricing’, has started gaining ground in the developed markets of the world, prompting the pharmaceutical companies generate requisite ‘health outcome’ data using similar or equivalent products.

Cost of incremental value that a product delivers over the existing ones, is of key significance and should always be the order of the day. Some independent organizations such as, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK have taken a leading role in this area.

Conclusion:

Warren Buffet – the financial investor of global repute once said, “Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.” Unfortunately, this dictum is not applicable to the consumers of high priced life saving drugs, such as, for cancer.

Price tags of most of the patented new cancer drugs, do not seem to give any indication that the pharma players believe in this pricing model, even remotely. As JAMA Oncology has established in their recent research study, there is no difference in the median price of per year of treatment between ‘Next-in-Class’ and ‘Novel Drugs’.

Thus far, India has been able to address this issue either through section 3(d) or Compulsory Licensing (CL) provisions of its Patents Act. As the saying goes, ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating’, the net fall-out of these measures has been demonstrably profound. For example, the global pharma giant Gilead has entered into voluntary License (VL) agreements with several local companies to market in India one of the most expensive products of the world – Sovaldi, at a small fraction of its original price of US$1,000/tablet. 

That said, effective long-term resolution of ‘Patented Drugs Pricing’ issue, in my view, is long overdue in India, especially for the treatment of life-threatening diseases, such as cancer. This has been necessitated by the fact that in many cases, therapeutic benefits of most of these drugs are not commensurate to their high costs.

The provision for ‘Patented Drugs Pricing’ has already been made in the NPPP 2012, though not implemented, as yet. While working out an implementable mechanism for the same, the new committee of the present Government may consider ‘Pharmacoeconomics Based or Value-Based Pricing (PBP/VBP) Model’ to effectively resolve this crucial issue. The specialized group that will operate this system could be a part of the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) of India.

The struggle for life in the fierce battle against dangerous ailments, without having access to new life-saving drugs, has indeed assumed a mind-boggling dimension in India, especially in the absence of Universal Health Coverage. It would continue to remain so, unless the new Government demonstrates its will to act, putting in place a transparent model of patented drugs pricing, without succumbing to any power play or pressures of any kind from vested interests.

The bottom-line is: It has to happen soon…very soon. For patients’ sake.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Awaiting ‘The Moment of Truth’ on ‘Working of Patents’ in India

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By a letter dated October 21, 2014 addressed to the Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) of India, the domestic pharma major Cipla has sought for the revocation of five patents of Novartis AG’s respiratory drug Indacaterol (Onbrez) in India, under Sections 66 and 92 of the Indian Patents Act.

Launch of a generic equivalent:

Cipla also announced its decision to launch shortly a generic equivalent of Indacaterol with the brand name Unibrez Rotacaps to satisfy the unfulfilled requirement of the new drug in India.

The Maximum Retail Price for a strip of 10 capsules of Unibrez Rotacaps 150 mcg would cost Rs.130.00 to patients against the equivalent strength of Onbrez of Novartis costing Rs.677.00, which is 420 percent more expensive than the price at which Cipla would sell this drug.

What do the Sections 66 and 92 of the Indian Patents Act say?

- Section 66 of the Indian Patents Act:

“66. Revocation of patent in public interest: Where the Central Government is of the opinion that a patent or the mode in which it is exercised is mischievous to the State of generally prejudicial to the public, if any, after giving the patentee an opportunity to be heard, make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette and thereupon the patent shall be deemed to be revoked.”

- Section 92 of the Indian Patents Act:

“92. Special provision for compulsory licenses: (1) If the Central Government is satisfied, in respect of any patent in force in circumstances of national emergency or in circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public non- commercial use, that it is necessary that compulsory licenses should be granted at any time after the sealing thereof to work the invention, it may make a declaration to that effect, by notification in the Official Gazette, and thereupon the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say –

(i) The Controller shall on application made at any time after the notification by any person interested, grant to the applicant a license under the patent on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit;

(ii) In settling the terms and conditions of a license granted under this section, the Controller shall endeavor to secure that the articles manufactured under the patent shall be available to the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advantage from their patent rights.

(2) The provisions of sections 83, 87, 88, 89 and 90 shall apply in relation to the grant of licenses under this section as they apply in relation to the grant of licenses under section 84.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (2), where the Controller is satisfied on consideration of the application referred to in clause (i) of sub- section (1) that it is necessary in –

(i) A circumstance of national emergency; or

(ii) A circumstance of extreme urgency; or

(iii) A case of public non- commercial use, which may arise or is required, as the case may be, including public health crises, relating to Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome, Human Immuno Deficiency Virus, tuberculosis, malaria or other epidemics, he shall not apply any procedure specified in section 87 in relation to that application for grant of license under this section:

Provided that the Controller shall, as soon as may be practicable, inform the patentee of the patent relating to the application for such non-application of section 87.”

Two key reasons:

Anchored on the above two sections of the Indian Patents Act, the two key reasons cited by Cipla for revocation of five patents granted to Indacaterol of Novartis AG are, very briefly, as follows:

Lack of inventive steps and ‘evergreening’ of patents:

The exclusivity given to five patents of Indacaterol is contrary to law due to lack of inventive step, being obvious inventions. Novartis allegedly has indulged in ‘evergreening’ with a number of patents to extend monopoly of the drug much beyond the term of the first patent. Indian law expressly bars ‘evergreening’ as it impedes drug access to a large majority of the patients.

Lack of working of the patents:

Cipla also claimed lack of “working” of those patents in the country, as a mere 0.03 percent of the drug requirement is currently being fulfilled in India. This leaves the percentage of inadequacy in the requirement of the drug per year at a staggering number of around 99.97 percent.

With supporting details, Cipla has stated in its letter that Indacaterol under the brand name Onbrez is imported by Novartis through its licensee Lupin Pharma only. It further pointed out that the Indian law requires all patents to be “worked” within the territory of India.

While adequate quantity of imports may qualify as working, the present case is one in which the patents in question have not been worked through imports of adequate quantity of the drug. Thus reasonable requirements of the public have not been fulfilled, at all.

Abysmally low drug access to Indian patients:

According to Cipla, when there has been a necessity for the availability of Indacaterol to a much larger number of patients afflicted by COPD, that has assumed magnitude of an epidemic, just a miniscule of 0.03 percent of the total drug requirement is currently being met in the country. In 2013, the import of Indacaterol, as reportedly declared in Form 27 by Novartis to the Patent office, was just 53,844 units, which could meet this drug requirement at best of only 4,500 out of 15 million patients, annually.

Despite accepted drug benefits, the doctors are unable to adequately prescribe Indacaterol in India, due to low quantity of the drug import for the public.

Thus, while announcing the launch of cheaper generic equivalents of the drug, Cipla emphasized that its Unibrez Rotacaps would fulfill the requirements of the public, meet public health interest and at the same time increase access to this medicine, with an affordable alternative, for a large number of patients.

Increasing incidence of COPD in India:

In its application to the DIPP, Cipla underscored that Indacaterol is one of the preferred medications to treat widely prevalent Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) that has reached the magnitude of an epidemic in India with about 15 million Indians afflicted with the ailment.

COPD is now among the top ten causes of disease burden in India. According to Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), the overall prevalence rates of COPD in India are 5.0 and 3.2 percent respectively in men and women of and over 35 years of age. The World Health Organization (WHO) also reported that COPD is the cause of death of more people than HIV-AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis all put together in the South East Asian Region.

Cipla quoted an Indian Study on “Epidemiology of Asthma, Respiratory Symptoms and Chronic Bronchitis in Adults (INSEARCH)”, which estimated that about 7 percent of deaths annually are a result of Chronic Respiratory Diseases in India.

Importance of Indacaterol in COPD treatment:

Cipla reiterated that Indacaterol is the preferred drug over other beta adrenoceptor agonists, as it has to be consumed only once a day. Moreover, it has a higher potency and prolonged effect as compared to other beta adrenoceptor agonists.

Strong arguments make the case interesting:

Though appropriate legal authorities would take a final call on the subject, prima facie, Cipla seems to have a strong case resting on the pillars of Sections 66 and 92 of the Indian Patents Act.

Since, Cipla has already gone ahead and announced the launch of cheaper generic equivalent of Indacaterol in India, it gives a sense about the company’s confidence in its argument against five valid patents of Novartis on this drug.

On the other hand, one may also justifiably say that Cipla should have waited for the final verdict of the court of law on the validity of five Indacaterol patents in India, before deciding to actually launch a generic version of the patented drug.

It is worth noting that in 2013, Novartis lost a legal battle related to patent grant for its anti-leukemia drug Glivec in the Supreme Court of India. The case lasted over seven years in various courts of law. Interestingly, Cipla had followed similar course of action in the Glivec case too, and had won the case decisively.

‘Form 27’ and the Indian Patent office (IPO):

At this stage it is worth noting, a ‘Public Notice’ dated December 24, 2009 was issued by the Controller General of Patents, Design & Trade Marks, directing all ‘Patentees and Licensees’ to furnish information in ‘Form No.27’ on ‘Working of Patents’ as prescribed under Section 146 of the Patents Act read with Rule 131 of the Patents Rule 2003.

The notice also drew attention to penalty provisions in the Patents Act, in case of non-submission of the aforesaid information.

The information sought by the IPO in ‘Form 27’ can be summarized as follows:

A. The reasons for not working and steps being taken for ‘working of the invention’ to be provided by the patentee.

B. In case of establishing ‘working of a patent’, the following yearly information needs to be provided:

  • The quantity and value of the invention worked; which includes both local manufacturing and importation.
  • The details to be provided, if any licenses and/or sub-licenses have been granted for the products during the year.
  • A statement as to whether the public requirements have been met partly/adequately to the fullest extent at a reasonable price.

The ‘Public Notice’ also indicated that:

• A fine of up to (US$ 25,000 may be levied for not submitting or refusing to submit the required information by the IPO.

• And providing false information is a punishable offence attracting imprisonment of up to 6 months and/or a fine.

The important point to ponder now is, if Cipla’s allegation is correct, what has been the IPO doing with the ‘Form 27’ information to uphold the spirit of Indian Patents Act 2005, thus far?

Conclusion:

For various reasons, it would now be interesting to follow, how does the IPO deal with this case right from here. In any case, information provided through ‘Form 27’ cannot remain a secret. ‘The Right to Information Act (RTI)’ will help ferret more such details out in the open.

As the ‘Moment of Truth’ unfolds in this case, one would be quite curious to fathom how the strong voices against ‘non-working of patents’ and ‘evergreening’ drive home their arguments before the court of justice.

On the other hand, the global innovator companies, their highly paid lobby groups and the USTR are expected to exert tremendous pressure on the Indian Government to protect the global pharma business interests in India, come what may. All these would indeed create a potboiler, as expected by many.

In this complex scenario, striking a right balance between rewarding genuine innovation, on the one hand, and help improving access to affordable modern medicines to a vast majority of the population in the country, on the other, would not be an enviable task for the Indian Government.

As the juggernaut of conflicting interest moves on, many would keenly await for a glimpse of ‘the moment of truth’ based on the judicial interpretation of ‘evergreening’ and ‘working of patents’, for this case in particular.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

An Aggressive New Drug Pricing Trend: What It Means To India?

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A new class and an aggressive drug-pricing trend is now evolving in the global pharmaceutical industry, exerting huge financial pressure on the patients and payers, including governments, especially, in the developed nations of the world.

Another aspect of this issue I deliberated in one of my earlier blog posts of August 18, 2014 titled, “Patented Drug Pricing: Relevance To R&D Investments.”

Let me start my deliberation today by citing an example. According to 2013 Drug Trend Report of the pharmacy benefits manager Express Scripts, the United States will spend 1,800 percent more on Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) medications by 2016 than it did last year. This is largely attributed to new Hepatitis C cure with Sovaldi of Gilead, priced at Rs 61,000 (US$ 1,000) per tablet with a three-month course costing around Rs. Million 5.10 (US$ 84,000), when it reportedly costs around U$130 to manufacture a pill.

In a Press Release, Express Scripts stated, “Never before has a drug been priced this high to treat a patient population this large, and the resulting costs will be unsustainable for our country…The burden will fall upon individual patients, state and federal governments, and payers who will have to balance access and affordability in a way they never have had to before.”

The magnitude of impact – an example:

According to another report from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid of the US, the cost to treat all Americans, who have hepatitis C, with Sovaldi would cost US$227 billion, whereas it currently costs America US$260 billion a year for all drugs bought in the country. According to Express Scripts, no major therapy class has experienced such a hefty increase in spending over the last 21 years.

This gives us a feel of the net impact of the evolving new aggressive drug pricing strategy on the lives of the patients and payers of one of the richest nations of the world.

Three critical parts of the evolving pricing strategy:

In an era, when new drug pricing has come under great scrutiny of the stakeholders globally, this strategy seems to have three critical components as follows:

1. Strategy for the developed countries: Set the launch price as high as possible and generate maximum profit faster from wealthy minority who can afford to pay for the drug.

It helps establishing the base price of the product globally, despite all hue and cries, maintaining a very healthy top and bottom line business performance, amidst ‘Wall Street cheering’.

Implementing this strategy meticulously and with precision, Gilead has reportedly registered US$ 5.8 billion in sales for Sovaldi in the first half of 2014. That too, in the midst of huge global concerns on alleged ‘profiteering’ with an exorbitantly priced HCV drug.

At that time, the company noted on its earnings call that it believes 9,000 people have been cured of HCV so far with Sovaldi, which means that the 6-month turnover of Sovaldi of US$ 5.8 billion was generated just from the treatment of 9000 patients. If we take the total number of HCV infected patients at 150 million globally, this new drug benefited less than one percent of the total number of HCV patients, despite clocking a mind-boggling turnover and profit.

2. Strategy for the developing countries: Create a favorable optic for the stakeholders by lowering the drug price significantly, in percentage term from its base price, earning still a decent profit. However, in reality the discounted price would continue to remain high for a very large number of patients.

Gilead is now in the process of implementing this strategy for 80 developing countries. For these markets, it has already announced a minimum threshold price of US$ 300 a bottle, enough for a month. With three months typically required for a full course and taking into account the currently approved combination with interferon, the total cost per patient would be about US$ 900 for a complete treatment against its usual price of US$ 84,000.

If we convert the discounted treatment cost, it comes down to around Rs. 55,000 from the base price of around Rs. Million 5.10. This discounted price, which is significantly less than the base price of the drug, creates an extremely favorable optic. No one discusses how many Hepatitis C patients would be able to afford even Rs. 55,000, say for example in a country like India? Thus, setting a high base price in the developed market for a new drug could make many in the developing world perceive that the treatment cost of Rs. 55,000 is very reasonable for majority of not so privileged patients.

Under the second strategy, Gilead has targeted mostly the world’s poorest nations, but also included some middle income ones such as Egypt, which has by far the highest prevalence of HCV in the world.

A ‘Financial Times’ report, also states, “At the US price, Gilead will recoup its Sovaldi development investment  . . . in a single year and then stand to make extraordinary profits off the backs of US consumers, who will subsidize the drug for other patients around the globe.”

If other global pharma companies also follow this differential strategy, one for the developed markets and the other for the developing markets, it could be a masterstroke for the Big Pharma. This would help address the criticism that its constituents are facing today for ‘obscene’ pricing of important new life saving drugs, as they target mostly the creamy layer of the society for business performance.

However, many in the United States are also articulating that they understand, the countries getting steep discounts from Gilead have high levels of poverty, but clearly points out that the disease affects lower-income patients in America, as well. To substantiate the point, they reiterate, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) about 150 million people worldwide have HCV, out of which around 2.7 million HCV diagnosed people live in the US. They highlight that currently even less than 25 percent of Americans with chronic HCV have had or are receiving treatment. In Europe, just 3.5 percent of patients of are being treated.

Thus, keeping in view of the increasing number of voices in the developed countries against abnormally high prices of the new drugs, the moot questions that come up are as follows:

  • Is Strategy 1 sustainable for the developed markets?
  • If not, would Strategy 2 for the developing market could ever be broader based?

3. Strategy for Voluntary License (VL) in those countries, where grant of product patent is   doubtful.

Thanks to the Indian patent regime, global companies would possibly consider following this route for all those products that may not be able to pass the ‘Acid Test’ of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act 2005. Gilead has followed this route for Sovaldi and before that for tenofovir (Viread).

In this context, it is worth noting that the Indian patent office has not recognized Sovaldi’s patent for the domestic market, just yet. Thus, following this strategy Gilead announced, “In line with the company’s past approach to its HIV medicines, the company will also offer to license production of this new drug to a number of rival low-cost Indian generic drug companies. They will be offered manufacturing knowhow and allowed to source and competitively price the product at whatever level they choose.”

Accordingly, on September 15, 2014, international media reported that Cipla, Ranbaxy, Strides Arcolab, Mylan, Cadila Healthcare, Hetero labs and Sequent Scientific are likely to sign in-licensing agreements with Gilead to sell low cost versions of Sovaldi in India.

It was also reported that these Indian generic manufacturers would be free to decide their own prices for sofosbuvir, ‘without any mandated floor price’.

Indian companies would require paying 7 per cent of their revenues as royalty to Gilead, which, in turn would ensure full technology transfer to them to produce both the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) and finished formulations. The generic version of Sovaldi is likely to be available in India in the second or third quarter of 2015, at the earliest.

However, the final decision of the Indian Patent Office on the patent grant for Sovaldi holds the key to future success of similar high-voltage, seemingly benign, VL based game plan of the global pharma majors.

The new trend:

In April 2014, Merck and Co. announced that its two HCV drug candidates had a 98 percent cure rate in a mid-stage trial. In addition, AbbVie is also expected to launch a high-end hepatitis C drug within the next year. The prices for these drugs are yet to be announced.

However, a new report of October 2014 states that USFDA has approved this month a new drug named Harmony, a ledipasvir/sofosbuvir combo formulation, again from Gilead for curative treatment of chronic HCV genotype 1 infection in adults. Harmony, which is called the son of Sovaldi, would cost a hopping US$ 94,500 for a 12-week regimen, as against US$ 84,000 for Sovaldi.

Hence, I reckon, similar aggressive pricing strategy for new drugs would gain momentum in the coming years and at the same time.

Is this pricing model sustainable?

Though Gilead pricing model for patented drugs works out better than what is prevailing today in India, the question that comes up yet again, whether the new model is sustainable for various reasons as mentioned above or would it be followed by majority of the global drug innovators?

In a situation like this, what then could be a sustainable solution in India?

The desirable pathway:

A transparent government mechanism for patented drugs pricing, as followed by many countries in the world, would be quite meaningful in India. The Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) of the Government of India could play a constructive role in this area, as already provided in the Drug Policy 2012 of the country.

This measure assumes greater urgency, as the astronomical prices of patented drugs, especially for life-threatening illnesses, such as cancer, have become a subject of great concern in India too, just as it has become a critical issue across the world.

DoP is in inactive mode:

It is not difficult to fathom that CL for all patented life-saving drugs would not be a sustainable measure for all time to come. Thus, the need for a robust mechanism of price negotiation for patented drugs was highlighted in the Drug Policy 2012.

The DoP first took up the issue for consideration in 2007 by forming a committee. After about six years from that date, the committee produced a contentious report, which had hardly any takers.

Today, despite the new government’s initiative to inject requisite energy within the bureaucracy, administrative lethargy and lack of sense of urgency still lingers with the DoP, impeding progress in this important subject any further.

Intense lobbying on this issue by vested interests from across the world has further pushed the envelope in the back burner. Recent report indicates, the envelope has since been retrieved for a fresh look with fresh eyes, as a new minister is now on the saddle of the department.

According to reports, a new inter-ministerial committee was also formed by the DoP under the chairmanship of one of its Joint Secretaries, to suggest a mechanism to fix prices of patented drugs in the country.
The other members of the committee are Joint Secretary, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP); Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; and Member Secretary, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA).

Unfortunately, nothing tangible has been made known to the stakeholders on this matter, just yet. I sincerely hope that the new government expedites the process now.

Three critical factors to consider:

While arriving at the patented products price in India, three critical factors should be made note of, as follows:

  • The discussion should start with the prices adjusted on the Purchasing Power Parity factor for India.
  • Any price must have a direct relationship with the per capita income of the population of the country.
  • Details of other public healthcare measures that the government would undertake, by increasing its healthcare spends as a percentage of GDP, should also be clearly articulated.

Conclusion:

The evolving and aggressive new product-pricing trend has three following clearly identifiable facets:

One, the base price of the drugs would be established at a very high level to help increase both the turnover and profit of the companies significantly and quickly. This measure would consequently make the drug bills of the developed world even more expensive, which could limit healthcare access wherever co-payment exists or the expenditures are Out of Pocket (OoP) in nature.

Two, against intense global criticism for aggressive drug pricing strategy, to create a favorable optic, the concerned companies would launch these products at a deep discount on the base price in the developing world. However, the net price would still remain high in absolute terms, considering per capita income in those countries.

Three, for many of these new products, Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents 2005 would place India at an advantage. Thus, in absence of evergreening type of product patents, to salvage the situation, many of these companies would prefer to offer Voluntary License (VL) to Indian generic manufacturers under specific terms and conditions. However, such VL may not have any potential value, if IPO refuses to grant patents to those products, which would fall under the above section. In that case, generic competition would further bring down the prices.

No doubt, the above pricing model for patented drugs works out better than what is prevailing today in India. However, the question that comes up, whether the new model is sustainable or would be followed by majority of the global drug innovators in the same way? Considering all these, it does not seem to be the most desirable situation. Moreover, the current patent regime is a deterrent mostly to evergreening of patents.

Thus, the Indian government should play a more specific and proactive role in this game by first putting in place and then effectively implementing a country specific mechanism to tame the spiraling patented drug prices in India, for the interest of patients.

The world has taken serious note of this fast evolving aggressive new drug-pricing trend, as different countries are in the process of addressing the issue in various country-specific ways. Unfortunately, the DoP still remains in a deep slumber, having failed once to half-heartedly put a clumsy mechanism in place to address the issue.

As India is now under a new political regime, let us sincerely hope, the new minister in charge succeeds to make it happen, sooner, reducing vulnerability of a vast majority of patients during many life threatening ailments and…of course, in tandem, ensuring justifiable profit margin for the innovator drug companies…the evolving aggressive new drug pricing trend notwithstanding.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Gilead: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place In India

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I had mentioned in my blog post of August 4, 2014, titled “Hepatitis C: A Silent, Deadly Disease: Treatment beyond reach of Most Indians” that in line with Gilead’s past approach to its HIV medicines, the company would offer to license production of sofosbuvir (brand name Sovaldi) to a number of rival low-cost Indian generic drug companies. They will be offered manufacturing knowhow, allowed to source and competitively price the product at whatever level they choose.

Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) is a once-a-day patented drug of Gilead for cure of chronic hepatitis C infection in most patients. Sovaldi has been priced at Rs 60,000 (US$ 1,000) per tablet in the developed markets with a three-month course costing Rs1.8 Crore (US$ 84,000), when it reportedly costs around U$130 to manufacture a tablet. This treatment cost is being considered very high even for many Americans and Europeans.

Gilead has also announced that it has set a minimum threshold price for Sovaldi of US$ 300 (Rs.18,000) a bottle, enough for a month. With three months typically required for a full course and taking into account the currently approved combination with interferon, the total cost of Sovaldi per patient would be about US$ 900 (Rs.54,000) for a complete treatment against its usual price of US$ 84,000 (Rs1.8 Crore). The company would offer this price to at least 80 countries.

Breaking-news in India:

On September 15, 2014, International media reported that Cipla, Ranbaxy, Strides Arcolab, Mylan, Cadila Healthcare, Hetero labs and Sequent Scientific are likely to sign in-licensing agreements with Gilead to sell low cost versions of Sovaldi in India.

It was also reported that these Indian generic manufacturers would be free to decide their own prices for sofosbuvir, ‘without any mandated floor price’.

Indian companies would require paying 7 per cent of their revenues as royalty to Gilead, which, in turn would ensure full technology transfer to them to produce both the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) and finished formulations. The generic version of Sovaldi is likely to be available in India in the second or third quarter of 2015, at the earliest.

Another reason of Gilead’s selecting the Indian generic manufacturers could possibly be, that of much of the global supply of generic finished formulations is manufactured in India, especially for the developing countries of the world.

Patent status, broad strategy and the possibility:

It is worth noting here that the Indian Patent Office (IPO) has not recognized Sovaldi’s (sofosbuvir) patent for the domestic market, just yet. This patent application has been opposed on the ground that it is an “old science, known compound.”

It is interesting that the Indian Pharmaceutical Association (IPA) and others, such as, Delhi Network of Positive People and Natco have reportedly opposed Sovaldi’s (sofosbuvir) patent application. If the patent for this drug does not come through, low priced generic versions of Sovaldi, without any licensing agreement with Gilead, would possibly capture the Indian market.

Conversely, due to unaffordable price of Sovaldi for most of the Hepatitis C patients, even if a patent is granted for this drug in India, the sword of Compulsory License (CL) on the ground of ‘reasonably affordable price’ looms large on this product.

To negate the possibility of any CL, in the best-case scenario of a patent grant, Gilead seems to have decided to enter into licensing agreement with seven other Indian generic manufacturers to create a sense of adequate competition in the market, as many believe.

However, if the IPO considers sofosbuvir not patentable in India, it would indeed be a double whammy for Gilead. Without any patent protection, all these in licensing agreements may also fall flat on the face, paving the way of greater access of much lesser priced generic sofosbuvir to patients, as indicated above.

The action replay:

If we flash back to the year 2006, we shall see that Gilead had followed exactly the same strategy for another of its patented product tenofovir, used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS.

1. Voluntary license:

At that time also Gilead announced that it is offering non-exclusive, voluntary licenses to generic manufacturers in India for the local Indian market, along with provision for those manufacturers to export tenofovir formulations to 97 other developing countries, as identified by Gilead.

Gilead did sign a voluntary licensing agreement with Ranbaxy for tenofovir in 2006.

The arrangement was somewhat like this. Gilead would charge a royalty of 5 percent on the access price of US$ 200 a year for the drug. Any company that signs a manufacturing agreement with Gilead to manufacture API of tenofovir would be able to sell them only to those generic manufacturers that have voluntary license agreements with Gilead.

Interestingly, by that time Cipla had started selling one of the two versions of tenofovir, not licensed by Gilead. Cipla’s generic version was named Tenvir, available at a price of US$ 700 per person per year in India, against Gilead’s tenofovir (Viread) price of US$ 5,718 per patient per year in the developed Markets. Gilead’s target price for tenofovir in India was US$ 200 per month, as stated above.

2. Patent challenge:

Like sofosbuvir (Sovaldi), Gilead had filed a patent application for tenofovir (Viread) in India at that time. However, the ‘Indian Network for People Living with HIV/AIDs’ challenged this patent application on similar grounds.

3. Patent grant refused:

In September 2009, IPO refused the grant of patent for tenofovir to Gilead, citing specific reasons  for its non-conformance to the Indian Patents Act 2005. As a result, the voluntary license agreements that Gilead had already signed with the Indian generic manufacturers were in jeopardy.

Current status:

In 2014, while planning the launch strategy of sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) for India, Gilead seems to have mimicked the ‘Action Replay’ of 2006 involving tenofovir, at least, in the first two stages, as detailed above. Only the patent status of sofosbuvir from the IPO is now awaited. If IPO refuses patent grant for sofosbuvir, Gilead’s fate in India with sofosbuvir could exactly be the same as tenofovir, almost frame by frame.

Gilead and the two top players in India:

Very briefly, I would deliberate below the strategic stance taken by two top generic players in india, from 2006 to 2014, in entering into voluntary licensing agreements with Gilead  for two of its big products, as I understand.

Ranbaxy:

In my view, the stand of Ranbaxy in Gilead’s India strategy of voluntary licensing in the last eight years has remained unchanged. It involves both sofosbuvir and tenofovir.Thus, there has been a clear consistency in approach on the part of Ranbaxy on this issue.

Cipla:

Conversely, an apparent shift in Cipla’s strategic position during this period has become a bone of contention to many. For tenofovir, Cipla did not sign any voluntary license agreement with Gilead. On the contrary, it came out with its own version of this product, that too much before IPO refused to grant patent for this drug.

However, unlike 2006, Cipla decided to sign a voluntary license agreement with Gilead for sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) in 2014, though no patent has yet been granted for this product in India.

Has Cipla changed its position on drug patent?

I find in various reports that this contentious issue keeps coming up every now and then today. Some die-hards have expressed disappointments. Others articulated that the new dispensation in Cipla management, has decided to take a different stance in such matter altogether.

In my view, no tectonic shift has taken place in Cipla’s position on the drug patent issue, just yet.

The owner of Cipla, the legendary Dr.Yusuf Hamied has always been saying: ‘I Am Not Against Patents … I Am Against Monopolies’

He has also reportedly been quoted saying: “About 70 per cent of the patented drugs sold worldwide are not invented by the owning companies”.

He had urged the government, instead of having to fight for CL for expensive lifesaving medicines by the generic drug makers, where voluntary licenses are not forthcoming, the government needs to pass a law giving the generic players “automatic license of rights” for such drugs, making these medicines affordable and thereby improving access to patients. In return, the local generic manufacturers would pay 4 percent royalty on net sales to patent holders. He was also very candid in articulating, if Big Pharma would come into the developing markets, like India, with reasonable prices, Cipla would not come out against it.

According to Dr. Hamied, “When you are in healthcare, you are saving lives. You have to have a humanitarian approach. You have to take into account what it costs to make and what people can pay.”

Considering all these, I reckon, the core value of Cipla and its stand on patents have not changed much, if at all, for the following reasons:

  • The voluntary license agreement of Cipla with Gilead for sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) along with six other generic manufacturers of India, unlike tenofovir, still vindicates its strong opposition to drug monopoly, respecting product patents.
  • Cipla along with manufacturing of sofosbuvir, maintains its right to market the product at a price that it considers affordable for the patients in India.

Conclusion:

Indian Patents Act 2005 has the requisite teeth to tame the most aggressive and ruthless players in drug pricing even for the most feared diseases of the world, such as, HIV/AIDS, cancer, Hepatitis C and others.

Many global drug companies, resourceful international pharma lobby groups and governments in the developed world are opposing this commendable Act, tooth and nail, generating enormous international political pressure and even chasing it in the highest court of law in India, but in vain. Glivec case is just one example.

Some pharma majors of the world seem to be attempting to overcome this Act, which serves as the legal gatekeeper for the patients’ interest in India. Their strategy includes not just voluntary licenses, but also not so transparent, though well hyped, ‘Patient Access Programs’ and the so called ‘flexible pricing’, mostly when the concerned companies are able to sense that the product patents could fail to pass the scrutiny of the Indian Patents Act 2005.

It has happened once with even Gilead in 2006. The drug was tenofovir. Following the same old strategy of voluntary licenses and relatively lower pricing, especially when its drug patent is pending with IPO post patent challenges, Gilead intends to launch Sovaldi in India now.

Carrying the baggage of its past in India, Gilead seems to have been caught between a rock and the hard place with sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) launch in the country. On the one hand, the risk of uncertain outcome of its patent application and on the other, the risk of CL for exorbitant high price of the drug, if the patent is granted by the IPO. Probably considering all these, the company decided to repeat its 2006 tenofovir strategy of voluntary licenses, yet again in 2014, for Sovaldi in India.

As of today, Sovaldi strategy of Gilead in India appears to be progressing in the same direction as tenofovir, the way I see it. However, the final decision of IPO on the grant of its patent holds the key to future success of similar high-voltage, seemingly benign, marketing warfare of pharma majors of the world.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.