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Pharma Policy Execution Gap Limits Access To Affordable Medicines?

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“The cost of new drugs is putting increasing pressure on people in both rich and poor countries”- was eloquently expressed in an article, titled “Why do new medicines cost so much, and what can we do about it?”. This was published by “The Guardian” on April 09, 2018.

Almost synchronically, expressing concern on this issue, the World Health Organization (W.H.O) advised the world leaders ‘to take bold new approaches’ for increasing access to medicines for all. A UN high-level panel on ‘access to medicines’ spent almost a year deliberating over related issues. The panel members were from pharma companies, as well as civil society and academics. The final report coming in September, backed de-linkage of the costs of R&D from the eventual price of the drug. Notably, the author who is also the health editor of the above publication, feels that any positive outcome in this direction is unlikely to materialize soon.

The majority of big pharma constituents, with the possible exception of GSK, whose then chief executive Sir Andrew Witty was unenthusiastic about the UN report. Probably because, it supported governments’ right to invoke ‘a get-out’ from the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS agreement. This is to bypass drug patents and make cheaper versions of the respective generic equivalents, in the interests of public health, in accordance with the 2001 Doha declaration. However, the author is hopeful that, “as happened with AIDS, each new crisis over access to medicines – whether concerning a common liver disease or a rare cancer, and particularly over the antibiotics that are under threat and vital to all our lives – is likely to put pressure on companies to find ways to bring the costs of medicines down.”

Stakeholder pressure for increasing access to medicines continues. Even in smaller developed countries, such as Switzerland, a section of the public demands that “Swiss authorities must act to make lifesaving drugs more affordable by introducing compulsory licensing.” Or, one can now see reports saying,“Irish patients are being denied access to nine drugs that are widely available across Europe, largely, on cost grounds.”

Nevertheless, regardless of mounting pressure for drawing a reasonable symmetry between cost of, especially new drugs and their improved access to patients, ongoing status-quo continues. In this article, I shall dwell on this concern from the Indian perspective, focusing on an agonizingly stark implementation-gap related to the current Indian pharma pricing policy.

Under pressure, pharma now recognizes the need for affordable drugs:

Coming under intense pressure of patients and other stakeholders, even the largest trade association of Big Pharma has recently changed its stance on this issue, though clearly sharking any responsibility for the same. It just recognized the need for affordable medicines for improved patient access to treatments by saying: “Too often patients have to fight to access breakthrough medicines that are revolutionizing how we fight disease.” It also accepted the fact that “many Americans are struggling to afford their medicines.”

“We can improve patient access and affordability by moving toward a system that prioritizes results for patients. Biopharmaceutical companies are working with insurers to develop innovative and flexible ways to pay for medicines that focus on results, lower out-of-pocket costs and enable patients to access the right treatments the first time” – it added.

What it really means: 

What it really means ‘treatment outcomes-based drug pricing’ or ‘value-based drug pricing (VBP)’. In other words, a situation where drug prices are set in line with their real and demonstrated clinical and economic value to patients, against other available products. This model will also ensure that patients’ money doesn’t get wasted from drugs that aren’t effective on them. The VBP model is, thus, significantly different from product pricing, based on ‘undisclosed’ cost of ongoing innovation for new drugs.

Is this Big Pharma’s new way to change optics?

The intent for imbibing VBP, as expressed by the above pharma association, throws open the door for discussion of its core intent. Is the intention real, or another Big Pharma way of changing general optics on the sensitive issue of new drug pricing? This doubt creeps in from the findings of some important studies on this issue. One such is an interesting paper, titled “Pricing for Survival” from KPMG. The analysis highlighted very limited application of VBP concept, and also why it is not yet viable – despite the hype being created around it.

According to KPMG, “there were 25 drugs engaged in various types of VBP with payers in the fragmented United States market as of September 2017. The problem is, these models appear to be limited in applicability to disease states with more standardized protocols and dominated by drug therapies with single indications – notably osteoporosis, diabetes and hepatitis C.” To date, VBP models seem to be facing several constraints, such as it is appealing mostly to payers that are fully integrated with healthcare delivery i.e., closed-loop payer-provider health systems or integrated delivery networks.

“The takeaway is, when it comes to specialty and orphan drugs, outcomes-based pricing simply faces too many barriers at present” – the article elaborated. Be that as it may, let me now explore the relevance of VBP in India.

Any relevance of VBP in India?

VBP has been tried in a health care environment where payers and drug companies are two critical players for access to affordable medicines, as we see in the KPMG study. Under any value-based pricing agreements for pharmaceuticals, both payers and pharma companies agree to link payment for a medicine to the value achieved, rather than volume.

Whereas, in the Indian healthcare scenario, as we are experiencing today, payers are mostly individuals.  Despite various well-publicized health schemes, expenditure on health, including drugs, remains by and large ‘out of pocket (OoP)’ – for a large Indian population. Hence, copying western framework for implementation VBP in India, would call for scores of ‘pharma – individual payer agreements.’ This would be a daunting task, if not impractical, to even try it out.

In this context, let me touch upon the Ayushman Bharat scheme that was launched by the Prime Minister on September 23, 2018, but just in one of the 29 states of India – Jharkhand. If, or as and when it will cover the entire country, the scheme is expected to bring 107.4 million families and more than 550 million people under health insurance coverage. However, the work seems to be still in progress.

There are three financing models for this scheme – insurance model, trust model and hybrid model – and the 19 states that have come on board for the scheme’s implementation in the country, have chosen a trust model, according to the Union Health Minister. The minister also reiterated: “Things are still unfolding. Only when the letters reach the beneficiaries will they understand and react.”

Nevertheless, the Union Health Minister himself, just like his counterparts in the previous governments, exhibited confidence that the country is “moving towards universal health cover with Ayushman Bharat scheme,” – as was the headline of the above media report.

Going by the past and current outcomes of several such government schemes in the country, and what the minister himself articulated on September 17, 2018, a large section of the Indian population still remains  apprehensive on the fast pan-India rollout and overall success of this ambitious health scheme. Hence, at this stage, I reckon, it may not be relevant to discuss the application of VBP model on Ayushman Bharat project. I wrote about such apprehensions in this Blog on June 18, 2018.

Having said that, VBP still remains relevant when we look at the government’s intent captured in the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy (NPPP) 2012,’ as I shall discuss below.

VBP and the policy implementation gap:

For making the point clearer, let me keep the Ayushman Bharat scheme aside because of its associated uncertainties. Even in the current health care environment of high OoP expenditure on drugs, especially on high priced new drugs, if one tries to make use of the VBP model, it is very much possible.

This is because, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012, under point 4 (XV) on ‘Patented Drugs, categorically states:  “There is a separate Committee constituted by the Government order dated February 01, 2007 for finalizing the pricing of Patented Drugs, and decisions on pricing of patented drugs would be taken based on the recommendations of the Committee.”

Curiously, even 6 years down the line, no meaningful decision has been taken on patented drug pricing in India by the successive governments. As I wrote in this Blog on December 12, 2016, Price Negotiation For Patented Drugs: Still A Policy Paralysis.

Parliamentary Standing Committee intervenes:

Six years after the constitution of the committee by the Department of Pharmaceutical (DoP), the long-awaited report was eventually submitted with a vague formula for pricing patented drugs in India. Intriguingly,the issue remained as such, until the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s August 2016 report was placed before the parliament. It strongly criticized the DoP’s efforts to recommend measures in regulating prices of life-saving patented drugs, despite government assurances for the same.

On September 23, 2016, media reported: “Upbraided by the parliamentary standing committee for its gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude, the department of pharmaceuticals has set about seeking suggestions from different ministries on price regulation of patented drugs.”

According to reports, a new inter-ministerial committee was formed thereafter, under the chairmanship of one of the Joint Secretaries of the DoP to suggest a new mechanism to fix prices of patented drugs in the country.
The other members of the committee are Joint Secretary – Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP); Joint Secretary – Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; and Member Secretary – National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA). But, the saga continues – at the cost of patients’ health interest.

Conclusion:

As it appears, there still lies a clear opportunity for Indian drug pricing policy makers introduce VBP concept for patented drugs in the country. Following this model, the prices of new and innovative drugs under patents can be set in line with their real and demonstrated clinical and economic value to patients, over the available existing products. Health Technology Assessment (HTA), for example, could be an effective tool in this process.

Additionally, the VBP model could also minimize, if not eliminate the risk of patients paying a high a price for new drugs coming through incremental innovation, adding too little clinical and economic value over existing drugs. There may, of course, be some teething trouble or even important issues in arriving at consensus on value-metrics for VBP. But, this can be sorted out through meaningful engagement with concerned parties.

Strikingly, even after 6 years since the NPPP 2012 was announced, nothing tangible has been made known to stakeholders on the execution of ‘patented drug pricing policy’ in India. An avoidable policy execution gap continues, limiting access to affordable new medicines to a vast majority of the Indian population, even today.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Playing Hardball, Riding the Horse of ‘Innovation’

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Media reports are now abuzz with various stories related to intense pressure being created by Big Pharma on the United States Government to declare India as a ‘Priority Foreign Country’ for initiating ‘Trade Sanctions’.

As we know, ‘Priority Foreign Country’ is the worst classification given by the United States to “foreign countries” that deny “adequate and effective” protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) or “fair and equitable market access” to the US.

One of the key factors that infuriated Big Pharma is the ‘patentability’ criterion of the Indian Patents Act 2005 captured in its section 3(d).  This denies grant of patent to those inventions, which are mere “discovery” of a “new form” of a “known substance” and do not result in increased efficacy, offering no significant treatment advantages over already existing drugs.

A brief perspective:

The sole requirement for any company to enjoy market monopoly with a medicine, for a specific period, with its associated commercial advantages, is obtaining a valid patent for that new drug substance from a competent authority of the concerned country. Marketing approval process and other requirements for the same of the drug regulators do not come in the way of the market monopoly status granted to patented products.

This is mainly because the drug regulators do not require to be convinced that a new drug is an improvement or more effective than the existing ones. As a consequence of which, there has been no compulsion for the Big Pharma to bring to the market only those New Molecular Entities (NMEs) that would significantly improve efficacy of a disease treatment benefitting the patients.

Choosing the easier path:

Developing any NME that is a breakthrough in the treatment of a disease is not just difficult and time consuming, it is very risky too. For this reason, once a new innovative drug gets well established in the market, many companies decide to produce their own versions of the same and obtain patent rights for the new ‘tweaked’ molecules, as is generally believed by many.

This approach of bringing ‘me-too’ types of so called ‘innovative’ drugs into the market is considered much less risky, takes lot lesser time in the R&D process, not as expensive and most importantly, enjoys all the commercial benefits that a break through NME would otherwise derive out of its invention, especially the market monopoly with free pricing.

In his well-known book titled ‘Bad Pharma’, Ben Goldacre stated that, as very often these ‘me-too’ drugs do not offer any significant therapeutic benefits, many people regard them as wasteful, an unnecessary use of product development money, potentially exposing trial participants to unnecessary harm for individual companies commercial gain, rather than any medical advancement.

‘Innovation’ of ‘me-too’ molecules:

Examples of some of the ‘me-too’ molecules are as follows:

  • Cemetidine – Ranitidine – Famotidine – Nizatidine – Roxatidine (to treat Acid-peptic disease)
  • Simvastatin – Pravastatin – Lovastatin – Pitavastatin – Atorvastatin – Fluvastatin – Rosuvastatin (to treat blood lipid disorder)
  • Captopril – Enalepril – Lisinopril – Fosinopril – Benzapril – Perindopril – Ramipiril – Quinalapril – Zofenopril (Anti-hypertensives)

Goldacre further highlighted in his book that despite this fact, pharma market does not behave accordingly. Unlike usual expectations that multiple competing drugs in the same disease area would bring the prices down, a Swedish data showed that the drugs considered by the US-FDA as showing no advantages over the existing ones, enter the market at the same or even at higher prices than the original ones. Consequently, the outcome of such innovations adversely impacts the patients and the payor including the government, as Big Pharma takes full advantage of market monopoly and free pricing for such drugs in the garb of innovation.

‘Innovation’ of ‘me-gain’ molecules:

Unlike the above ‘me-too’ drugs, which are new molecules, though work in a similar way to the original ones, another kind of patented drugs have now come-up in a dime a dozen.

Goldacre defined those drugs as ‘me-again’ drugs. These are the same molecule re-launched in the same market at the same price with a different patented ‘enantiomer’. Each of a pair of such molecules is a mirror image of each other e.g. esomeprazole (Nexium) is the left-handed version of the omeprazole molecule (Prilosec), which is a mixture of both left and right handed forms.

There is no dramatic difference between omeprazole and esomeprazole in any respect. Moreover, it is worth noting that concerned constituents of Big Pharma come out with ‘me-again’ drugs only at the end of the patent lives of the original ones. What then could be the reason?

Some examples of ‘me-again’ drugs are as follows:

Enantiomer/Brand Medical Condition Original Drug/Brand
Levocetirizine (Vozet) Allergies Cetirizine (Zyrtec)
Escitalopram (Lexapro) Depression Citalopram (Celexa)
Esomeprazole (Nexium) Acid reflux Omeprazole (Prilosec)
Desloratadine (Clarinex) Allergies Loratadine (Claritan)
Pregabalin (Lyrica) Seizures Gabapentin (Neurotonin)

Why do the doctors prescribe such drugs?

That is indeed a good question, why do the doctors prescribe such costly, avoidable and so called ‘innovative’ drugs? Well, don’t we know that already?

Section (3d) plugs the loophole:

To discourage market entry of high priced and avoidable ‘me-too’ and ‘me-again’ types of drugs that are also an outcome of so called pharma ‘innovations’, the Indian law makers very wisely introduced the section (3d), while amending the Indian Patents Act in 2005. This section, as indicated above, categorically states that inventions that are mere “discovery” of a “new form” of a “known substance” and do not result in increased efficacy of that substance are not patentable. This law has also passed the scrutiny of the Supreme Court of India in the Glivec case of Novartis.

With this Act, India has unambiguously reiterated that it does not support the grant of patents for inventions that are minor modifications of the original ones, effectively blocking the usual path of patents grant as followed by Big Pharma across the world to enjoy monopolistic commercial advantages of ‘frivolous’ innovations, as called by many experts in this area.

Consequent ire of Big Pharma:

This above action of Indian law makers has raised the ire of Big Pharma, as it has a huge commercial interest to protect ‘me-too’ and ‘me-again’ types of innovations in India, even if that comes at the cost of patients’ health interest.

Section (3d) of the Indian Patents Act, therefore, became a major hindrance in meeting the commercial goals of its constituents in India, as such molecules constitute a large majority of the total number of NMEs innovated globally.

As intense power-packed advocacy campaigns of the global pharma companies with the Government of India did not yield any meaningful result to get the section 3(d) amended, it unleashed the might of its well funded lobby groups having free access to the corridors of political power to play hardball with India, riding the horse of innovation and pooh-poohing patients’ interests.

Playing hardball:

The question therefore arises, would India tactfully reciprocate playing hardball or give in to the pressure of trade sanctions under ‘Priority Foreign Country’ categorization of the United States?

I reckon India would not give in. To state more emphatically, India just cannot give in now, under any circumstances.

Come May 16, 2014, the new Union Government of India would almost be ready take its position on the saddle. Thereafter, even if it prefers to give in to intense US political pressure just to avoid trade sanctions, in all practicality that would virtually be a non-starter. This is because, the new Government would unlikely to be in a position to garner enough votes in the Parliament to amend the section (3d), ignoring the general sentiment on this important public health related issue and political compulsions of many of its constituents on the subject.

Would America go to WTO?

Would the United States of America ultimately complain against India in the multilateral forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for alleged violation of the TRIPS Agreement? That is exactly the question that many people are asking today.

In this context it is worth noting, India has reiterated time and again that Indian Patents Act 2005 is in full compliance of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration of 2001.

Since, no country has complained to WTO against India on this issue, as yet, despite so much of posturing and the noise generated the world over, it appears improbable that the US would now do so, though Big Pharma would continue playing hardball raising the same old bogey of protection of ‘innovation’ in a much higher pitch, cleverly camouflaging its hardcore vested commercial interests.

What happens, if WTO decides in favor of India?

In the multilateral forum, if the WTO decides in favor of India, there is much to loose for Big Pharma.

In that scenario, the Indian example would encourage a large number of countries to enact similar model of Patents Act fully complying with the TRIPS agreement, as vetted by the WTO.

Some has termed it as a refreshingly fresh “Alternative Model of Patent Law’, going away from the dominant IP model as is being propagated by the US.

As I had indicated in the past, countries like the Philippines, Brazil and South Africa have either emulated or strongly favoring this alternative model that favors protection of Intellectual Property (IP) and at the same time promotes access to new inventions to a large majority of the global population.

Conclusion:

I reckon, Big Pharma’s playing hardball with India, riding the horse of ‘innovation’, could ultimately boomerang.

The Government of India, irrespective of any political color, lineage or creed, is unlikely to be bullied by Big Pharma constituents any time soon.

More importantly, even in a worse case scenario, the Government would be incapable of getting the section (3d) amended by the Indian Parliament garnering majority of the lawmakers’ support and going against strong political and public voices on this issue.

Nevertheless, Big pharma would continue to wish it to happen… and that drags me to the good old saying:

“If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.”

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.