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The Recent Ban On Irrational FDCs: History Repeats Itself

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The recent regulatory ban on a large number of irrational Fixed Dose Combination (FDC) drugs is not a new incident in India. A similar mega ban was announced even before, about nine years ago. Intriguingly, the saga continues, for various reasons, without any tangible outcome for the patients on the ground.

On March 11, 2016, the latest ban, again on a large number of irrational FDCs, was notified. It caused a flutter and an immediate sharp adrenaline rush to the impacted drug companies and was soon followed by an interim stay order, again by an honorable High Court of the country.

Thus, when I connect the past dots with the latest one, on mega ban of irrational FDCs in India, a similar sequence of events gets unfolded, following each of such ban notifications of the Government.

Looking back, 294 FDCs were banned by the DCGI in 2007. At that time too, the important issue of patients’ health, safety and economical interest, got converted into a legal quagmire. Many adversely affected FDC drug players chose to go to the court of law to protect their business interest, and also successfully managed to obtain a ‘Stay’ order from the Madras High Court.

Consequently, those 294 irrational FDCs, banned by the Union Ministry of Health on health and safety grounds, continued to be promoted, prescribed and sold to patients across India, without any hindrance, whatsoever.

The matter continues to remain sub judice, as we deliberate the issue here. Thus, whether the recent gazette notification on the ban of irrational FDCs would immediately be implemented, unlike the past ban, or the history would repeat itself, is indeed a big question mark, at this juncture.

Would this ban have similar outcome?  

As discussed, close to a decade after the serious legal fall-out of the ban of 294 irrational FDCs in 2007, another mega ban of 344 irrational FDCs has been announced by the Government, through a Gazette Notification dated March 11, 2016. Some well known brands, such as, Corex, Phensedyl, Crocin Cold and Flu, D-Cold Total, Nasivion and Vicks Action 500 Extra, among others, reportedly come under this ban now. Here is the complete list of 344 banned FDCs.

According to the Government, the reason for banning these drugs is that ‘they involve risk to humans and safer alternatives were available.’

Nevertheless, manufacturers of some of these mega brands have again obtained an interim injunction on the ban for their respective products, from the Delhi High Court.

Sometime during the day, i.e. on March 21, 2016, the honorable Delhi High Court is expected to take up this patient-centric issue. It apparently smacks a blatant self-serving interest of the concerned irrational FDC manufacturers, that defeats the core purpose and value of pharma products for their users.

Like most other issues, the Court directive on this issue, as well, would ultimately prevail, without any shade of doubt.

Is it a ‘bolt from the blue’ for the pharma industry? 

Many industry watchers feel that this recent ban has not come as a ‘bolt from the blue’ for the pharma players, at all, as is being claimed by a section of the pharma industry. Even the Union Ministry of Health has, reportedly, clarified the following points on the recent notification:

  • “We have tried to bring objectivity to the issue by roping in the best of scientists to study the effects of these FDCs.”
  • “Show cause notices were also issued to more than 344 companies and they were given time to make further representations after the expert committee gave their recommendations. Some of them did not even care to respond. Everybody was given ample opportunity. After that, the move was initiated. It was done after much examination.”
  • “It is necessary and expedient in the public interest to regulate by way of prohibition of manufacture for sale, sale and distribution for human use, of the said drugs in the country.”

It is worth noting, at least, one of these well known pharma brands was, reportedly, banned in one of our neighboring countries – Sri Lanka, in 2012, for wide-spread drug misuse, long after its marketing approval in the country.

Some key events leading to the recent ban: 

Besides the above articulation by the Union Ministry of Health, it is worth noting, especially, the following key developments to ascertain, whether this ban came suddenly to the irrational FDC manufacturers, and without any prior warning or appropriate communication:

  • The issue of manufacturing licenses being granted by some states for FDCs without prior approval of Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), was first discussed by the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB) in the year 2000, though without any major tangible outcome till 2007. 
  • In 2007, Government banned 294 FDCs, and the consequent court proceedings had ‘Stayed’ this ban.
  • Expressing huge concern on pharma malpractices related to irrational FDCs, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare in its 59th report (2012) also had flagged this issue. The lawmakers observed in the report that manufacturing licenses for large numbers FDCs were being issued by the State Drug Authorities, without prior approval of the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), in violation of rules. The committee also noted that multiple FDCs, which are available in India had been rejected by the drug regulators in Europe, North America, and Australia, while for many others never had marketing approval applications submitted outside India (Section 7 of [6]).
  • Subsequently, in June 2013, CDSCO  announced the “Policy Guidelines for Approval of Fixed Dose Combinations (FDCs) In India.”
  • According to CDSCO, just 1193 FDCs were approved by the DCGI, since 1961 till November, 2014. Thus, all drug manufacturers should clearly know, which FDC has been approved by the DCGI, and when, leaving no scope for any ambiguity in this area. Thus, there should be no problem in total conformance to the above ‘FDC Policy Guidelines’ by these drug producers.
  • In the same year – 2013, a public notice was also, reportedly, issued, calling all those drug players manufacturing FDCs to apply with the requisite fee, in the prescribed form to the DCGI office, providing the required details.  
  • In 2014, a six-member committee, chaired by Prof. (Dr.) Chandrakant Kokate, Vice Chancellor, KLE University, Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College, Belgaum, Karnataka, was formed to expedite the review process of the applications. 
  • The Kokate Committee has, reportedly, reviewed about 6,600 FDCs, so far, and classified them under four categories – irrational, require further deliberations, rational and require additional data generation. 
  • According to a report, 963 FDCs were found under the irrational category, providing reasons in detail for each. 
  • In 2016, the Government finalized its action, based on the Report of Kokate Committee and also the response received (or still not received despite requests) from the concerned FDC manufacturers.
  • The March 11, 2016 Gazette Notification banned 344 ‘irrational’ FDCs, ruffling many feathers, but understandably to protect patients’ health interest.
  • On March 14, 2016, in response to an appeal against this ban through a writ petition, first by Pfizer, the Delhi High Court reportedly granted the company a stay, pending the next court hearing on March 21, 2016. Subsequently, several such stay orders by the honorable Delhi High Court have been issued with the same date of hearing. 
Adverse health and economic impact on patients:

Besides serious health risks, the patients also suffer from a huge adverse economical impact, in rupee value terms, by consuming much avoidable irrational FDC formulations, which are generally more expensive than single ingredient drugs, if taken separately at times of necessity or convenience.

The ban of 344 FDCs is estimated to cover over 2,500 brands, in different therapy categories, including chronic diseases, where medicines are taken for a long period of time. Thus, a large number of patients were consuming these irrational formulations for a long period of time without any inkling of their necessity and more importantly serious adverse health impact that these irrational FDCs could cause.

To quantify how much have the patients collectively spent on these banned medicines, in the rupee value terms, I shall quote from the estimates of one of the well reputed and much quoted pharma retail audit and market research organization of India – AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd.

According to its report of March 13, 2016, Indian Pharmaceutical Industry would lose Rs. 3,838 Crore (MAT), which is 3.1 percent of the turnover of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM), when calculated based on the retail sales of these FDCs in the last 12-month period.

Paraphrasing the same finding, one can logically conclude that Indian patients withstood an adverse economic impact of Rs. 3,838 Crore in a 12-month period, by spending on these unnecessary and irrational FDCs of dubious value, besides health risks. 

To my surprise, some of the MNC pharma players contribute a major chunk to this avoidable expenditure of the patients, besides associating and avoidable health risks.

Quoting similar credible data, it is also possible to give company-wise break-up in this area, which, in my view, may not be meaningful here.

Two Critical issues to address:

Although, a lot of water has since flown down the bridges, a large number of irrational FDCs are still in the market, exposing patients to possible health hazards and economical hardship.

In this blog, I discussed this core issue in two of my articles, one on July 15, 2013 titled, “FDC Saga: Defiant Manufacturers, Sloppy Regulators and Humongous Inaction”, and the other on May 18, 2015 titled, “Booming Sales Of Unapproved Drugs: Do We Need ‘Safe In India’ Campaign For Medicines?”.

I reckon, the following two would still remain the critical issues, which need to be addressed, expeditiously, once and for all, for patients’ sake: 

  • Stringent compliance with the latest CDSCO requirements by all the manufacturers of FDCs in India must be ensured. Any non-conformance should attract strong punitive measures, through a transparent process.
  • Whether such drugs are being widely misused, creating a grave risk for health and other safety hazards, must be ascertained periodically, based on credible data.
An important example:                         

Just the other day, Reuters reported that one of the largest pharma companies operating in India, was selling a FDC of the antibiotics cefixime and azithromycin, without approval of the DCGI.

Interestingly, this particular FDC has reportedly not received marketing approval in the major global pharma markets, such as, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France or Japan.

After the ban of this irrational FDC, the company was compelled to stop manufacturing and sales of this powerful antibiotic cocktail that poses huge health risk to patients.

This Reuters report also states, the drug ‘had been promoted and administered as a treatment for a broad array of illnesses, including colds, fevers, urinary tract infections, drug-resistant typhoid and sexually transmitted diseases.’ It also found chemists who were selling the drug to prevent post-operative infection and for respiratory problems.

Many doctors and health experts have been saying that the spread and misuse of antibiotic combinations may be contributing to antibiotic resistance in India.

FDC approval must be hard evidence-based:

Since all pharmaceutical products, whether available as a single ingredient, or FDC formulations, are globally considered as ‘Evidence-Based Medicines’. Such evidences are established through robust, stringent and well regulated clinical trials for obtaining marketing approval from the drug regulators, unlike most ‘traditional medicines’.

Following this well-established global norm, and as recommended by even the World Health Organization (WHO), all irrational FDCs must be identified through a transparent and medical science-based process, and banned forthwith by the Government.

Establishing safety and efficacy for all FDCs through clinical trials, just like any other single ingredient drug, introduced for the first time in India, whenever it happens or had happened in the past, inadvertently or otherwise, should be a ‘must happen’ regulatory requirement, for all time to come.

Profit making interest through introduction of a plethora of irrational FDCs, should never be allowed to overshadow patients’ health and economical interest.

The bogey of even ‘25 to 30-year-old FDCs’ now being banned: 

Some section of the industry is also raising this point, vociferously, protesting against the bans of their respective old and top-selling FDC brands, which have now been considered by the Government as irrational, and questioning: ‘why now?’

This point is irrelevant, as not taking action ever, against a wrong doing allowed over a long period time, does not make an irrational FDC formulation a rational one, for all time to come.

Moreover, this recent action of the drug regulator can not be considered as unique either. With the advancement of medical science, in the past years too, the DCGI issued banned notifications, covering many old FDCs, considering those ‘irrational combinations’ at a given point of time, such as, analgin + pitofenone, vitamins B1 + B6 + B12, cyproheptadine + lysine, just to name a few.

Conclusion:

As is known to many, pharmacovigilance is still at a very nascent stage in India. Consequently, ‘Adverse Drug Reactions (ADR)’ or ‘Adverse Drug Events’ reporting are still abysmally poor in the country. No information on ‘Adverse Drug Events’, as claimed by the manufacturers of these irrational FDCs, should, therefore, in no way mean that these drugs are safe and efficacious and beyond any reasonable doubt.

Although the laxity of the drug regulator in this area can’t also be condoned, in any way, the enormity of the risks posed by irrational FDCs to the innocent patients, is indeed mind boggling.

If the manufacturing and sale of all irrational FDCs are not legally stopped, even after a long and rigorous scientific and medical scrutiny by the experts, the patients in the country would, unfairly, continue to remain exposed to huge health and economic risks, without any fault of theirs. This is exactly what happened in 2007 also, when, after the stay order of the ban notification for 294 irrational FDCs by the honorable Madras High Court, all those FDCs continued to be promoted, prescribed and sold to patients across India, unhindered… but at whose cost?

Yet again, the gazette notification of the Government on the recent ban on 344 FDCs, has gone for judicial scrutiny, at least, for some money spinning key brands of the large pharma players.

This time, however, there is one significant difference, the Government seems to be far more assertive and committed to ensure that only safe medicines are available in the market, despite reported intense advocacy by the industry. This commitment on the part of the Government is also evident from the media report that the (DGCI) has again sent a new list of additional 1,200 FDCs for a probe to the panel, which recommended the ban of 344 irrational FDCs in the last week, and that too, after the court stay order on the latest ban.

Further, a senior a senior official in the Health Ministry has, reportedly, reiterated that the Government will stand firm on its decision, and will support the ban with robust data, in the Delhi High Court.

Would history repeat itself, this time now? We, at least, would get a sense of it, as the proceeding of the honorable Delhi High Court commences today, on this issue.

Either way, it will possibly send a clear signal, whether the triumph of commercial profit motive with irrational FDCs would continue, unabated, over patients’ health, safety and economic interests, at least in the foreseeable future. 

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Pharma R&D: Chasing A Rainbow To Replicate The Past

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Would future be always a replica of the past?

If the response is yes, the efforts of many global pharma players to replicate the successful Research and Development (R&D) models of long gone by days, would continue to be a grand success. The new drug pipeline would remain rich and sustainable. R&D costs would be increasingly more productive, with the rapid and more frequent churning out of blockbuster drugs, in various therapy areas.

However, an affirmative response to this question, if any, has to be necessarily supported by relevant credible data from independent sources.

Additionally, yet another equally critical query would surface. Why then the prices of newer innovative drugs have started going through the roof, with the rapid escalation of R&D expenses?

Thus, there is a need to ponder whether the continued hard effort by many large innovator companies in this direction is yielding the desired results or not.

In this article, I shall try to dwell on this issue with the most recent data available with us.

A new research report:                

A new research report of the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions titled, “Measuring the return from pharmaceutical innovation 2015: Transforming R&D returns in uncertain times” states that the R&D returns of major life sciences industry groups have fallen to their lowest point in 2015, since 2010. The report tracked and reviewed the estimated returns of 12 leading global life sciences companies.

Some of the data presented in this report would give an idea about the magnitude of current challenges in this space. Nevertheless, there could be a few rare and sporadic green shoots, which can also be cited to claim a revival in this area.

I am quoting below some key pharma R&D trends, for the period starting from 2010 to 2015, as illustrated in the Deloitte report:                      

A. Declining R&D productivity: 

Year R&D return (%)
2010 10.1
2011 7.6
2012 7.3
2013 4.8
2014 5.5
2015 4.2

B. Increasing drug development cost with decreasing estimated sales:

During 2010 to 2015 period, the average peak sales estimate per drug has fallen by 50 percent from US$ 816 million to US$416 million per year, while the development costs per drug, during the same period increased by 33 percent, from US$ 1.188 billion to US$ 1.576 billion.

C.  Smaller Companies showing better R&D productivity:

Between 2013-2015, relatively smaller companies showed better R&D productivity as follows:

  • Big companies: 5 percent
  • Mid to large cap companies: 17 percent

D. External innovation becoming increasingly more important:             

Again, mid to large cap companies opting for more external innovation are showing a higher proportion of late stage pipeline value, as below:

  • Big companies: 54 percent
  • Mid to large cap companies: 79 percent
A fear of failure?

The Deloitte report throws some light on the general stakeholders’ concerns about the exorbitantly high price fixation for innovative new drugs by the concerned companies, together with consequential macroeconomic pressures.

One of the key suggestions made in this report, is to increase the focus on reduction of R&D costs, while accelerating the new drug development timelines. I shall broach upon this point briefly just in a short while.

However, the stark reality today, the hard efforts still being made by many large global drug companies to almost replicate the old paradigm of highly productive pharma R&D, though with some tweaking here or there, are not yielding expected results. The return on R&D investments is sharply going south, as the new drug prices rocketing towards north.

Is it happening due to a paralyzing fear of failure, that moving out of the known and the traditional sphere of the new drug discovery models could impact the stock markets adversely, making the concerned CEOs operational environment too hot to bear?

Be that as it may, without venturing into the uncharted frontiers of the new drug discovery models, would it at all be possible to bring out such drugs at a reasonable affordable price to the patients, ever?

I have deliberated before, in this blog, some of the possible eclectic ways in this area, including in one of my very recent articles on January 4, 2016 titled, “2015: Pharma Industry Achieved Some, Could Achieve Some More”.

New innovative drugs evaluated over priced: 

Here, I would not quote the prices of Sovaldi and its ilk, which are known to many. I intend to give examples of just two other new drugs that have triggered significant interest as potential advances for the care of patients in two common disease areas, namely, asthma and diabetes. These two drugs are GlaxoSmithKline’s Nucala® (Mepolizumab) for Asthma and Novo Nordisk’s Tresiba® (Insulin Degludec) for Diabetes.

According a December 21, 2015 report of the ‘Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER)’ of the United States:

“The annual price of mepolizumab would need to be discounted 63-76% to be better aligned with value to patients and the health system, while insulin degludec would need to be discounted less than 10% to do so.”

Thus, there has been a growing mismatch between the value that new innovative drugs, in general, offers to the patients and the price that the innovator companies fix for such drugs. This trend, if continues, would significantly limit patients’ access to new drugs, as the pharma players keep chasing disproportionately high profitability to increase their shareholder value.

External sourcing of R&D may not make new drugs affordable:

Taking a cue from the highly successful strategy of Gilead, especially what it has done with Sovaldi and Harvoni, if other major global pharma players’ also try to enrich their late stage new drug molecule pipeline from external sources, would that effectively resolve the core issue? 

In my view, this could possibly be one of the ways to contain R&D expenses and with much lesser risk, as suggested in the Deloitte report. However, I doubt, whether the same would effectively help bringing down the prices of newer innovative drugs, in tandem.

This is primarily because of the following contemporary example, that we now have with us.

Although the active compound that is used to manufacture Sovaldi, or for that matter even Harvoni, is not Gilead’s in-house discovery, the prices of these drugs have already gone through the roof. 

It is altogether a different matter that robust patent laws along with the Government vigilance on obnoxious drug pricing is gradually increasing in various countries. Some developed and developing markets of the world, including the Unites States and the United Kingdom, either already have or are now mulling for an effective counter check to irresponsible drug pricing, primarily by putting the ‘innovation’ bogey right at the very front.

In India, prompted by its robust patent law and to avoid any possibility of Compulsory Licensing (CL), Gilead ultimately decided to give Voluntary Licenses (CL) for Sovaldi to several Indian drug companies. These pharma players will manufacture the drug in India and market it in the country at a much lesser price.

A new cooperative effort for cancer drugs:

On January 11 2016, ‘The New York Times’ reported the formation of ‘National Immunotherapy Coalition (NIC)’. This is a cooperative effort by some leading global pharma companies to speed up the testing of new types of cancer drugs that harness the body’s immune system to battle tumors. The NIC will try to rapidly test various combinations of such drugs.

This is important, as many researchers believe that combinations of two or more drugs that engage different parts of the immune system might be effective for more patients than a single drug.

On the face of it, this initiative appears to be a step in the right direction and could make the cancer drugs more affordable to patients. However, only future will tell us whether it happens that way or not.

Conclusion:

Nevertheless, the bottom line is, to make the new innovative drugs available at an affordable price to patients, along with strict vigilance by the government bodies, the old and a traditional ball game of drug discovery has to change.

This would necessarily require fresh eyes, inquiring minds and high IQ brains that can bring forth at least significant eclectic changes, if not a disruptive innovation, in the new drug discovery and development process, across the world.

Otherwise, and especially when the low-hanging fruits of drug discovery have already been plucked, if the major global pharma players continue striving to replicate the grand old path of new drug discovery, the efforts could very likely be, and quite akin to, chasing a rainbow.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Higher The Healthcare Spend, Better The Healthcare Performance: A Myth?

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It is generally believed, higher the per-capita expenditure of healthcare, better is the overall ‘healthcare performance’ of a nation.

However, this myth has recently been busted by a new study, the take-home message of which would be quite relevant for India too. It flags a very important point, just as too low per-capita expenditure on healthcare fails to deliver an optimal healthcare performance to the target population, higher health expenditure, on the other hand, does not have any linear relationship with commensurately better healthcare performance either.

The question, therefore, comes up: What then would be the optimal per-capita spending on healthcare to offer quality healthcare performance in a country like India?

The study:

According to this recent Commonwealth Fund report , per-capita expenditures on healthcare in 2011 of eleven wealthy nations were as follows:

Per-Capita Healthcare Spend in 2011

Rank Country US $
1. United States 8,508
2. Norway 5,669
3. Switzerland 5,643
4. Netherlands 5,099
5. Canada 4,522
6. Germany 4,495
7. France 4,111
8. Sweden 3,925
9. Australia 3,800
10. United Kingdom 3,405
11. New Zealand 3,182

Against the above spend, the ‘Healthcare Performance’ rankings of the same 11 nations were as under, showing no linear relationship between higher per-capita healthcare expenditure and better healthcare performance:

Performance of Healthcare System

Rank Country
1. United Kingdom
2. Switzerland
3. Sweden
4. Australia
5. Germany
6. Netherlands
7. New Zealand
8. Norway
9. France
10. Canada
11. United States

The basis of ranking:

Interestingly, though the healthcare expenditure of the United States of America at 17.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the highest in the world, according to this report, America ranks worst among all these nations, namely, France, Australia, Germany, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

The ranking was made based various factors, which include quality of care, access to doctors and equity throughout the country.

The U.K. ranked best, with Switzerland following a close second, though their respective per-capita expenditures on healthcare were much less than the United States.

Holds good in BRIC perspective too:

Coming to the BRIC nations’ perspective, though India’s per-capita healthcare spend has been the lowest among these 4 countries, the following quick example would clearly establish that here also the healthcare performance does not have any linear relationship with the per-capita healthcare spend:

Per capita Healthcare expenditure in 2011: Country Comparison

Country US $ World Rank Physician/1000 people Hospital/1000 people Life expectancy at birth (years)
Brazil 1120.56   41 1.76 2.3 73.4
Russia 806.7   55 4.31 9.6 69.0
India 59.1 152 0.65 0.9 67.08
China 278.02   99 1.82 3.8 73.5

(Source: WHO data)

Taking the United States as an example:

To illustrate the point further, let me take the US details as an example, as it incurs the highest per-capita expenditure on healthcare. When that is the fact, does high healthcare spending of the US help the patients commensurately? 

Going by these reports, it does not appear so, as:

  • The Commonwealth Fund report also states, “Moreover, US patients were the most likely to find it very difficult to get after-hours care without going to an emergency room – 40 percent said it was very difficult, compared with only 15 percent in the Netherlands and Germany, the lowest rates of any country on this measure.”
  • The 2008 Commonwealth Fund survey, of 7,500 chronically ill patients in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, reportedly also found that: “More than half (54 percent) of the US patients did not get recommended care, fill prescriptions, or see a doctor when sick because of costs, compared to 7 percent – 36 percent in other countries. About a third of the US patients – more than in any other country – experienced medical errors or poorly-coordinated care, while 41 percent spent more than US$ 1,000 in the past year on out-of-pocket medical costs, compared with 4 percent in the UK and 8 percent in the Netherlands.”

The study also highlighted the following for the United States with the highest health expenditure:

  • Lesser number of doctors and hospital beds among developed nations:

The US has fewer physicians per 100,000 populations than any of the other countries apart from Japan, and the fewest doctor consultations (3.9 per capita) than any except Sweden. Relative to the other countries in the study, the US also had few hospital beds, short lengths of stay for acute care and few hospital discharges per 1,000 populations.

  • Highest rates of potentially preventable deaths from asthma and amputations due to diabetes:

While the US performs well on breast and colorectal cancer survival rates, it has among the highest rates of potentially preventable deaths from asthma and amputations due to diabetes, and rates that are no better than average for in-hospital deaths from heart attack and stroke.

  • Individual payers negotiate prices with health care providers:

In the US, individual payers negotiate prices with health care providers, a system that leads to complexity – and varying prices for the same goods and services, says the study.

Where is the high healthcare spending of US going?

High health costs in the United States are mostly due to higher prices driven by free-market economy and not quality of care, says the study. Some of the key characteristics of the US healthcare space in the areas under discussion are as follows:

High and totally decontrolled drug prices:

The drug prices are totally decontrolled in the US, unlike most other developed nations, where price negotiations for reimbursed drugs are the common norms.

The above study highlights that US prices for the 30 most commonly-used branded prescription drugs are more than double the prices paid in Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the UK, and they are a third higher than in Canada and Germany. In contrast, prices of generic drugs are lower in the US than in any of the other 12 nations due to very high competition. This reinforces the point that any delay in the entry of generics after patent expiry would impact the patients and the payor very adversely

Expensive hospital stays:

US hospital stays are far more expensive than in other countries, at more than US$18,000 per discharge compared with about US$13,000 in Canada and under US$10,000 in Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, France and Germany.

Conclusion:

In 1999, according to a WHO Study, per capita healthcare expenditure in India was just US$ 18.2. The figure rose to US$ 28.7 in year 2004 and US $ 59.1 in 2011, which reflects a double digit Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) in per capita healthcare expenditure of the country from the 2004 study to 2011. The absolute numbers may be far from adequate; nevertheless, the trend is ascending. This needs to be accelerated, possibly by the new health minister with the prime minister’s direct help and intervention.

There is a lot to learn from the US healthcare model too, especially from its pitfalls and regulatory structure, as deliberated above.

Finally, taking a cue from all these, India should decide at what per-capita spend, with all necessary regulatory measures being firmly in place, the country would be able to ensure quality ‘access’ to healthcare for all its citizens.

Mere comparison of per-capita healthcare spend of each country, I reckon, may not mean much now. India needs to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in this area, as it were, to arrive at its own health expenditure model for quality healthcare service delivery to all in the country. This is more important than ever before, as higher healthcare spends do not necessarily mean commensurately better healthcare performance.

By: Tapan J. Ray 

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Is Sun Pharma Sailing In The Same Boat As Ranbaxy?

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A ‘Warning Letter’ of May 7, 2014 from the USFDA to Sun Pharmaceuticals – the no.1 pharma major by market capitalization in India has nailed its Karkhadi, Vadodara, Gujarat based plant in India for similar data deletions as found at Ranbaxy.

Such data manipulation reportedly got Ranbaxy into so much trouble that it last year paid U$ 500 million and agreed to plead guilty to 7 felony charges.

The concerned Gujarat based plant of Sun pharma manufacturers the antibiotic cephalosporin.

This development came to the fore just weeks after Sun Pharmaceutical announced a US$ 3.2 billion deal to buy the much troubled, yet the largest generic drug company of India – Ranbaxy.

My earlier apprehensions on this deal:

At that time in my blog post of April 14, 2014, I expressed my apprehensions on this deal on four key areas, with as many words as follows:

1. Sun Pharma too is under USFDA radar:

As we know that along with Ranbaxy, Wockhardt and some others, Sun Pharma also had come under the USFDA radar for non-compliance of the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs).

Under the prevailing circumstances, I apprehended, it would indeed be a major challenge for Sun Pharma to place its own house in order first and simultaneously address the similar issues to get USFDA ‘import bans’ lifted from four manufacturing plants of Ranbaxy in India that export formulations and API to the United States.

This could be quite a task indeed for Sun Pharma.

 2. Pending Supreme Court case on Ranbaxy:

Prompted by a series of ‘Import Bans’ from US-FDA on product quality grounds, the Supreme Court of India on March 15, 2014 reportedly issued notices to both the Central Government and Ranbaxy against a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking not just cancellation of the manufacturing licenses of the company, but also a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on the allegation of supplying adulterated drugs in the country.

Ranbaxy/ Sun pharma would, therefore, require convincing the top court of the country that it manufactures and sells quality medicines for the consumption of patients in India.

 3. CCI scrutiny of the deal:

Out of the Top 10 Therapy Areas, the merged company would hold the highest ranking in 4 segments namely, Cardiac, Neuro/CNS, Pain management and Gynec and no. 2 ranking in two other segments namely, Vitamins and Gastrointestinal.

Noting the above scenario and possibly many others, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), after intense scrutiny, would require taking a call whether this acquisition would adversely affect market competition in any of those areas. If so, CCI would suggest appropriate measures to be completed by the two concerned companies before the deal could take effect.

This would also be a task cut out for the CCI in this area.

 4. SEBI queries:

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), has already sought information from Sun Pharmaceutical on stock price movement and the deal structure.

According to reports, it is due to “Ranbaxy shares showing good movement on three occasions: first in December, then in January and subsequently in March 2014, just before the deal was announced.” This has already attracted SEBI’s attention and has prompted it to go into the details.

The matter is now subjudice.

The current scenario:

Out of my four identified areas of challenges, Sun Pharma has already started feeling the heat in the following two areas:

1. Quality issues with FDA:

The issue is extremely important, as to turn around Ranbaxy, this has to be addressed to the complete satisfaction of the USFDA. Otherwise, the game is a non-starter.

2. SEBI queries on stock price movement and the deal structure:

In this area, just today the Supreme Court reportedly refused to stay the Andhra Pradesh High Court order that stalled the US$ 4 billion Sun Pharma merger with Ranbaxy. Daiichi Sankyo and Ranbaxy had approached the Supreme Court seeking vacation of the stay of the status quo order by the High Court, which on April 25, 2014 directed the BSE and NSE not to approve the merger while admitting a petition by retail investors alleging insider trading in the US$ 4 billion deal.

The vacation bench comprising of Justices B S Chouhan and A K Sikri also directed the High Court to decide on Sun Pharma’s application seeking vacation of the status quo order within two days and posted the matter for further hearing on May 29. The judges observed that the Andhra High Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the merger process.

The outcome of this case would indeed be interesting and crucial for Sun Pharma.

Conclusion:

Even if one keeps aside the three issues out of above four as the legal ones, the very first challenge related to USFDA on drug quality, would continue to remain as the ‘make or break’ area, for this deal to be commercially successful for Sun Pharma.

When USFDA reportedly nailed Sun Pharma’s Karkhadi , Vadodara, Gujarat based plant for similar data deletions as found at Ranbaxy, it may give a feeling that the acquirer Sun Pharma possibly is also sailing in the same boat as the acquiree Ranbaxy.

If this apprehension makes any sense, the moot question that comes up:

“Can one blind man show the right direction to another blind man sailing in the same boat in the midst of a storm?”

Let us wait for the eternal time to tell us the answer.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

‘Herceptin Biosimilars’ Seriously Questioned

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The news struck as an anticlimax, close on the heels of high decibel product launch of ‘Herceptin Biosimilars’ in India, being hyped as the first in the world, bringing much needed relief to many diagnosed breast cancer patients for their economical pricing.

At the same time, this legal challenge has now come as an acid test for the regulator to prove that ‘Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion’ for any new drug approval and especially if it is a complex biosimilar used for the treatment of patients suffering from dreaded diseases, such as, breast cancer.

It’s not patent this time:

Interestingly, this is not a patent infringement case, as Roche has reportedly given-up its patent on Trastuzumab (Herceptin) in India last year.

Alleged violations: 

The above media report highlights, in Delhi High Court Roche has sued Biocon of India and its US based generic partner – Mylan along with the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) related to launch of ‘Herceptin Biosimilar’ versions in India.

The allegation against Biocon and Mylan is that their recently launched drugs are being misrepresented as ‘biosimilar Trastuzumab’ or ‘biosimilar version of Herceptin’ without following the due process in accordance with the ‘Guidelines on Similar Biologics‘, necessary for getting approvals of such drugs in India.

‘Caesar’s wife’ under suspicion too:

The DCGI has also been sued by Roche for giving permission for launch of this product allegedly not in conformance with the above biosimilar guidelines, which were put in place effective August 15, 2012.

Roche reportedly argued that the above guidelines on similar biologics laid down a detailed and structured process for comparison of biosimilar with the original product and all the applications for manufacturing and marketing authorization of biosimilars are necessarily required to follow that prescribed pathway before obtaining marketing approval from the DCGI. Roche has also stated that there is no public record available, in the clinical trial registry India (CTRI) or elsewhere to show that these two players actually conducted phase-I or II clinical trials for the drug.

According to report Roche claims that DCGI has approved the “protocol and design study for testing” of Biocon related to the proposed drug just before the above regulatory guidelines were made effective, predominantly for patients’ health and safety reasons.

Interim restrain of the Delhi High Court:

In response to Roche’s appeal, the Delhi High Court has reportedly restrained Mylan and Biocon from “relying upon” or “referring to Herceptin” or any data relating to it for selling or promoting their respective brands Canmab (Biocon) and Hertaz (Mylan) till the next hearing.

The relevance of ‘Guidelines on Similar Biologics’:

The ‘Guidelines on Similar Biologics’ clearly articulated:

“Since there are several biosimilar drugs under development in India, it is of critical importance to publish a clear regulatory pathway outlining the requirements to ensure comparable safety, efficacy and quality of a similar biologic to an authorized reference biologic.”

Thus for patients’ health and safety interest the above regulatory pathway must be followed, the way these have been prescribed without any scope of cutting corners. This is even more important when so important pharmacovigilance system is almost non-functional in India.

Attempts to dilute the above guidelines from some quarters:

It was earlier reported that strong representations were made to the drug regulator in writing by powerful domestic players in this area urging to dilute the above ‘Guidelines’, otherwise it will be difficult for them to compete with the pharma MNCs.

This argument is ridiculous by any standard and smacks of putting commercial considerations above patients’ health interest.

The key issue:

As I see it, four quick questions that float at the top of my mind are as follows:

  • If the ‘Guidelines on Similar Biologics’ have not been followed either by the applicants or by the DCGI, how would one establish beyond an iota of doubt that these drugs are biosimilar to Trastuzumab, if not ‘Biosimilar to Herceptin’?
  • If these drugs are not proven biosimilar to Trastuzumab, as specified in the ‘Guidelines on Similar Biologics’, how can one use Trastuzumab data for their marketing approvals and the DCGI granting the same?
  • If these drugs were not biosimilars to Trastuzumab, would these be as effective, reliable and safe as Herceptin in the treatment of breast cancer?
  • Further, how are references related to Herceptin being used to promote these drugs both pre and post market launch?

Conclusion:

I guess, predominantly commercial considerations prompted Roche to sue Biocon, Mylan and also the DCGI on ‘Trastuzumab biosimilars’, launched recently in India.

Be that as it may, for the interest of so many diagnosed breast cancer patients in the country, there is crying need for the facts to come out in the open, once and for all. Are these drugs truly Trastuzumab biosimilars with comparable safety, efficacy, quality and reliability of Herceptin?

If the answer comes as yes, there would be a huge sigh of relief from all corners inviting millions of kudos to Biocon and Mylan.

However, if by any chance, the allegations are proved right, I do not have an iota of doubt that the honorable Delhi High Court would ferret out the truth, unmask the perpetrators and give them exemplary punishments for playing with patients’ lives.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

FDC Saga: Defiant Manufacturers, Sloppy Regulators and Humongous Inaction

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“TO SIN BY SILENCE WHEN THEY SHOULD PROTEST MAKES COWARDS OF MEN”       – Abraham Lincoln

The ghost of untested, irrational and even of bizarre kind of Fixed Dose Combination (FDC) drugs, which continue to be launched, promoted, prescribed and sold freely across the length and breadth of India, has started haunting the Ministry of Health of India, yet again, in 2013. 

Though the issue originated decades ago, in 1988 appropriate ‘Rule’ of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of India was amended suitably to have a firm regulatory grip over this situation. Despite this much awaited amendment, the situation almost went astray with incessant market entry of a large number untested FDC medicines of dubious medical rationale.

A free for all situation, as it were, in the FDC arena, continued to be facilitated by blatant laxity on the part of, especially, the state drug regulators by allowing unfettered market entry of such drugs, ignoring the CDSCO directive.

On the other hand, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), despite its statutory powers,  continued to suffer from humongous inaction untill the issue resurfaced again in 2007 and then of course, now in 2013.

The WHO Model:

The 2005 ʹProcedure to update and disseminate the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, Criteria for Selection’ includes the following statement regarding Fixed Dose Combination products (FDCs):

ʺMost essential medicines should be formulated as single compounds. Fixed‐dose combination products are selected only when the combination has a proven advantage over single compounds administered separately in therapeutic effect, safety, and adherence or in delaying the development of drug resistance in malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/ AIDS.ʺ

Thus, FDCs:

  • Need to demonstrate clinical efficacy and safety beyond the individual drugs when given alone.
  • Need to ‘demonstrate bioequivalence of the single combined dose unit with the components administered in the same doses separately but concomitantly’.

‘Adherence’ aspect of WHO Model for FDCs is also important. Problems with ‘adherence’ could lead to inadequate and inconsistent dosing, which in turn could lead to development of drug resistance.

With robust and unquestionable medical rationale, FDCs are expected to provide superior efficacy and improved compliance without causing any untoward risk to patients.

A major disadvantage:

However, one of the major disadvantages with the FDCs is lack of flexibility in adjusting dose of individual ingredients, even if it is required for some patients. Internationally, most popular example is the FDCs of antiretroviral drugs for HIV infected patients like, Combivir, Trzivir, Kaletra etc.

Interestingly, in India there are FDCs for almost all disease areas from allergic disorders to Wolf-Parkinson-White syndrome (exaggerated), as it were.

Market attractiveness for FDCs in India: 

The domestic market for FDCs is very large and growing much faster, in sharp contrast to the western world. The following table will vindicate this point:

% Share

Drug

2008

2009

2010

2011

Plain

55

55

55

54
Combinations

45

45

45

46

Domestic Market: USD 13 Billion; MAT Apr 2013

Source:IMS

Thus, because of growing market demand, pharmaceutical companies in India tend to market FDCs of all different permutations and combination, at times even crossing the line of any ‘sound medical rationale’. For this reason, we find in the website of ‘Central Drugs Standard Control Organization’ (CDSCO), the banned list of so many FDCs.

A messy regulatory situation:

Introduction of new FDCs does not only warrant a ‘sound medical rationale’ but also ‘strict conformance to all prescribed regulatory requirements’ for patients’ interest. 

To check unfettered market introduction of potentially harmful FDCs, the Ministry of Health issued a Notification in September 1988, including FDCs in Rule 122 E of the Drugs & Cosmetics Rules (D&CR) 1945.

In effect, it removed the powers of the State FDAs to give manufacturing or marketing approval of FDCs. After the notification was issued, all manufacturers/marketers of all new FDCs are required to apply only to the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) under Rule 122E of the D&CR 1945 as a new drug, along with the stipulated fees by way of a Treasury Challan.

Since this entire process entails appropriate regulatory data generation, besides  time and expenses involved, the above ‘Rule’ was continuously and deliberately broken and manufacturing and marketing approvals for various types of FDCs falling under ‘new drug’ category were regularly sought and granted by the State Drug Controllers.

Many believe that the State FDAs were equally responsible for knowingly flouting the Law, as were the pharmaceutical manufacturers.

Patients’ safety – the foremost concern:

Despite serious concerns expressed by a Parliamentary Standing Committee, this complicity resulted in the market being flooded with ‘irrational combinations’ which posed a real threat to patients’ interest and safety. The State FDAs were reminded of the notification by the earlier DCGI.

294 FDCs were banned by the DCGI in 2007. Thereafter, the important issue of patients’ interest and safety got converted into a legal quagmire, as many FDC manufacturers chose to go to the court of law to protect their business interest and also managed to obtain a ‘Stay’ order from the Madras High Court. The matter is still subjudice.

Be that as it may, those 294 FDCs banned by the Ministry of Health of India on health and safety grounds continue to be promoted, prescribed and sold to patients across India without any hindrance, whatsoever.  

Untangling the messy knot:

As the issue got entangled into prolonged litigations, the CDSCO took initiative of resolving this contentious issue again in 2009 with the help of an expert committee, involving the manufacturers.

This subcommittee cleared 48 FDCs under ‘similar FDCs already approved’, after discussing the merits and demerits, including pharmacodynamics, pharmacokinetics, side effects, dosage, medical rationale etc. of each ingredient and the combinations. The decision of the Sub Committee was then submitted to the Drug Technical Advisory Board (DTAB).

After formal approval of DTAB, these combinations are construed to be new drugs and any company wishing to market/manufacture the formulation would require submitting its Application in Form 44 to the DCGI to get approval in Form 45.

This decision was expected to send a clear signal to all concerned that resorting to any form of shortcuts to bypass strict adherence to prescribed regulatory requirements, could seriously jeopardize patients’ interest and safety. The same process was subsequently followed for the balance 142 FDCs, as well.

Thereafter, a special committee was again appointed by the CDSCO in 2013 to look into this matter in a holistic way. However, such sporadic knee-jerk reactions have failed to deliver any tangible results in this area – not just yet.

The saga continues:

Even after the above critical decision of the DTAB the saga still continues.

In March 2013, by a written reply, the Minister for Health and Family Welfare reportedly informed the Lok Sabha (the lower House of the Parliament) that in twenty three cases of new FDC, licenses have been granted by the State Licensing Authorities (SLAs) without the mandatory approval of the DCGI and action will be taken in all these cases.

However, no one seems to know, as yet, what action the Government has taken against those errant officials.

Current scenario:

Recently, the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) by a notification to State Drug Controllers has reportedly ordered all manufacturers of new FDC products, licensed locally before October 2012 without CDSCO permission, to submit safety and efficacy data prior to 30 August 2013.

This decision of DGHS has created a furore within the concerned FDC manufacturers, yet again, the possible outcome of which is yet to be ascertained.

The State Drug Controllers had issued manufacturing licenses for these FDCs prior to October 2012. At that time concerned manufacturers were given 18 months time period to prove efficacy and safety of these medicines to the DCGI. Regrettably, as per the above report, the DCGI has confirmed that he has received hardly any response from the FDC manufacturers till date on this regulatory requirement.

CDSCO has also stated that manufacturers, who will fail to submit the required data by the deadline run the risk of having their products banned from the market.

Before this, the State Drug Controllers were informed about this requirement on January 15, 2013.

At this point it is worth mentioning, the DCGI in October 2012 had reportedly also barred the State Drug Controllers from granting manufacturing licenses to pharmaceutical companies under brand names of the drugs, directing them to strictly issue licenses under generic name of the molecule. Additionally, he also asked the state licensing authorities not to grant licenses to combination drugs, which are technically ‘new drugs’ and fall within the domain of DCGI only.

Conclusion:

This logjam with FDCs certainly cannot continue in perpetuity, neither should such regulatory sloppiness be acceptable to any right thinking stakeholder.

All blatant violations of Drugs and Cosmetics Act of India must be stopped forthwith and the violators be brought to justice without delay. Patients’ health interest, as required by the drug regulators, is non-negotiable.

The order of DGHS asking all manufacturers of new FDCs, licensed locally before October 2012 without CDSCO permission, to submit safety and efficacy data prior to 30 August 2013, should not follow recently reported Pioglitazone type of volte face, once again, under similar outside pressure.

It is high time now for the Government to bring the unending saga of  irrational and harmful FDCs, orchestrated by defiant manufacturers, encouraged by sloppy regulators and catalyzed by humongous systemic inaction, to its logical conclusion, for patients’ sake. 

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

 

New Drug Price Control Order of India: Is it Directionally Right Improving Access to Medicines?

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The last Drug Policy of India was announced in 2002, which was subsequently challenged by a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Karnataka High Court on the ground of being inflationary in nature. The Honorable Court by its order dated November 12, 2002 issued a stay on the implementation of the Policy.

This judgment was challenged by the Government in the Supreme Court, which vacated the stay vide its order dated March 10, 2003 and ordered as follows:

“We suspend the operation of the order to the extent it directs that the Policy dated February 15, 2002 shall not be implemented. However we direct that the petitioner shall consider and formulate appropriate criteria for ensuring essential and lifesaving drugs not to fall out of the price control and further directed to review drugs, which are essential and lifesaving in nature till 2nd May, 2003”.

As a result DPCO 1995 continued to remain in operation, pending formulation of a new drug policy as directed by the honorable court.

In the recent years, following a series of protracted judicial and executive activities, the New National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012) came into effect on December 7, 2012. In the new policy the span of price control was changed to all drugs falling under the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011) and the price control methodology was modified from the cost-based to market based one. Accordingly the new Drug Price Control Order (DPCO 2013) was notified on May 15, 2013.

However, the matter is still subjudice, as the new policy would require to pass the judicial scrutiny.

In this article, I shall try to explore whether the new DPCO 2013 is directionally right in improving access to medicines for a vast majority of population in the country .

An overview:

As stated above, the new DPCO 2013 has just been notified after an agonizing wait of about 18 years, bringing all 652 formulations under 27 therapeutic segments of the National List of Essential Medicines under price control.

As prescribed in the Drug Policy 2012, in the new DPCO the cost based pricing mechanism has been replaced with a market-based one, where simple average price of all brands with a market share above 1% in their respective segments will be considered.

Only decrease in price and no immediate increase:

Companies selling medicines above the new Ceiling Prices (CP), as will be notified by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) soon, would have to slash prices to conform to the new CP level. However, those selling these scheduled drugs below the ceiling price will not be allowed to raise prices, resulting in significant price reduction of most essential drugs with price increases in none. Prices of all these formulations will be frozen for a year. Although a silver lining is that manufacturers will be permitted an annual increase in the CPs in line with the Wholesale Price Index (WPI).

The span:

The span of DPCO 2013 will cover approximately 18% of US$ 13.6 billion domestic pharmaceutical market. However, the total coverage will increase to around 30%, for a year, after coupling it with existing price controlled medicines, as these will continue with the current prices for a year.

No change in retail margin:

DPCO 2013 continues with the provision of DPCO 1995, fixing margin for the Retailers at 16% of Ceiling Price, excluding Taxes.

Benefit to consumers:

Indian consumers will undoubtedly be the biggest beneficiaries of the new DPCO, as ceiling prices will now be based on roughly 91% of the pharmaceutical market by value, resulting upto 20% price reduction in 60% of the NLEM medicines. The prices of some drugs will fall by even upto 70%.

Overall impact:

In the short-term, Indian pharma market may shrink by around 2.3 per cent on implementation of the new policy, according to an analysis by market research firm AIOCD AWACS. The impact could be more pronounced for multinationals, given their premium pricing strategy for key brands. For the patients, anti-infective, cardio-vascular, gastro-intestinal, dermatology and painkillers would witness relatively steeper drop in prices.

However, despite initial adverse impact, higher volume growth over the next few years may help the pharmaceutical companies to recover and pick-up the growth momentum.

More transparent and less discretionary:

Moreover, the industry reportedly feels that the shift in the methodology of price control from virtually opaque and highly discretionary cost based system to relatively more transparent market based one, is directionally right and more prudent. They point out, even WHO in its feedback to the Department of Pharmaceuticals welcomed the intent to move away from cost-based pricing as it has been abandoned elsewhere.

The drafting of DPCO 2013 also appears to have reduced the discretionary criteria for the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) to bare minimum.

Check on any essential drug going out of market:

DPCO 2013 has tried to prevent any possibility of an essential drug going out of the market without the knowledge of NPPA by incorporating the following provision in the order:

“Any manufacturer of scheduled formulation, intending to discontinue any scheduled formulation from the market shall issue a public notice and also intimate the Government in Form-IV of schedule-II of this order in this regard at least six month prior to the intended date of discontinuation and the Government may, in public interest, direct the manufacturer of the scheduled formulation to continue with required level of production or import for a period not exceeding one year, from the intended date of such discontinuation within a period of sixty days of receipt of such intimation.” 

Patented Products:

DPCO 2013 does not include pricing of patented products, as the Department of pharmaceuticals (DoP) has already circulated the report of an internal committee, specially constituted to address this issue, for stakeholders’ comments.

Encourages innovation:

The new DPCO encourages innovation and pharmaceutical R&D offering significant pricing freedom. It states all locally developed new drugs, new drug delivery systems and new manufacturing processes will remain exempted from any price control for a five-year period.

Implementation:

Interestingly, the changes in prices will be effective after 45 days (15 days in the earlier DPCO 1995) from the date of  respective CP notifications. This increased number of days is expected to allow the trade to liquidate stocks with existing prices.

However, the industry feels that its hundred percent implementation at the retail level, even within extended 45 days, for previously sold residual stocks lying in remote locations, could pose a practical problem.

The Government reportedly answers to this apprehension by saying, the provisions and wordings for implementation of new CPs in DPCO 2013 are exactly the same as DPCO 1995. Only change is that the time limit for implementation has been extended from 15 days to 45 days in favor of the industry. Hence, those who implemented DPCO 1995, on the contrary, should find effecting DPCO 2013 changes in the CPs much easier.

Opposite views:

  • Reduction in drug prices with market-based pricing methodology is significantly less than the cost based ones. Hence, consumers will be much less benefitted with the new system.
  • A large section in the industry reportedly does not co-operate with the NPPA in providing details, as required by them, to make the cost based system more transparent.
  • Serious apprehensions have been expressed about the quality of outsourced market data, which will form the basis of CP calculations.

Key challenges:

I reckon, there will be some key challenges in the implementation of DPCO 2013. These are as follows:

  • Accuracy of the outsourced market data based on which Ceiling Prices will be calculated by the NPPA.
  • In case of any gross mistakes, the disputes may get dragged into protracted litigation.
  • Outsourced data will provide details only of around 480 out of 652 NLEM formulations. How will the data for remaining products be obtained and with what level of accuracy?
  • The final verdict of the Supreme Court related to the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) on the NPPP 2012, based on which DPCO 2013 has been worked out, is yet to come. Any unfavorable decision of the Honorable Court on the subject may push the NPPP  2012 and DPCO 2013 back to square one.

Conclusion:

Thus, DPCO 2013 should achieve the objectives of the Government in ensuring essential medicines are available to those who need them most by managing prices in the retail market and balancing industry growth on a longer term perspective. Interestingly, it also encourages indigenous innovation and R&D.

Thus, DPCO 2013, at long last, seems to be a well balanced one.

That said, making drug prices affordable to majority of population in the country is one of most important variables to improve access to medicines. This is an universally accepted fact today, though not an end by itself.

It is worth noting, price control of medicines since the last four decades have certainly been able to make the drug prices in India one of the lowest in the world coupled with intense cut-throat market competition. Unfortunately, this solitary measure is not good enough to improve desirable access to modern medicines for the common man due to various other critical reasons, which we hardly discuss and deliberate upon with as much passion and gusto as price control.

Therefore, industry questions, why despite so many DPCOs and rigorous price control over the last four decades, 47% of hospitalization in rural area and 31% of the same in urban areas are still financed by private loans and selling of assets by individuals?

Others reply with equal zest by saying, the situation could have been even worse without price control of medicines.

By: Tapan J. Ray 

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

 

 

Should high prices of new drugs, causing low access to majority of patients, be attributed to high R&D cost?

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Many thought leaders have been arguing since long that pharmaceutical R&D expenses are being over stated and the real cost is much less. An article titled “Demythologizing the high costs of pharmaceutical research”, published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2011 indicates that the total cost from discovery and development stages of a new drug to its market launch was around US$ 802 million in year 2000. This was worked out in 2003 by the ‘Tuft Center for the Study of Drug Development’ in Boston, USA.

However, in 2006 the same figure increased by 64 per cent to US$ 1.32 billion, as reported by a pharmaceutical industry association. Maintaining similar trend, if one assumes that the R&D cost will increase by another 64 per cent by 2012, the cost to bring a new drug to the market through its discovery and development stages will be around US $2.16 billion. This will mean a 2.7 times increase from its year 2000 estimate, the article says.

The authors mentioned that the following factors were not considered while working out the 2006 figure of US$ 1.32 billion:

  • The tax exemptions that the companies avail for investing in R&D.
  • Tax write-offs amount to taxpayers’ contributing almost 40% of the R&D cost.
  • The cost of basic research (should not have been included), as these are mostly done in public funded universities or laboratories.

The article comments that ‘half the R&D costs are inflated estimates of profits that companies could have made if they had invested in the stock market instead of R&D and include exaggerated expenses on clinical trials’.

The authors alleged that “Pharmaceutical companies have a strong vested interest in maximizing figures for R&D as high research and development costs have been the industry’s excuse for charging high prices. It has also helped generating political capital worth billions in tax concessions and price protection in the form of increasing patent terms and extending data exclusivity.”

The study concludes by highlighting that “the real R&D cost for a drug borne by a pharmaceutical company is probably about US$ 60 million.”

Declining Pharmaceutical R&D productivity:

That pharmaceutical R&D productivity is fast declining has been vindicated by ‘2011 Pharmaceutical R&D Factbook’ complied by Thomson Reuters, the key highlights of which are as follows:

  • 21 new molecular entities (NMEs) were launched in the global market in 2010, which is a decrease from 26 NMEs of the previous year.
  • 2010 saw the lowest number of NMEs launched by major Pharma players in the last 10 years
  • The number of drugs entering Phase I and Phase II clinical trials fell 47% and 53% respectively during the year.

Does pharmaceutical R&D always create novel drugs?

According to a recent report, US-FDA approved 667 new drugs from 2000 to 2007. Out of which only 75 (11%) were innovative molecules having much superior therapeutic profile than the existing ones. However, more than 80% of 667 approved molecules were not found to be better than those, which are already available in the market.  Thus, the question very often being raised by many is, why so much money is spent on discovery and development of ‘me-too’ drugs and thereafter for their prescription generation through aggressive marketing, when the patients pay for the entire cost of such drugs including the profit after being prescribed by the doctors?

A global CEO challenged the status quo:

By challenging the status quo, Andrew Witty, the global CEO of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in his speech  in Mumbai on September 27, 2011 to the members of the Indian pharmaceutical industry commented that the cost of over a billion dollar to bring a new molecule to the market through its discovery and development stages is “unacceptable.” He attributed such high R&D expenses to the ‘cost of failure’ by the industry.

Witty said, “High in-house failure rates are slowing progress on pricing affordability… We need to fail less and deliver more”.

He commented during his deliberation that success in reducing the R&D cost to make innovative drugs more affordable to the patients of all income levels, across the globe, will be the way forward in the years ahead.

Ways to reduce the R&D cost:

Some other experts articulated that sharp focus in the following areas may help containing the R&D expenditure to a great extent and the savings thus made, in turn, can fund a larger number of R&D projects:

  • Early stage identification of unviable new molecules and jettisoning them quickly
  • Newer cost efficient R&D models, like one implemented by GSK
  • Significant reduction in drug development time.

An opposite view:

The book  titled “Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks, and Rewards”, published by the government of USA states that the three most important components of R&D investment are:

  • Money
  • Time
  • Risk

Money is just one component of investment together with a long duration of time to reap the benefits of success intertwined with a very high risk of failure. The investors in the pharmaceutical R&D projects not only take into account of how much investment is required for the project against expected financial returns, but also the timing of inflow and outflow of fund with associated risks.  It is thus quite understandable that longer is the wait for the investors to get their return, greater will be their expectations for the same.

The publication also highlights that the cost of bringing a new drug from the ‘mind to market’ depends on quality and sophistication of science and technology involved in a particular R&D process together with associated investment requirements for the same. In addition, regulatory requirements to get marketing approval of a complex molecule for various serious disease types are also getting more and more stringent, increasing their cost of clinical development simultaneously. All these factors when taken together make the cost of R&D very high and unpredictable.

Thus to summarize, high pharmaceutical R&D costs involve:

  • Sophisticated science and technology dependent high up-front financial investments
  • A long and indefinite period of negative cash flow
  • High tangible and intangible costs for acquiring technology with rapid trend of obsolescence
  • High risk of failure at any stage of product development

Conclusion:

While getting engaged in to this debate, one should possibly keep in mind that effective patent exclusivity period in the pharmaceutical industry is much limited as compared to any other industry across the globe. This is mainly because a long period of 8-10 years goes between drug discovery/grant of patent, drug development and market launch of the new molecule, when it starts recovering the cost and making a profit. Thus the period of effective commercial exclusivity that a new drug enjoys through patent protection usually lasts not more than 10 to 12 year period.

For all these reasons and despite such a huge controversy, I wonder, even if the R&D expenditures are brought down to the year 2000 level of US$ 802 million through various productivity improvement measures, whether it will really be possible to develop a commercial R&D model by any pharmaceutical company to deliver low price innovative drugs ensuring high access to majority of the patients. For that one should possibly look at other R&D models like, ‘Patent Pool’ and ‘Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD)’ systems along with various funding options.

Thus in my view, high prices of new drugs, causing low access to majority of patients, should by and large be attributed to high R&D cost. However, there is not even an iota of doubt about commercial unsustainability of such ballooning research and development expenditures even in the medium term.

That said, the arithmetic of pricing for a new marketable molecule could change dramatically, if “the real R&D cost for a drug borne by a pharmaceutical company be just about US$ 60 million”, as argued by the authors of a publication quoted above, though the figure, I reckon, is quite unrealistic.

By: Tapan J Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.