Is The Global Generic Drug Market Slowing Down?

Driven by a strong environmental headwind, both within and outside the country, several pharma companies in India have recently started raising a red flag on their future earning guidance for the stock market, though citing quite different reasons altogether. Quoting the following two recent examples, I shall illustrate this point:

“For decades, the generic drug business has followed a simple model for growth: wait for a chemical medicine to go off patent, then copy it. But 2018 promises to be one of the industry’s last big bumper crops, with $27.8 billion worth of therapies losing protection. The following year’s haul drops by almost two thirds, and the year after it shrinks even further” – reported the May 27, 2017 article in Bloomberg titled, ‘Pharma Heir Seeks a New Holy Grail as Generic Drugs Run Dry,” quoting the promoter of Glenmark.

Another May 27, 2017 article by Reuters also quoted similar business sentiment, though for a much different reason, of the world’s fifth-largest generic drug maker – Sun Pharma, following similar concerns of Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd and Lupin Ltd. Here, the promoter of Sun Pharma said, “We may even have a single digit decline in consolidated revenue for full-year 2018 versus full-year 2017.”

These red flags, though signal different reasons, prompt some fundamental questions: Is the global generic drug market, especially the US, slowing down? If so, what then is the real reason of the anticipated business slow-down of large Indian pharma players? Is it due to lesser number of patented products going off-patent in the future years, or is it due to pricing pressure in various countries, including the US, or a combination of several other factors alongside? In this article, I shall deliberate on this emerging concern.

Global generic drug market – the past trend:

Several favorable environmental factors have been fueling the growth of generic drug prescriptions across the world, and the trend continues going north. Currently, the growth of generic drug prescriptions is outpacing the same for the patented ones. According to the April 2017 research study titled “Generic Drugs Market: Global Industry Trends, Manufacturing Process, Share, Size, Growth, Opportunity and Forecast 2017-2022”, published by IMARC, the global generic drug market was valued at around US$ 228.8 Billion in 2016, growing at a CAGR of around 9 percent during 2010-2016.

This trend has been well captured in numbers, from various different angles, in the September 2016 report of Evaluate Pharma, as follows:

Global trend of prescription generic drug sales (2008-2015) 

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Global Rx Drug Sales (2008-15) (US$ Billion) 650 663 687 729 717 724 749 742
Growth per Year (%) +2.0 +3.5 +6.1 (1.6) +0.9 +3.5 (1.0)
Rx Generics Drug Sales (US $Billion) 53 53 59 65 66 69 74 73
Generics as % of Total Rx Drugs 8.2 8.0 8.6 9.0 9.2 9.5 9.9 9.9
% Market at risk to patent expiry or available for new generic drugs entry 3.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 4.0 5.0 6.0

(Table 1: Adapted from the report ‘World Preview 2016, Outlook to 2022’ of EvaluatePharma, September 2016)

The Table 1 shows, while the overall global sales growth of prescription drugs faltered during 2012-15 period, mainly due to after effects of patent expiry of several blockbuster drugs, the general trend of generic drug sales continued to ascend. As we shall see below, the projected trend in the succeeding years is not much different, either.

Global generic drug market – present, and projected future trend:

The global generic drug market is currently growing at a faster pace than the patented drugs, and this overall trend is likely to remain so in future too, as we shall find below.

Globally, North America, and particularly the US, is the largest market for generic drugs. According to the QuintilesIMS 2016 report, generic drugs saved patients and the US health care system US$227 billion in 2015. Although around 89 percent of the total prescriptions in the US are for generic drugs, these constitute just 27 percent of total spending for medicines. In other words, the share of patented drugs, though, just around 11 percent of total prescriptions, contribute 73 percent of the total prescription drug costs.

Backed by the support of Governments for similar reasons, Europe is, and will continue to register impressive growth in this area. Similarly, in Latin America, Brazil is the largest market for generic drugs, contributing 23 percent and 25 percent of the country’s pharma sector by value and by volume, respectively, in 2015.

Major growth drivers to remain the same:

The following major factors would continue to drive the growth of the global generic drug market:

  • Patent expiration of innovative drugs
  • Increasing aging population
  • Healthcare cost containment pressure, including out of pocket drug expenditure
  • Government initiatives for the use of low cost generic drugs to treat chronic diseases
  • Despite high price competition more leading companies are taking interest in generic drugs especially in emerging markets

India – a major global player for generic drugs:

India and China dominated the generic drug market in the Asia pacific region. India is the largest exporter of the generic drug formulations. A large number of drug manufacturing plants belonging to several Indian players have obtained regulatory approval from the overseas regulators, such as, US-FDA, MHRA-UK, TGA-Australia and MCC-South Africa. Consequently, around 50 percent of the total annual turnover of many large domestic Indian drug manufacturers comes from exports.  The top global players in the generic drug market include Teva Pharmaceuticals, Novartis AG, Mylan, Abbott, Actavis Pharma and India’s own Sun Pharma.

No significant change in the future market trend is envisaged:

When I compare the same factors that fueled the growth of global prescription generic drug market in the past years (2008-2015) with the following year (2016), and the research-based projections from 2017-2022, no significant change in the market trend is visible.

Global trend of prescription generic drug sales (2015 – 2022)

Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Global Rx Drug Sales (2015-22) (US$ Billion) 742 778 822 873 931 996 1060 1121
Growth per Year (%) (-1.0) +4.8 +5.7 +6.2 +6.6 +7.0 +6.5 +5.7
Rx Generics Drug Sales (US $Billion) 73 80 86 92 97 103 109 115
Generics as % of Total Rx Drugs 9.9 10.3 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.3
% Market at risk to patent expiry or available for new generic drugs entry 6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 5.0

(Table 2: Adapted from the report ‘World Preview 2016, Outlook to 2022’ of EvaluatePharma, September 2016)

The Table 2 shows, the overall global sales growth trend of prescription drugs appears a shade better in 2008-15 period, even with the after effects of patent expiry (Table 1), as compared to 2016-22. The scope for entry of new generic drugs goes below 4 percent of the total prescription drug market only in two years – 2020 and 2021. Thus, any serious concern only on this count for a long-term growth impediment of the global generic drug market, post 2018, doesn’t seem to be based on a solid ground, and is a contentious one. Moreover, the sales trend of prescription generic drugs as a percentage of the total value of all prescription drugs, hovers around 10 percent in this statistical projection, which is again a shade better than around 9 percent of the past comparable years.

What triggered the major pricing pressure?

With its over 40 percent of the total pharmaceutical produce, predominantly generic drug formulations, being exported around the world, India has become one of the fastest growing global manufacturing hubs for medicinal products. According to Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Council of India (Pharmexcil), United States (US) is the largest market for the India’s pharma exports, followed by the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa, Russia, Nigeria, Brazil and Germany.

Since long, the largest pharma market in the world – the US, has been the Eldorado of pharma business across the globe, mostly driven by the unfettered freedom of continuously charging a hefty price premium in the country. Thus far, it has been an incredible dream run, all the way, even for many large, medium and small generic drug exporters from India.

However, ongoing activities of many large drug companies, dominated by allegedly blatant self-serving interests, have now given rise to a strong general demand on the Governments in different countries, including the US, to initiate robust remedial measures, soon. The telltale signs of which indicate that this no holds barred pricing freedom may not be available to pharma, even in the US, any longer.

Self-inflicted injury?

The situation where several major Indian generic companies are in today, appears akin to an avoidable self-inflicted injury, basically falling in the following two important areas. Nonetheless, even after the healing process gets over, the scar mark would remain for some more time, till the business becomes as usual. Hopefully, it will happen sooner than expected, provided truly ‘out of box’ corrective measures are taken, and followed up with a military precision.

Huge price hikes:

According to the Reuters report of September 11, 2016, US Department of Justice sent summons to the US arm of Sun Pharma – Taro Pharmaceutical Industries Inc. and its two senior executives seeking information on generic drug prices. In 2010, Sun Pharma acquired a controlling stake in Taro Pharmaceutical Industries.

On September 14, 2016, quoting a September 8, 2016 research done by the brokerage firm IIFL, ‘The Economic Times’ also reported that several large Indian generic drug manufacturers, such as, Sun Pharma, Dr. Reddy’s, Lupin, Aurobindo and Glenmark have hiked the prices of some of their drugs between 150 percent and 800 percent in the US. These apparently avoidable incidents fuel more apprehensions in the prevailing scenario. As I wrote in this Blog on September 12, 2016, the subject of price increases even for generic drugs reverberated during the last Presidential campaign in the US, as well.

Serious compromise with product quality standards:

Apprehensions on dubious quality standards of many drugs manufactured in India have now assumed a gigantic dimension with import bans of many India made generic drugs by foreign drug regulators, such as US-FDA, EMA and MHRA. Today, even smaller countries are questioning the Indian drug quality to protect their patients’ health interest. This critical issue has started gaining momentum since 2013, after Ranbaxy pleaded guilty and paid a hefty fine of US$ 500 million for falsifying clinical data and distributing allegedly ‘adulterated medicines’ in the United States.

Thereafter, it’s a history. The names of who’s who of Indian drug manufacturers started appearing in the US-FDA and other overseas drug regulators’ import ban list, not just for failing to conform to their quality standards, but also for willful non-compliance with major cGMP requirements, besides widely reported incidents of data fudging and falsification of other drug quality related documents.

Global murmurs on generic drug quality among doctors:

There are reported murmurs both among the US and the Indian doctors on the generic drug quality standards, but for different drug types and categories.

According to the Reuters article published on March 18, 2014, titled “Unease grows among US doctors over Indian drug quality”, many US doctors expressed serious concerns about the quality of generic drugs supplied by Indian manufacturers. This followed the ‘import bans’ by the USFDA and a flurry of huge Indian drug recalls there. Such concerns are so serious, as India supplies about 40 percent of generic and over-the-counter drugs used in the United States, making it the second-biggest generic drug supplier after Canada.

While the doctors in the US raise overall quality concerns on the products manufactured by the large Indian branded generic companies, Indian doctors are quite at ease with the branded generics. They generally raise quality concerns only on generic drugs without any brand names.

Thus, a lurking fear keeps lingering, as many feel that Indian drug manufacturing quality related issues may not necessarily be confined only to exports in the developed world, such as, the United States, European Union or Canada. There is no reason to vouch for either, that such gross violations are not taking place with the medicines consumed by patients in India, or in the poorer nations of Africa and other similar markets.

In conclusion:

Sun Pharma has publicly expressed its concern that pricing pressure in the US may adversely impact its business in 2018. There doesn’t seem to be any major surprise on this statement, as many believe it was likely to happen, though for a different reason, since when the global media reported in September 2015: “FDA revokes approval for Sun Pharma’s seizure drug over compliance issues.”

As investors are raising concerns, the following comment by the Co-Chairman and Chief Executive of Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, reported by ‘Financial Express’ on August 24, 2015, well captures the vulnerability of Indian generic drug business in this area: “The U.S. market is so big that there is no equivalent alternative. We just have to get stronger in the U.S., resolve our issues, build a pipeline and be more innovative to drive growth.”

Inadequate remedial measures could unleash this pressure to reach a dangerous threshold, impacting sustainable performance of the concerned companies. On the other hand, adequate remedial action, both strategic and operational, could lead to significant cost escalation, with no space available for its neutralization through price increases, gradually squeezing the margin. It will be a tight rope walk for many in the coming years.

As research reports indicate, the global generic drug market is not and will not be slowing down in the long term, not even in India. There may be some temporary ups and downs in the market due to pricing pressure, and the number of novel products going off-patent in some years. Nevertheless, the traditional business models being followed by some large companies may retard their respective business growth, considerably.

The pricing pressure is a real one. However, from the Indian perspective, I reckon, it’s primarily a self-inflicted injury, just as the other major one – the drug import bans on the ground of serious compromise with product quality standards. Many Indian generic drug players don’t believe so, and probably would never will, publicly.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Is Drug Price Control The Key Growth Barrier For Indian Pharma Industry?

The corollary of the above headline could well be: “Are drug price hikes the key growth driver for the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM)?”

Whenever the first question, as appears in the headline of this article: “Is drug price control a key barrier to growth of the IPM?”, is asked to the pharma players, irrespective of whether they are domestic companies or multinationals (MNCs), the answer in unison would quite expectedly be a full-throated ‘yes’. Various articles published in the media, including some editorials too, also seem to be on the same page, with this specific view. 

Likewise, if the corollary of the above question: “Are drug price hikes the key growth driver for the IPM?”, is put before this same target audience, most of them, if not all, would expectedly reply that ‘in the drug price control regime, this question does not arise at all, as IPM has been primarily a volume driven growth story.’ This answer gives a feel that the the entire or a major part of the IPM is under Government ‘price control’, which in fact is far from reality

Recently, a pharma industry association sponsored ‘Research Study’, conducted by an international market research organization also became quite vocal with similar conclusion on drug price control in India. This study, released on July 2015, categorically highlights ‘price control is neither an effective nor sustainable strategy for improving access to medicines for Indian patients’. The report also underscores: “The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.”

I argued on the fragility of the above report in this Blog on September 7, 2015, in an article titled, “Drug Price Control in India: A Fresh Advocacy With Blunt Edges”.

Nonetheless, in this article, going beyond the above study, I shall try to put across my own perspective on both the questions raised above, primarily based on the last 12 months retail data of well-respected AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd. 

Pharma product categories from ‘Price Control’ perspective:

To put this discussion in right perspective, following AIOCD-AWACS’ monthly pharma retail audit reports, I shall divide the pharma products in India into three broad categories, as follows:

  • Products included under Drug Price Control Order  2013 (DPCO 2013), which are featuring in the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011) 
  • Products not featuring in NLEM 2011, but included in Price Control under Para 19 of DPCO 2013
  • Products outside the ambit of any drug price control and can be priced by the respective drug manufacturers, whatever they deem appropriate

The span of price controlled medicines would currently be around 18 percent of the IPM. Consequently, the drugs falling under free-pricing category would be the balance 82 percent of the total market. Hence, the maximum chunk of the IPM constitutes of those drugs for which there is virtually no price control existing in India.

According to the following table, since, at least the last one-year period, the common key growth driver for all category of drugs, irrespective of whether these are under ‘price control’ or ‘outside price control, is price increase in varying percentages: 

Value vs Volume Growth (October 2014 to September 2015):

Month DPCO Product      Gr% Non-DPCO Products Gr% Non-NLEM Para 19 Gr% IPM
2015 Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume
September 2.8 1.2 10.9 1.1 11.5 9.0 9.9 1.4
August 3.3 (2.7) 14.5 2.4 15.2 13.7 13.0 1.6
July 5.1 (0.6) 14.2 4.1 11.8 9.9 12.9 3.3
June 5.6 (0.1) 16.2 6.2 14.6 11.7 14.8 5.0
May 5.3 (0.3) 12.1 3.4 7.2 4.3 11.0 2.6
April 11.1 5.3 18.4 9.6 11.9 9.6 17.2 8.7
March 17.6 9.5 21.7 13.0 15.6 13.2 20.9 12.2
Feb 13.9 7.6 20.0 10.1 14.4 9.9 18.9 9.6
Jan 6.9 1.8 14.0 3.7 NA NA 12.7 3.3
2014    
December 8.0 0.7 14.8 3.2 NA NA 13.6 2.7
November 3.1 (3.4) 12.6 0.3 NA NA 10.9 (0.4)
October (2.4) (5.7) 6.8 (1.7) NA NA 5.2 (2.6) 

Source: Monthly Retail Audit of AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd 

Does ‘free drug-pricing’ help improving consumption?

I would not reckon so, though the pharma industry association sponsored above study virtually suggests that ‘free pricing’ of drugs would help improve medicine consumption in India, leading to high volume growth.

As stated earlier, the above report of IMS Health highlights, “The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.”

On this finding, very humbly, I would raise a counter question. If only free pricing of drugs could help increasing volume growth through higher consumption, why would then the ‘price-controlled non-NLEM drugs under para 19’, as shown in the above table, have generally recorded higher volume growth than even those drugs, which are outside any ‘price control’? Or in other words, why is the consumption of these types of ‘price controlled’ drugs increasing so significantly, outstripping the same even for drugs with free pricing?

The right answers to these questions lie somewhere else, which I would touch upon now.

Are many NLEM 2011 drugs no longer in supply?

DPCO 2013 came into effect from from May 15, 2013. Much before that, NLEM 2011 was put in place with a promise that all the drugs featuring in that list would come under ‘price control’, as directed earlier by the Supreme Court of India.  Even at that time, it was widely reported by the media that most of the drugs featuring in the NLEM 2011 are either old or may not be in supply when DPCO 2013 would be made effective. The reports also explained its reasons. 

To give an example, a November 6, 2013 media report stated: “While the government is still in the process of fully implementing the new prices fixed for 348 essential medicines, it has realized that most of these are no longer in supply. This is because companies have already started manufacturing many of these drugs with either special delivery mechanism (an improved and fast acting version of the basic formulation) or in combination with other ingredients, circumventing price control.”

Just to give a feel of these changes, the current NLEM 2011 does not cover many Fixed-Dose Combinations (FDC) of drugs. This is important, as close to 60 percent of the total IPM constitutes of FDCs. Currently, FDCs of lots of drugs for tuberculosis, diabetes and hypertension and many other chronic and acute disease conditions, which are not featuring in the NLEM 201, are very frequently being prescribed in the country. Thus, the decision of keeping most of the popular FDCs outside the ambit of NLEM 2011 is rather strange.

Moreover, a 500 mg paracetamol tablet is under price control being in the NLEM 2011, but its 650 mg strength is not. There are many such examples.

These glaring loopholes in the NLEM 2011 pave the way for switching over to non-NLEM formulations of the same molecules, evading DPCO 2013. Many experts articulated, this process began just after the announcement of NLEM 2011 and a lot of ground was covered in this direction before DPCO 2013 was made effective.

Intense sales promotion and marketing of the same molecule/molecules in different Avatars, in a planned manner, have already started making NLEM 2011 much less effective than what was contemplated earlier. 

Some examples:

As I said before, there would be umpteen number of instances of pharmaceutical companies planning to dodge the DPCO 2013 well in advance, commencing immediately after NLEM 2011 was announced. Nevertheless, I would give the following two examples as was reported by media, quoting FDA, Maharashtra:

1. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Consumer Healthcare having launched its new ‘Crocin Advance’ 500 mg with a higher price of Rs 30 for a strip of 15 tablets, planned to gradually withdraw its conventional price controlled Crocin 500 mg brand costing around Rs 14 for a strip of 15 tablets to patients. GSK Consumer Healthcare claimed that Crocin Advance is a new drug and therefore should be outside price control.

According to IMS Health data, ‘Crocin Advance’ achieved the fifth largest brand status among top Paracetamol branded generics, clocking a sales turnover of Rs 10.3 Crore during the last 12 months from its launch ending in February 2014. The issue was reportedly resolved at a later date with assertive intervention of National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA).

2. Some pharmaceutical companies reportedly started selling the anti-lipid drug Atorvastatin in dosage forms of 20 mg and 40 mg, which are outside price control, instead of its price controlled 10 mg dosage form.

Why DPCO 2013 drugs showing low volume growth?

From the above examples, if I put two and two together, the reason for DPCO 2013 drugs showing low volume growth becomes much clearer.

Such alleged manipulations are grossly illegal, as specified in the DPCO 2013 itself. Thus, resorting to illegal acts of making similar drugs available to patients at a much higher price by tweaking formulations, should just not attract specified punitive measures, but may also be construed as acting against health interest of Indian patients…findings of the above ‘research report’, notwithstanding, even if it is accepted on its face value.

In my view, because of such alleged manipulations, and many NLEM 2011 drugs being either old or not in supply, we find in the above table that the volume growth of ‘Price Controlled NLEM drugs’ is much less than ‘Price Controlled non-NLEM Para 19’ drugs. Interestingly, even ‘Out of Price Control’ drugs show lesser volume growth than ‘Price Controlled non-NLEM Para 19 drugs’.

Government decides to revise NLEM 2011:

The wave of general concerns expressed on the relevance of NLEM 2011 reached the law makers of the country too. Questions were also asked in the Parliament on this subject.

Driven by the stark reality and the hard facts, the Union Government decided to revise NLEM 2011. 

For this purpose, a ‘Core Committee of Experts’ under the Chairmanship of Dr. V.M Katoch, Secretary, Department of Health Research & Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), was formed in May 2014.

The minutes of the first and second meetings of the ‘Core Committee of Experts’, held on June 24, 2014 and July 2, 2014, respectively, were also made public. 

On May 5, 2015, the Union Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers Ananth Kumar said in a written reply to the ‘Lok Sabha’ that “The revised NLEM would form the basis of number of medicines which would come under price control.” This revision is taking place in the context of contemporary knowledge of use of therapeutic products, the Minister added.

Would pharma sector grow faster sans ‘price control’?

If ‘drug price control’ is abolished in India, would pharma companies grow at a much faster rate in volume with commensurate increase in consumption, than what they have recorded during ‘limited price control’ regime in the country? This, in my view, is a matter of conjecture and could be a subject of wide speculation. I am saying this primarily due to the fact that India has emerged as one of the fastest growing global pharmaceutical market during uninterrupted ‘drug price control regime’ spanning over the last 45 years.

Nevertheless, going by the retail audit data from the above table, it may not be necessarily so. The data shows that volume growth of ‘out of price control’ drugs is not the highest, by any measure. On the contrary, it is much less than ‘price controlled drugs under para 19 of DPCO 2013′, which are mainly prescribed for non-infectious chronic diseases on a large scale.

I am referring to AIOCD-AWACS data for just the last 12 months, because of space constraint, but have gone through the same for the entire DPCO 2015 period, till September’15. The reason for my zeroing in on DPCO 2015 is for the three simple reasons:

- The span of price control in this regime is the least, even lesser than DPCO 1995, which was 20 percent. 

- It is much more liberal in its methodology of ‘Ceiling Price (CP)’ calculation, over any other previous DPCOs

- It has also a provision, for the first time ever, of automatic price increases every year for price controlled drugs, based on WPI.

A safeguard for patients?

Medicines enjoy the legal status of ‘essential commodities’ in India. Thus, many believe that ‘drug price control’ is a ‘pricing safeguard’ for Indian patients, especially for essential medicines and ‘out of expenses’ for drugs being as high as over 60 percent.

In the prevailing health care environment of India, the situation otherwise could even be possibly nightmarish. The key reason for the same has been attributed to ‘market failure’ by the Government, for most of the pharmaceutical products, where competition does not work. I discussed this issue in my article titled, “Does ‘Free-Market Economy’ Work For Branded Generic Drugs In India?” of April 27, 2015, in this Blog.

In India, ‘drug price control’ has successfully passed the intense scrutiny of the Supreme Court, along with its endorsement and approval. Any attempt of its retraction by any Government, without facing a tough challenge before the Apex Court, seems near impossible.

Conclusion: 

The fundamental reasons for overall low volume growth, or in other words, price-increase driven value growth of the IPM, I reckon, lie somewhere else, which could be a subject matter of a different debate altogether.

As I said in the past, IPM grew at an impressive speed consistently for decades, despite ‘drug price control’, and grumbling of the industry for the same. This high growth came from volume increase, price increase and new product introductions, the volume growth being the highest.

Most of the top 10 Indian pharma players, came into existence and grew so fast during the ‘drug price control’ regime. The  home-grown promoter of the numero-uno of the IPM league table, is now the second richest person of India. These are all generic pharma companies.

Generally speaking, Indian pharma shares even today attract more investors consistently than any other sector for such a long time. Granted that these companies are drug exporters too, but they all gained their critical mass in partly ‘price controlled’ Indian market. The criticality of the need for consistent growth in the domestic market, by the way, still remains absolutely relevant to all the pharma players in India, even today, despite…whatever.

Growth oriented overall Indian pharma scenario remaining quite the same, ‘drug price control’ with a current span of just around 18 percent of the IPM, can’t possibly be a growth barrier. Otherwise, how does one explain the highest volume growth of ‘price controlled non-NLEM drugs’, which is even more than ‘out of price-control drugs’?

Be that as it may, in my view, implementation of public funded ‘Universal Health Care (UHC)’ by the Indian Government, in any form or calling it by any other name, can possibly replace DPCO. Similar measures have been adopted by all the member countries of the ‘Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’ in this area, though following different paths, but nevertheless to attain the same goal.

Lamentably enough, the incumbent Government too has not ‘walked the talk’ on its number of assurances related to this core issue of health care in India.

Still, the hope lingers!

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.